


Ibrahim Muradov

Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies



DNIPRO UNIVERSITY
of TECHNOLOGY
1899

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DNIPRO UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY



IBRAHIM MURADOV

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This textbook provides an introduction to International Peace and Conflict Studies. As the book is designed for undergraduate students, it delivers an outline of international peace and conflict studies. It primarily addresses the concepts of conflict and peace to familiarize students with the relevant terms they are projected to deal with. Subsequently, the book concentrates on the level of analysis issue to widen the horizons of students in understanding international conflict and the peace process. Later, it introduces the mainstream International Relations Theories in relation to the investigation of international conflict and the peace process. The textbook then analyzes some of the possible ways claiming to tackle international conflict and thereby achieve peace in international relations. In the end, the study sheds light on the international conflict in the context of globalization to equip readers with the latest developments in international peace and conflict studies.

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PREFACE

Introduction to International Peace and Conflict Studies is written as a textbook for the bachelor's specialty 291 «International relations, public communications, and regional studies»

Codes	Competencies
C4	To analyze the essence of international conflicts and the peace process in modern international relations; to understand the specifics of international conflicts in the age of globalization.

The main purpose of studying international conflicts and peace is to achieve one of the most challenging goals of the discipline, namely, to prevent war and attain lasting peace. In this light, this work aims:

First - to uncover philosophical reasons behind the origin of international conflicts;

Second - to divulge methods that offer potential ways to overcome international conflict and achieve peace in practice.

In this regard, the major learning outcomes of the textbook will be as follows:

Codes	Competencies
1	Mapping the origin of conflict in the context of the nature-nurture relationship
2	Seeking for conflict in hunter-gatherer groups and its significance for understanding modern human societies
3	Describing negative peace and positive peace to search for a better way in achieving genuine peace
4	Demonstrating the importance of levels of analysis for exploring the causes of war
5	Identifying the capabilities and limits of individuals, the state-level and international systemic level of analysis at the onset of international conflict
6	Yielding some recommendations in connection with the choice of level of analysis prior to initiating research on an international conflict.

7	Understanding the foremost of IR theories in enlightening the complexity of international conflicts
8	Exploring the role of human nature and anarchy in initiating a war between states
9	Evaluation of democratic and undemocratic regimes in connection with the international conflicts
10	Analyzing the relationship between agents and structure of international relations for widening our horizons in thinking of international conflicts
11	Engaging with the approaches that claim to thwart international conflicts
12	Describing the balance of power approach in international relations and uncovering its role in maintaining the status quo
13	Evaluating the tenet of collective security in comparison with the balance of power in terms of its effectiveness for deterring aggressor states
14	Enlightening the ideas of disarmament and arms control and their potential in promoting world peace
15	Analyzing the strengths and drawbacks of the four peaceful means (negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement) in the resolution of international disputes
16	Engaging international conflicts in the context of globalization of world politics
17	Grasping the origin of new war debate in the context of the accelerated globalization process
18	Analyzing the nexus between the new source of international conflicts and peace and globalization

The textbook is intended for the acquisition of the above-mentioned knowledge and skills by candidates for a bachelor's degree in the specialty 291 «International relations, public communications, and regional studies».

The textbook consists of five main chapters, each of which contains a reader's guide, learning outcomes, an introduction, the main text with several subheadings, a case study/studies, a conclusion, and questions for self-control.

The first chapter initially reveals the origin of conflicts by drawing attention to the nurture-nature debate, which is vital for understanding the causes of wars. Then, the chapter sheds light on the peace concept in connection with the state of peace and conflict and their interactions with each other. The second chapter pays attention to the levels of analysis issue which is indispensable to enrich students' viewpoints to understand international conflicts. The following chapter introduces mainstream IR theories and clarifies their comprehension of international conflict and peace which are also of great importance for widening students' horizons. Subsequently, the fourth chapter illustrates the possible methods to deal with international conflicts along with the pros and cons of those methods. In the final chapter, the textbook evaluates international conflicts in the age of globalization which is invaluable for students to realize the ongoing armed conflicts in the international arena.

The reader's guide at the beginning of the chapters introduces the gist of the topics and formulate the training objectives that are tested with the questions for self-control at the end of the chapters.

Each chapter contains at least one case study that enables students to apply the theoretical approaches they are learning in practice.

The conclusions at the end of each chapter reflect its key provisions related to the implementation of educational objectives.

CHAPTER 1

ENGAGING THE CONCEPTS OF CONFLICT AND PEACE

Reader's Guide

Conflict and peace are ostensibly two contradicting concepts central to peace and conflict research. However, the state of peace and conflict are not always the antithesis of each other. Rather than being static conditions, they are highly dynamic and tend to change according to given circumstances. This is an introductory chapter on conflict and peace research that defines the concepts of conflict and peace. To this end, the chapter first addresses conflict in the context of the nature-nurture debate. Subsequently, it outlines peace in a narrow and broad sense. In the end, the chapter reveals the relationship between the state of conflict and peace.

Taxonomy of the theme and learning outcomes:

1. Mapping the origin of conflict in the context of the nature-nurture relationship;
2. Seeking for conflict in hunter-gatherer groups and its significance for understanding modern human societies;
3. Illustrating the impact of environmental conditions on increasing and decreasing the occurrence of aggression;
4. Uncovering the types of peace in peace studies and their importance;
5. Describing negative peace and positive peace to search for a better way in achieving genuine peace;

6. Analyzing compatibility of conflict and peace under their constant interaction.

Introduction

Twentieth-century had witnessed two world wars in the first half and a large number of small-scale, albeit long-lasting, wars under the shadow of the Cold War in the second half and therefore has been recorded as one of the bloodiest centuries in human history. Even though the Cold War had not turned into World War III between Western and Eastern blocs its evaporation yielded a short period of euphoria in the early 1990s. Even the Russian Federation, the successor state of the defeated Soviet Union, consented to adopt Western *values* namely a democratic political system and a free-market economy, which was unthinkable just a few years before the disintegration of the USSR. An optimism prevailed in international relations when the bipolar world order ceased to exist. Many scholars, primarily from the Liberal school, assumed that the world would be much safer than during the Cold War. For them, the spread of democracy, the growing interdependence with the free market economy, and the advancement of modern communication mechanisms would set a perfect stage for international peace. On the other hand, some scholars, belonging mainly to the Realist school, were not as optimistic as the liberalists. They believed that the peaceful atmosphere in international relations that surfaced following the Cold War was impermanent but a harbinger of new conflicts.

In essence, the two schools in question, which can also be classified as optimists and pessimists, were not new to the assessment of international relations. A comparable debate discussion had already taken place after the First World War; initially, it was dominated by the Liberal approach, but later it witnessed the rise

of Realism towards the Second World War. Not surprisingly, human history is quite rich with the representatives of both schools such as Thucydides (c.460-406 BC), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) or Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1747) or Adam Smith (1723-1790) respectively. Liberalism and Realism will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, but suffice to note that both paradigms dominate international relations from time to time depending on time and space factors.

Will the new international order, which has begun to take shape in the wake of the Cold War, diminish conflicts while promoting peace in global politics? Or only certain parts of the world will enjoy welfare while the rest of it sustain indigent life? In other words, will the peace be limited to the “core” regions such as Western Europe, North America, or Japan while the conflicts continue to be natural for the “periphery”? To what extent will this duality yield a peaceful environment in international relations, and if so, how long will it last? Will the inequality between developed and underdeveloped countries disturb welfare societies, or will Third World countries ultimately benefit from accelerating globalization? For some, the debate on durable peace is not only limited to the “core” and the “periphery” but also the “core” itself is quite questionable. Given the disappearance of the Soviet threat uniting the European and North American countries, states within the “core” may find themselves in conflicting positions against each other, and thus peace in these countries can easily become fragile.

Undoubtedly, achieving lasting peace in the internal and external arena is the common desire of human beings, including those who initiate the conflict. It is a fact that domestic and foreign actors often wage wars in the name of achieving justice and peace. Nevertheless, concepts such as justice, order, or peace are slippery rather than static, depending on the interpretation of the warring parties. How do we understand peacetime if conflicting parties can even wage war on the pretext of maintaining peace, order, or justice and if states of peace and

conflict are often relative or tend to change depending on circumstances? Beyond all these predicaments, it is momentous to comprehend, in the first place, if peace is attainable in the international arena. Is it possible to diminish or prevent, if not eradicate, international conflicts? Originally, international relations, as a discipline separate from political science, was established to seek an answer to the same question - how to prevent wars in the international arena? Although the main objective of this study is to describe international conflict and peace studies, it is essential to first investigate the origin of the conflict in order to develop better lenses for evaluating international conflicts. It is also substantial to understand the extent of peace in finding a peaceful solution to international conflicts.

Conflict: Embedded in Human Nature or a Technical Problem to Overcome?

For a long time, scientists have pondered the question of whether human beings can sidestep warfare, or it is an inevitable state of human nature. This is the most basic question that one ought to answer first to grasp the origin of conflict and peace studies. To find a thorough response to the enigma of war, it is essential to take a look at human history. It is equally vital to problematize whether a static human nature exists or not. In comparison to human beings animal species have a more or less steady way of life that has been formulated by their biological evolution and thereby can be called “natural” for them. Animal species in this context have zoology, ethology, and evolution but they do not have history. In contrast to animals, the learning capacity of humans has reached an unprecedented degree by the transfer of accumulated artifacts, techniques, communication skills, and belief systems to their descendants. [1, p. 3] For this reason, the human way of life has evolved very distinctly from the rest of the animal species.

Since the human lifestyle is extremely dynamic and constantly changing, can we still talk about human nature? Humans, in fact, have begun to experience an extremely volatile way of life, mostly in the last 10,000 years. The two million years history of our genus *Homo* illustrates that humans lived approximately alike, hunter-gatherers lifestyle. When not considering the agricultural and animal husbandry period, the hunter-gathering way of life consists 99,5 percent of human history. Therefore, it would be enlightening to know whether hunter-gatherers were fighting, and if not, whether conflicts are a new phenomenon in human history that has arisen along with the adoption of the agricultural lifestyle. To be more precise, all humans today belong to the species of *Homo sapiens*, as the genus *Homo* itself evolved over the long period of its existence. The remains of *Homo sapiens* discovered in Africa show that modern-day humans evolved more than 100,000 years ago. In any case, *Homo sapiens*' espousal of the agricultural way of life accounts for less than 10 percent of its existence. For that reason, it would be fair to assume that the human state of nature, if there is any, has been formulated in the course of the hunter-gathering period.

Since *Homo sapiens* experienced a predominantly hunter-gatherer lifestyle, it would be more appropriate to inquire whether hunter-gatherers fought. Was warfare an integral part of the hunter-gatherer lifestyle, if so, a natural phenomenon for humans? Or did fighting just come in parallel with the transition to farming and animal husbandry lifestyle and thereby unnatural to human beings? To answer these questions, two opposing arguments were put forward by Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1755) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. [1, p.5] According to Hobbes, 'warre' was inherent to the human state of nature. People, for Hobbes, were murderous to their own kind for gain, safety, and reputation. He asserted that the human state of nature was compatible with the condition of every man

against every man, which made “the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. [2, p. 78] This is, according to Hobbes, the basic human state of nature, however, the formation of the state and its coercive power ensures at least internal peace among the people.

On the contrary, Rousseau underlines in his work *A Discourse on the Origin and the Foundation of Inequality Between Humanity* that conflict is not embedded in human nature, instead, it resulted from the adoption of the agricultural lifestyle that led to demographic growth, the establishment of coercive states, and the emergence of private property. To support his argument, Rousseau draws attention to the indigenous humans who lived in nature sparsely but harmoniously by exploiting abundant resources. [1, p. 5]

Throughout the nineteenth century when European powers were dominating most of the other countries by exploiting their resources Hobbesian worldview was preponderant in Europe. However, during the twentieth century, with the disillusionment of “progress”, the Rousseauite image prevailed in the social sciences. Azar Gat points out that mainly three advancements in recent decades threw light on the discussion of why humans kill their own kind: First was connected to the comprehensive empirical research on animal aggression and behaviors; the second was related to the rich empirical studies on the hunter-gatherers’ way of life and fights among them; the last one stemmed from the overall explanations yielded by the evolutionary theory. [1, p. 6]

In the vein of Rousseauite interpretation, the 1960s witnessed a new discussion on the human state of nature. Robert Ardrey was one of the whom initiated the debate in his work named *African Genesis*. At that time, zoologists assumed that the chimpanzees, our closest relatives, were vegetarian, non-territorial, and non-violent. Ardrey asserted that humans turned into “killer apes” due to our ancestors’ espousal of hunting and eating meat. In response to Robert Ardrey, Konrad Lorenz in his book entitled *On Aggression* argued that there is no

connection between aggression and predation. Lorenz revealed that intraspecific fights take place among herbivores, no less than carnivores. However, he pointed out that fighting to the death is a rare incident observed among members of the same species. The act of killing in the relationship between hunter and prey is rational because the hunter's existence depends on the prey. On the contrary, intraspecies fight arises because of access to resources and females. Under such circumstances, it becomes unnecessary to prolong the war as soon as one side gives up. The reason behind this, Lorenz believed, was the tendency of animals to preserve their own kind. [1, 6-7] This viewpoint was dominant in the 1960s and also much of the 1970s.

Nevertheless, the arguments of Konrad Lorenz have been soon disproved by evolutionary theory and zoological observations. The new studies illustrated that deadly conflicts indeed take place within the same species. According to the new inquiries, intraspecific killing is quite prevalent and directed against easy targets that are mostly young members. The investigations also revealed that competition within species is much fiercer because they vie for the same resources and mates. In the case of the human state of nature, the new works based on the observations of extant hunter-gatherers in the American north-west coast and the Australian continent confirmed that violent conflict was widespread in human history even before the adoption of the agricultural way of life. The realization of deadly fights between hunter-gatherers was a groundbreaking advance in conflict studies because it refuted the assumption that killing was an alien act for humans before the Agricultural Revolution. For this reason, it has been divulged that, as with other animal species, fighting to the death was a fairly common action among humans. Hunter-gatherers often fought for scarce resources because they were inherently inclined to inhabit the richest ecological environments, which made conflict inevitable. [1, p. 134]

Understandably, hunter-gatherers were not as large groups as modern societies.

Their groups were composed mostly of close relatives. They fought for the survival of their kinsfolk and tended to prioritize their closest relatives. Individuals within the kin groups were ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the kinsfolk. Individuals living in small hunter-gatherer groups knew each other closely, but this factor faded away with the adoption of the agricultural lifestyle that led to population growth. Thus, population growth in societies, where members of the same groups are alienated from each other, has reached thousands or even millions over time. The factor that binds such large group members to each other was no longer kinship but shared culture. Common cultures created fictitious societies in which individuals could still die for each other or societies, just as in small hunter-gatherer groups, although blood is no longer an imperative element. This solidarity, whose roots are in the form of kinship in hunter-gatherer societies, manifests itself as xenophobia, ethnocentrism, patriotism, and nationalism in modern societies.

The work of Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization*, is quite enlightening and informative in searching for the origin of the conflict. After detailing the reasons for conflict in hunter-gatherer societies, Azar Gat arrives at the following main conclusions. [1, p. 133-145] The violent conflict is not limited to modern societies that have begun to take shape with the adoption of the agricultural lifestyle. Contrary to the assumptions of some scientists in the 1960s, fighting to the death was a common phenomenon among hunter-gatherers. The main causes of the conflict were access to scarce resources and women. Since the rich ecological niches were limited but attractive to hunter-gatherers, later to agriculturalists too, fights for attaining better environments or protecting positions were prevalent. In the state of nature, resources are not infinite, and thereby humans, as in the case of animal species, fight for gaining the same objects. Peter Wallensteen in his work, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, draws attention to the same point in explaining the conflict in the social world.

Wallensteen defines conflict as *a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources*. [3, p. 16] Conflicts within species take even more aggressive forms because they often desire identical substances.

Gat also reveals the connection between access to scarce resources and sex. According to him, possessing resources is tightly linked to reproduction in the state of nature. The human state of nature is not exceptional in this sense. In essence, the state of human nature, especially male, does not tend to be strictly monogamous. Competition over females frequently caused a fight among hunter-gatherers. Also, having rich resources was a by-product of having more women in these circumstances. To be sure, the modern social world is much more complex than hunter-gatherer groups. In the modern world, status, power, fame, and honor are all vital to people and subject to competition.

It should also be kept in mind that access to scarce resources and competition over women may not be the direct cause of conflict. No less than the real violent conflict, it is the perception of fight that shapes the lives of humans in the state of nature. Fear is one of the main driving forces behind the condition of insecurity which sets the stage for mutual deterrence. Mutual deterrence creates a *security dilemma*, the strength of one side poses a threat to the opponent and vice versa. The parties constantly invest their resources to strengthen their security but never feel safe due to the arms race that yields *a security dilemma*. This is the basis of the human state of nature that has been shaped throughout the evolutionary process.

However, evolutionary theory often ignores the cultural dimension of the social world. In other words, even though the evolutionary theory is a key for comprehending the state of nature and human behavior in that state of affairs it is insufficient to expound on the social world shaped by culture. It is equally not correct to ignore the biological component in human culture. It is mostly gene-

culture interactions that explain the modern social world. Adopting a one-dimensional viewpoint is inadequate to understand the complex modern social life. In fact, the espousal of the agricultural lifestyle and subsequent population growth accelerated and diversified cultural advancements in human life. Human society in this new stage has departed from its original or evolution-shaped characteristics. In other words, the innate human desires, needs, and emotional mechanisms, which emerged during the long evolutionary process and manifested themselves mostly in hunter-gatherer societies, have radically altered and become artificial in modern societies.

Returning to the main question (whether the violent conflict is embedded in human nature or it is a ‘cultural invention’), Azar Gat, taking into account the deadly fights between hunter-gatherers, concludes that conflict is an innate phenomenon in living beings, including humans. Nevertheless, violent conflict among humans is also *optional*. It is optional because under certain circumstances frequency of fighting may decrease or increase. [1, p. 40] For instance, young people growing in violent social environments prone to become violent or beaten children tend to become beating parents and etcetera. Such examples reveal that conflicts between people are linked to environmental conditions. Likewise, human behavior during the quarantine regimes due to the COVID-19 pandemic in developed countries is an excellent example of this subject. As is known, more ‘peaceful’ societies emerged in Western countries after the Second World War. However, it has been observed several times that people in these countries began to ‘fight’ over toilet roll during the quarantine days in fighting against the COVID-19 pandemic. Hence, depending on the given conditions fighting may easily be triggered or controlled. It can be triggered easily because it is embedded in human nature but also can be controlled when favorable conditions are created.

In brief, violent conflict is both innate and optional in human life. This bottom-

up logic is also valid in international relations. Conflicts between states will be detailed in the following chapters, but it is sufficient to note at this stage that the frequency of wars in international relations varies in relation to the world orders such as bipolar, multipolar, unipolar, or many other factors, and thereby they can be avoidable/unavoidable depending on the given circumstances. Since this section designed conflict as *innate* in human life but *optional* triggered in a particular environment, now it is time to shed light on the state of peace as a condition that also occurs in certain circumstances.

Case Study 1

Stanford Prison Experiment

Stanford Prison Experiment was a psychological experiment organized in August 1971 by Philip Zimbardo that was initially planned for fourteen days but was shouted down after six days due to disturbing effects on participants in penitentiary simulation. The main idea of the research was to discover the usage of abuse and power in the situation when people suddenly changed their usual attitudes.

Twenty-four students from Stanford University with a sound mind and kind character were randomly assigned to the roles of the twelve prisoners and twelve guards. All conditions were held similarly as in real prison. “Prisoners” wore uniforms with chains on their legs and were called by numbers instead of their names to get fully into an atmosphere of the place with freedom restrictions. As “prisoners” and “guards” were not given proper instructions on their responsibilities in prison simulations, no profound changes in behaviors between the two groups were recorded on the first day. However, the prisoners started a rebellion the next day, and the watchers, given no limitations, began to use psychological, physical abuse and taking advantage of their privileged status, they restricted access to the bathroom and provided insufficient food except those prisoners who did not participate in the rebellion. Hence, the prisoners started to feel isolated, and in some cases, the process led to disorders in their behaviors and hysterias. The most famous example was the prisoner 8612, who started to scream, curse, and behave like a crazy person and therefore was released from the “prison.” In the course of the experiment, both groups started to forget the reality and erase the borders of what was permitted. Even after the parents of the prisoners, the lawyer, and the priest visited the place of the experiment, the hysterical and tense atmosphere was still present and even got worse.

On the sixth day, Zimbardo halted the investigation earlier due to various issues, including concerns from the participants' parents. After the feedback session, the organizers emphasized that all people after participation in the experiment felt embarrassed of their

actions.

Even though the authenticity of the project is questioned nowadays, the experiment showed that people could quickly adapt to the stereotyped roles that society has subscribed to them and change their behavior.

Understanding Peace in the Context of the Nature-Nurture Debate

As we discussed in the previous chapter, the conflict has always been with us throughout human history. Contrary to some arguments made in the 1960s, aggression was not the invention of the Agricultural Revolution but rather it was also a widespread action of hunter-gatherers in attaining scarce resources and females. In this sense, conflict is not something that occurred in human societies about 10,000 years ago. Scientific research on existing hunter-gatherer societies allows us to conclude that violent conflict has always been an important part of human life and is therefore innate to us. Nevertheless, it has also been revealed that the frequency of occurrence of war varies according to the given conditions. Since the prevalence of war varies according to conditions, it can be said that if a certain environment is designed, it is likely to reach non-violence or *peace* in a narrow sense. In this section, the state of peace with regard to the conflict will be addressed.

Prior to defining peace in a broad sense, which is emphasized often in peace studies, it is worth maintaining the debate of whether peace is achievable in a narrow sense. Eliminating war from human life is highly correlated with the debate whether aggression is embedded in human nature or is a behavior we acquire from external conditions. At this stage, two options emerge for those aiming to deal with violent conflict in human societies. First, if aggression is innate to humans then there is only one possible way for reaching peace which is the alteration of human nature. In other terms, recognizing aggression as an

integral part of human nature leaves no option for those who aspire to construct peaceful societies other than genetic engineering that can modify the nature of humans. Humanity is not yet capable of altering human nature, but even if we manage to do so, the consequences are not easy to foretell. Second, the rejection of the claim that aggression is embedded in human nature makes it possible to claim that conflict is something we learn socially and that people can be taught to live in harmony and peace in the same way that they learn aggression.

In his work *What Causes War?* Greg Cashman argues that there are six main proofs for the argument that violent conflict is primarily an acquired behavior.

- 1) In the past, hunter-gatherer societies were largely peaceful up until the Agricultural Revolution, making warfare a relatively new phenomenon.
- 2) Peaceful societies exist today, further demonstrating the absence of innate aggression and dispelling the myth that all people are aggressive.
- 3) Globally, the degree of violence and aggression vary tremendously from culture to culture and from state to state, and this must be due to cultural and environmental factors rather than biological ones.
- 4) Even in states with violent cultures, some individuals are peaceful.
- 5) Studies of primate behavior show the importance of culture and learning on behavior.
- 6) The experimental evidence is fairly clear that aggression is greatly influenced by learning. Aggression can be taught; it can also be modified, reduced, and even eliminated by learning. [4, p. 30-31]

Cashman draws the following conclusions after detailing the nature-cultivation debate. First, aggression is likely not intrinsic to humans and may not be an instinctual reaction to particular external circumstances. Nevertheless, aggression is one of the potential human behaviors and is part of our evolutionary heritage. It is an integral part of human behavior, available under certain requirements. Second, along with aggression, the ability for peacemaking is also part of the human state of nature. Third, aggressiveness can be managed depending on human intelligence, social learning, and environmental conditions. Fourth, most of the causes of war are related to the social environment, and most

of them are socially constructed. It is socially constructed because war breaks out in particular times and geography, not constantly everywhere. To the extent that conflict is an output of evolution, it is essentially the output of cultural, social, and political conditions. Fifth, it is indisputable that fighting has always been a part of human life. It is certainly a myth that hunter-gatherer societies were peaceful and thus violent conflict was invented by agriculturalists. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the number of wars and their destructiveness has been increased tremendously. Therefore, the effect of the environment and culture on the eruption of war is incontrovertible. Finally, it is worth noting that the nurture-nature debate is basically deceptive. None of the above-mentioned arguments are valid universally but rather they are reasonable in relation to the given circumstances. Therefore, it is unwise to attempt to win the argument on the debate whether particular aggression is due to human nature or socially learned. In essence, there is a constant interaction between biological and environmental factors in determining human behaviors, including aggression. [4, p. 47-48] In this respect, Robert M Sapolsky states:

To some extent, the age-old “nature versus nurture” debate is silly. The action of genes is completely intertwined with the environment in which they function; in a sense, it is pointless to even discuss what gene X does, and we should consider instead only what gene X does in environment Y. [5, p. 104-120]

Consequently, it would be fair to claim that peace is an indispensable component of the human state of nature. Peace is so desirable that even conflicts are mostly done to achieve a state of peace. It is quite likely to eliminate war to some extent, as aggression varies depending on time and space factors. Since we have elucidated the impact of biological and environmental factors on the state of conflict and peace, now is the time to define peace in a broad sense to grasp its content in modern societies.

Peace – Absence of War?

As we have shown in previous chapters, although the magnitude and destructiveness of war increased enormously with the Agricultural Revolution, it was not invented by agriculturalists about 10,000 years ago. Instead, it was also part of hunter-gatherer societies. Therefore, fighting is quite ‘natural’ to human beings. Since humanity has not yet been able to modify human nature to achieve eternal peace, we must seek alternatives to live in harmony. In this regard, it has also been clarified that the war does not erupt regularly, but its occurrence varies depending on the circumstances. This means that peace can be achieved if a certain environment is created. However, non-conflict is a narrow definition of peace that can also be called *security*. Even though the concepts of *peace* and *security* connote alike conditions at first glance, they have different purposes. According to the security viewpoint, the opponent is usually a threat and thereby either needs to be deterred, neutralized, or eliminated. On the contrary, peace is more than a state of security. It is not about neutralization or eradication of opponents but finding a common ground to live in harmony.

If peace is more than security, how is peace defined broadly? Most peace researchers divide the state of peace into two categories. First, peace is perceived as the absence of war, which is called *negative peace*. Second, peace is defined as the presence of justice, which is called *positive peace*. [6, p. 6-7] While negative peace (absence of war) seems more appropriate to international relations, positive peace, in which a central authority not only prevents aggression between individuals or groups but also ensures justice, is more compatible with the intra-state order. However, it is undeniable that there is a continuous interaction between internal and external relations, and therefore, positive peace must be built both in the international arena and within the country in order to achieve lasting peace. In this sense, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founding father of the Republic of Turkey, famously stated: “Peace at Home,

Peace in the World”. Therefore, attaining positive peace both domestically and internationally ought to be the main goal of those who seek to achieve a more peaceful world order.

Peace in a broad sense is defined as a state of justice by many scholars. According to Johan Galtung, the absence of positive peace (the broad definition) in a human society stems mostly from “structural violence”. In essence, structural violence may include negative peace but is the source of obstruction in achieving positive peace. Galtung points out that violence is anything that prevents a person from reaching his or her maximum potential. [7, p. 167-191] For David Cortright, positive peace “means transcending the conditions that limit human potential and assuring opportunities for self-realization.” [6, p. 7]

Consequently, it is also worth noting that peace is not mere pacification. If a person desires peace, it does not mean that he or she has given up fighting. Peace advocates are against aggression, violent conflict, or war, but they are indeed not passive types. In other words, passive types tend to only hope for peace or pray for it, but pacifists are active types who refuse to accept injustice. In this respect, Charles Webel asserts:

Peace in its progressive or dialectical mode denotes active individual and collective self-determination and emancipatory empowerment...Genuine pacifism is transformative and activist, employing nonviolent means of social and personal change to resist oppression, war, and injustice and to promote personal and social moral integrity and radical, peaceful means of transforming conflicts and actors. [8]

Peace is a dynamic and active process rather than a static condition. It is dynamic in the sense that under certain conditions, even violence may be required to achieve peace. David Cortright uses the term *pragmatic pacifism* to describe similar circumstances. Cortright formulates pragmatic pacifism as a bridge term between *pacifism* and *just war*. The majority of peace advocates are

pragmatic pacifists rather than absolute pacifists. [6, p. 14] Pragmatic pacifists find it reasonable to resort to violence in self-defense or to remedy injustice. As pointed out, peace is not a static but dynamic and progressive process. War can be promoted or condemned by peace advocates under certain conditions. For example, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, almost all Americans consented to the launch of the US military operation *War on Terror* in Afghanistan. In contrast, the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003 was largely condemned by the national and international community.

To emphasize the elusive or slippery characteristic of peace, Webel draws attention to the peace-conflict relationship. In this respect, Webel specifies that conflict is not an antithesis of peace. Conflict may be desirable if it furthers progress or peace in human societies.

Conflicts may, perhaps paradoxically, promote and increase peace and diminish violence if the conflicting parties negotiate in good faith to reach solutions to problems that are achievable and tolerable, if not ideal. And sometimes the antithesis of peace is not violence, even political violence, since violent means (such as the Second World War and wars of independence/national liberation) have sometimes historically helped to bring about periods of less violence and fragile peace. [8, p. 8-9]

By contrast, Webel underlines, terror and terrorism are indeed the antitheses of peace. Unlike conflict, which may occur in a state of self-defense or freedom movements against oppressive rulers and thereby may promote positive peace, terror and terrorism are not compatible with peace. [8, p. 9-10] Terrorism is a method used by both states and non-state actors to induce fear in humans for influencing the less vulnerable. Being at peace in our inner world means, among others, freedom from anxiety and terror caused or threatened from both below (non-state actors) and above (from states).

Consequently, peace is so intangible that we recognize it by its absence. It is not

merely a state of non-violence. The absence of aggression is related to negative peace, which may include injustice circumstances, such as slavery. On the contrary, positive peace is a dynamic process that deals with injustice, inequality, discrimination, etc. It is not a static situation, but a lively process that constantly seeks to overcome the obstacles that prevent reaching a more free and just society. As Webel claims, there are three dialectical realms of peace. The first is the sphere of *inner* peace. This realm is more connected with the mental and emotional condition of individuals. The second is the realm of *outer* peace. It is related to socio-political, internal, and international peace. The last sphere of peace is *intersubjective*. Intersubjective peace is the domain of the daily interaction of humans. [8, p. 10] These three dialectical spheres of peace are in constant interaction which yields a positive peace.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced and elaborated on the concepts of conflict and peace, respectively. Conflict and peace concepts are so important in international relations studies that even as a discipline separate from political science, International Relations had been established in 1919 with the questions of how to avoid war and to establish a more peaceful international order. However, before understanding how these concepts are apprehended in international relations, it was essential to grasp their origin. Therefore, the chapter first dealt with the causes of conflicts in human societies. In this sense, the state of human nature has been questioned to reveal whether it is war-prone or not, if not so, whether the conflict was an invention of the Agricultural Revolution that took place only about 10,000 years ago. Research on hunter-gatherers has unveiled that conflict is not an invention of agriculturalists but has always been a part of human life. This fact allowed us to conclude that fighting is embedded in human

nature formulated throughout the evolutionary process. Throughout the evolutionary process, human has mainly fought for attaining food and sex. On the contrary, the cultural development of human societies, accelerated by the Agricultural Revolution, has radically altered human desires. Evolutionarily shaped human wants have become more ‘artificial’ with the stimulated cultural developments. Besides, the population growth, diversified human wants, and technological developments increased the magnitude and destructiveness of wars.

Nevertheless, it has been found that the number of violent conflicts varies depending on the given situation. Such deduction allows us to argue that the amount of war can be reduced if favorable conditions are arranged. This argument links us to the state of *peace* and its attainability. It has been detected that there are basically two types of peace. The first one is related to the absence of war which is also called *negative peace*. Negative peace describes the environment where there is no fighting. However, when negative peace prevails in a society, that does not necessarily mean justice is ensured. The second type of peace, which is also called *positive peace*, introduces the whole picture by providing a broad definition of peace. Positive peace deals with inequality, discrimination, racism, and all other injustices in human society. Moreover, positive peace is not about pacifying people in the name of nonviolence. Instead, it is an active and dynamic process that justifies the use of violence under certain conditions.

Consequently, conflict is not the antithesis of peace. Peace is more than a non-violent state which is merely a negative peace. Conflict and peace are dynamic processes that are in constant interaction with each other. For instance, the origin of many conflicts can be found in a state of negative peace. Conversely, many conflicts can erupt to restore order or justice and thus can lead to achieving positive peace.

Questions for Self-control

1. Why does the nature-nurture relationship matter in seeking the origin of conflict?
2. What role do conflicts in hunter-gatherer groups play in understanding conflicts in modern human societies?
3. What is the role of environmental conditions in the increase or decrease of aggression in the behavior of individuals or societies?
4. What is the significance of classifying peace as negative and positive peace in terms of achieving genuine peace?
5. Under what conditions may the boundaries between the state of conflict and peace be blurred?

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CHAPTER 2

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Reader's Guide

It is essential to determine the origin of conflict before starting to analyze a specific international conflict. The source of the conflict may lie at multiple levels of analysis, from the individual to the system. For this reason, the present chapter aims to enrich students' outlooks in exploring the causes of wars. Hence, the first section reveals the role of leaders in the outbreak of international conflicts in the context of the individual level of analysis. The second section uncovers the origin of war at the state-level of analysis, moving beyond the individual level. The final section concentrates on the systemic level of analysis by linking the source of conflict with the anarchic structure of international relations.

Taxonomy of the theme and learning outcomes:

1. Illustrating the importance of levels of analysis for exploring the causes of war;
2. Identifying the capabilities and limits of individuals at the onset of international conflict;
3. Exploring the source of war at the state-level of analysis by delving deep into their internal political and economic structures;
4. Introducing the international systemic level of analysis, in the context of Kenneth N. Waltz's work, to magnify viewpoint in appraising the origin

of war;

5. Yielding some recommendations in connection with the choice of level of analysis prior to initiating research on an international conflict.

Introduction

On 6 November 2013, Ukraine's then-president Viktor Yanukovich stated that Ukraine, making a pragmatic decision for rational modernization, had chosen to integrate with the European Union (EU). Yanukovich repeatedly remarked that he would sign the Association Agreement with the EU. However, on 21 November, the president announced that he would refuse to sign the agreement with the EU, even though he had planned to participate in the Eastern Partnership Summit to be held in Vilnius on 28-29 November. Yanukovich's U-turn from pro-European to the pro-Eurasian direction caused great disappointment among Ukrainians who regarded the EU as the only remedy for their corrupt political and economic systems. Following Yanukovich's announcement that he refused to sign the deal with the EU, people began flocking to the Maidan to protest the president's decision, and soon demonstrations spread across the country. [1, p. 118-119] As a result of the Euromaidan Revolution, also known as the Revolution of Dignity, Yanukovich was overthrown from his office and afterward fled to the Russian Federation. Shortly after the revolution, Crimea was illegally annexed by the Russian Federation, and a full-fledged war broke out in eastern Ukraine. A question arose: Who is responsible for the breaking out of the war in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula? In other words, who is to blame for the protracted war in eastern Ukraine and the invasion of the peninsula?

Among other actors, academics and policymakers have devised a series of

explanations for the conflict in Ukraine. Some regarded Yanukovych's refusal to deal with the EU as the main driving force behind the war. Others considered Russian President Vladimir Putin as the main source of the onset of the war. Those who concentrate on Yanukovych or Putin's policies to shed light on the inception of the war in eastern Ukraine seek to explain the war on the individual level of analysis. Some others purported that the war originated from the domestic dynamics of Ukraine. Or others paid great attention to Russia's expansionist policy to throw light on the war in Ukraine. Those who attempt to disclose the causes of the war by focusing on the internal factors of Ukraine or Russia indeed explain the war on state-level of analysis.

On the other hand, some other actors underestimate both individual and state levels of analysis but instead attach great importance to the structure of the international system to arrive at a meaningful explanation of the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Individuals and internal formations of states, in their views, do not play a substantial role in determining the behaviors of states in international relations. On the contrary, the structure of the international system diverts the performances of states. The types of international systems such as unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, or multipolar constrain or activate the manners of states. In this respect, for many scholars, the emergence of a unipolar international system in the wake of the breakdown of the Eastern Bloc had fertilized new wars in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, those who adopt the international system level of analysis when appraising the war in Ukraine point out that NATO's eastward expansion policy and the EU's Eastern Partnership policy have triggered the war.

This chapter deals with the causes of war at various levels of analysis to enrich outlooks for the assessment of international conflicts. To this end, the individual level of analysis has been introduced focusing primarily on the effects of individuals' psychologies and environmental conditions on the outbreak of war.

Thereafter, the origins of the war have been evaluated at the state level of analysis to comprehend war as a rational act of policymakers rather than their irrational decision that stems from either their psychological disorder or lack of information. Finally, the causes of war have been explored at the international system level of analysis. It has been divulged how various structures of international systems compel states to engage in war.

The Individual Level of Analysis

In examining the causes of conflict in the first chapter, we have concluded that aggression is embedded in human nature, but its activation depends on existing conditions. This argument is a key for the individual level of analysis to understand the origins of war. According to the individual level of analysis, war stems either from human nature or behavior. Proponents of this level of analysis stress that great emphasis must be placed on human beings in understanding violent conflict. However, proponents of the individual level of analysis basically fall into two groups: *pessimists* and *optimists*. Pessimists highlight the flawed nature of human beings and thereby do not believe that a peaceful world is attainable. Optimists, on the contrary, consider that achieving peace is quite possible if we shift the human being. Changing people can be done basically in two ways: Firstly, by changing human nature, and secondly, by ameliorating the condition of human life through education or psychological treatment. If imperfect human nature is considered the main source of war, there is no option but to configure human genetics. Since humanity has not yet been able to do this, pessimists may be justified in the view that striving for a peaceful world is a futile endeavor. Still, there is an essential puzzle that pessimists have difficulty dealing with, that not all people react in the same way to the difficulties they face. Therefore, it is worth focusing on the psychological and external factors that formulate the character of individuals.

External factors on individuals are related to the environment in which they are raised. For instance, people living in a region or country with frequent wars tend to see violence as a casual act that people resort to solving their problems. However, those who have never experienced war conditions see violence as a very unusual human act. In other words, whoever constantly experiences violence in their life is likely to acquire more aggressive characteristics. Not surprisingly, the effects of environmental factors are closely related to human psychological characteristics. Individuals or political leaders in our case possess diverse personal traits. For instance, leaders with *dogmatic* traits have difficulty admitting new developments or are not open-minded enough to consider all possible options and are therefore more likely to go to war. Likewise, leaders with *authoritarian* personalities often ignore their advisors and actually aspire to hear the information they want from them rather than listen to their views.

Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, in connection to the authoritarian or dictator leaders, draw attention to another dimension. For the Chiozza and Goemans, leaders who lose his/her office as a result of a regular election or voluntarily retire are less likely to initiate a war. On the contrary, leaders who hold their office through fraudulent means such as election fraud or illegal amendment of the constitution are more likely to go to war. The authors point out that such authoritarians or dictators have high expectations from war, unlike leaders who lose their posts in the usual way. Authoritarian leaders are often aware of the punishment they will receive after losing office. Therefore, by winning the war, they hope to eliminate all rivals and strengthen their position. [2, p. 4-5] In brief, Chiozza and Goemans indicate the importance of leaders' personal interests to commence a war.

Furthermore, the role of *perceptions* and *beliefs* at the level of individual analysis is another factor that should be mentioned. In addition to psychological dispositions, individuals react to external developments with perceptions and

beliefs, but not with *objective reality*. Perception, in view of Charles A. Duelfer and Stephen Benedict Dyson, “is not a passive process of receiving information but an active process of constructing reality.” [3, p. 76] Greg Cashman, in a similar vein, stresses: “a leader’s current images and beliefs act as a filter through which she assesses the nature of the opponent, the perception of threats, the utility of force, and so on.” [4, p. 84] A leader’s *worldview* has a certain impact on the decision-making process. Leaders, like ordinary people, interpret state policies according to their worldview, despite their efforts to be pragmatic. To some extent, their feelings or perceptions of the opponent’s behavior play a critical role. Unsurprisingly, their worldview from time to time sets the stage for misperceptions about the opponents because not always their interpretations of the developments are compatible with reality.

Besides, the mood of the leaders is another noteworthy determinant. For example, those who hold positions with high responsibilities such as the presidency, prime ministry, foreign ministry, and so on are under great stress every day. Stress results from a combination of physiological threats, insomnia, information overload, apprehension, frustration, time pressure, and internal conflicts necessitated by risky decisions. International relations experts believe stress is at its peak in times of crisis. [4, p. 108] Of course, not all leaders react to stress the same way. Their responses vary according to their age, character, and many other features. All in all, the role of stress on leaders in decision-making processes is a significant component.

Last but not least, *humiliation*, according to Evelin Lindner, is another factor that creates hostilities between individuals. [5] On the individual level of analysis, the fact that humiliation can lead to war does not sound convincing, especially in democratic countries, but this component is conceivable when authoritarian leaders are at stake. As dictators tend to identify their personalities with their state, they can go so far as to start a war due to humiliation.

Nevertheless, humiliation makes more sense at the state level of analysis which will be discussed in the following section.

Case Study 2

George W. Bush and The Global War on Terrorism

George W. Bush was the 43rd president of the United States, was elected two consecutive terms, and faced calamities such as the September 11 terrorist attack and Hurricane Katrina during his presidency.

George W. Bush followed in his father's footsteps, enrolled at Yale University, and graduated in History. He was a member of the Delta Kappa Epsilon (student fraternity) and was known for his aggressive behaviors on campus. Additionally, George W. Bush entered the postgraduate school of business at Harvard University and graduated with an MBA degree, being the only President to do so.

George W. Bush supported his father's (George W. H. Bush) initiative to wage war against Iraq. As it is known, Kuwait was occupied by Iraq in 1990, and in response, the US-led coalition forces demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi military forces by launching Operation Desert Storm.

George W. Bush became the president of the USA in 2001. The Bush policy was regarded as neoconservative. His main foreign policy objective was to consolidate the global supremacy of the US under the auspices of the military force. In his worldview, US leadership as the winner of the Cold War was unquestionable in global politics, and therefore Washington D.C. would not hesitate to use military force in the case of perceiving any threat to its supremacy.

In the wake of the infamous 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon George W. Bush declared the "War on Terrorism". Hence, the USA, along with its allies invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban government that allegedly provided sanctuary for "al Qaeda" terrorist organization.

In this section, we have identified the possible causes of war at the individual level of analysis. Undoubtedly, there may be an infinite number of reasons for individuals to onset a war or involve in it. To this end, two main standpoints – pessimists and optimists – have been introduced. Pessimists are those who attribute the causes of war to flawed human nature. Therefore, in their view, achieving world peace is nothing more than a naïve idea. On the other hand,

optimists regard war as an abnormal human action that can be eliminated if certain conditions are met. In short, for the optimists, war does not arise out of human nature, but because of environmental conditions that can be corrected by means such as education or rule of law. The weakness of the optimists at the level of individual analysis stems from their difficulty in explaining war as a rational act. Optimists consider that war breaks out because of *irrational* leaders. If they are *treated* in some way, the war will disappear from the international arena. Since the individual level of analysis fails to unveil the inception of war as a rational act we need to shift our viewpoint and focus on another level of analysis.

The State Level of Analysis

If war breaks out because of flawed human behavior, why are not all states, more or less, equally prone to war? As it is known, some states are more prone to war than others. Or some states went through many wars but remained in peace for a long time afterward. Since imperfect human nature does not fluctuate on its own over time to influence the behavior of decision-makers to inaugurate or prevent a war, there must be something else that compels certain states to commence a war while others live in peace. This reasoning forces us to look elsewhere for the causes of international conflict rather than human behavior. To this end, this chapter delves into the internal dynamics of states to shed light on the causes of war, adopting the lens of state-level analysis.

Those who seek to illuminate the main driving force behind the outbreak of wars through state-level analysis argue that certain local political or economic models tend to initiate wars regardless of the behavior of individuals. There are mainly two schools – Marxism and Liberalism – that attach great importance to the domestic variables to illustrate why certain states are more warlike than others. In the Marxist view, the source of war lies at the center of the capitalist

economic model. Marxists claim that states with capitalist economies have no option but to pursue imperialist policies. They underline that the capitalist system produces inequality among people in terms of wealth distribution. This inequality, for Marxism, paves the way for underconsumption, lack of domestic investment, and finally stagnation. As a result, capitalist forces tend to pursue an expansionist policy to reach new investment opportunities, new markets for selling surplus production, and natural resources. [6, p. 21] Since the expansionist policies have been done mostly through hard power, capitalism also fuels the military spending that sets the stage for arms races between capitalist countries. Therefore, according to the Marxist viewpoint, humanity needs to alter the capitalist economic model to avoid war. For this thought, war may break out either among capitalist states or between capitalist and communist states but not among the latter.

When we look at history, we can observe that the Marxist perspective is not very convincing. Contrary to the assumption of the Marxist view, the prosperous capitalist countries opposed the outbreak of the First World War but were supported by almost all the others. Moreover, it fails to yield a meaningful elucidation for the wars that took place between Communist states. For instance, the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam engaged in military conflicts with one another while capitalist countries in Europe, North America, and Japan sustained nonviolent relations. [7, p. 60] Hence, the Marxist standpoint, indicating the capitalist economic model as the origin of war, is insufficient to understand wars between states.

Along with Marxism, Classical liberalism is another current that attaches considerable importance to the domestic factors of states in explaining the source of war. However, contrary to the Marxist view, liberalists claim that advancing the capitalist economic model would lead to the termination of wars. The classical liberal school, mainly defended by nineteenth-century British and

American scholars, presumes that the capitalist countries are peace-loving because war is bad for commerce. Adam Smith (1723-1790), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), or John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the most influential proponents of classical liberalism, underlined the significance of *liberty*. In this sense, Mill pointed out: “the only unfailling and permanent source of improvement is liberty...” [8, p. 86] These classical liberals believed that individuals are the key to progress. They argued that the efforts of individuals to improve their living conditions would contribute to the progress of society. Therefore, for the classical liberals, the government should not interfere in individuals’ activities. For Smith, the government’s interference was the source of unnatural inequalities among individuals. Therefore, the role of the government in society should be limited to policing. [8, p. 89-90] One of the leading advocates of classical liberalism was Richard Cobden (1804-1865). Cobden believed that if we quest for welfare, peace is the best option. In other words, according to Cobden, peace yields more gain than war. Writing in 1840, he displayed his view as: “We can keep the world from actual war, and I trust that the world will do that through trade.” [7, p. 61]

Besides *free trade* and *democracy* have been seen by many classical liberals as another remedy to prevent war. According to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), countries with democratic governments would be less inclined to engage in war. The main rationale behind Kant’s view is that, unlike autocrats, more people are involved in the decision-making process to initiate a war in democratic governments and the people tend to avoid the misery of war. Similar to Kant, Thomas Paine (1737-1809) identified monarchical rule as the source of war. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, Paine noted: “Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind, and source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is restored to its natural and original place, the nation...Were this the case throughout Europe, the causes of war would be taken away?” [8, p. 101]

In brief, Marxist and Liberal approaches incline to divide countries into two groups, “bad” and “good”. In the Marxist view, bad countries are countries with capitalist economies. However, for Liberals, capitalism, and democracy promote peace in the international arena, and therefore capitalist democracies are models of good governance. Although both perspectives broaden our horizons in analyzing wars at the state level, they fail to explain many instances in history that “bad” countries did not go to war, but “good” states did.

Along with the political and economic structures of the state, *bureaucratic politics* is another aspect that explains the causes of war at the state-level of analysis. The bureaucratic politics probe into the interplay of government officials and institutions rather than political or economic structures to reveal the origin of war. This understanding mainly attaches great importance to bureaucratic interests. The approach emphasizes strict bargaining between the government branches over the state budget. For example, resource struggles between military branches serve to increase security spending that poses a threat to adversaries. In return, the adversaries begin to spend more on military affairs that eventually creating the classic security dilemma. [7, p. 62]

In addition to the bureaucratic politics and political and economic models of states, the *dyadic* level of analysis draws attention to the common characteristics of pairs of states. According to this view, some factors force certain pairs of states into war. The most known such factors are contiguity, enduring rival states, and states with close power capabilities. For example, wars are often observable between contiguous states. Neighbor states tend to engage in wars over border disputes, territorial claims, or water usage. The role of shared ethnicity is another reason to spark a war between pairs of states. [4, p. 238-251] There are plenty of examples in international relations that proves that contiguous states are more prone to involve in wars than states located far from each other. Pakistan – India, Israel – Palestine, Azerbaijan – Armenia, Russia –

Georgia, or Russia – Ukraine are some examples of warring neighboring states. Consequently, the state-level of analysis shifts our focal point from individuals to the structures of countries to uncover the reasons behind the outbreak of war. The approach essentially alleges that the characters of leaders hardly matter, as the political or economic patterns of the state force them to act in a certain direction. In this sense, while Marxism blames capitalist economies as the source of war, liberals argue that free trade has great potential to stimulate peace in international relations. In other words, both approaches divide countries into two groups as “good” and “bad” by filling their contents according to their own principles. However, history is full of exemplary wars that took place not only between good and bad states, classified according to the above-mentioned views but also between any countries regardless of their internal structures. Moreover, the state-level analysis highlights the abundance of wars that have unfolded between neighboring states. Although historical examples underpin this argument, it is also not difficult to come across a large number of contiguous states living in peace. Therefore, it is necessary to shift our viewpoint once again to seek the causes of war. To this end, the following section explores the origins of war at the international systemic level.

The International Systemic Level of Analysis

So far, we have delved into two levels of analysis to uncover the causes of war. The first level underlined the role of individuals at the onset of war. The second level, bypassing individuals, placed great emphasis on the political or economic structures of states to provide an explanation for the inception of the war. The present section draws our attention to the final, systemic level of analysis in order to comprehend the origin of international conflicts. The levels of analysis have been primarily introduced by Kenneth N. Waltz in his book entitled *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (1959). Waltz divided the levels into

three parts and named them as images. We have addressed the first and the second images as the individual and state levels of analysis in the preceding sections. The third image of Waltz will be treated as a systemic level of analysis.

Following Kenneth N. Waltz, J. David Singer considered the levels of analysis issue in his often-cited article, *The Problem of Level of Analysis in International Relations* (1961). According to Singer, the system level is the most comprehensive level among the others, covering the entire set of interactions within the system and its environment. He portrays the level as “the systemic level of analysis, and only this level, permits us to examine international relations in the whole, with a comprehensiveness that is of necessity lost when our focus is shifted to a lower, and more partial, level.” [9, p. 80] Singer highlights the *comprehensiveness* of the system level in terms of *descriptiveness*, not in the context of its *explanatory capability*, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

To understand the cause of war at the level of systems analysis, let’s briefly look at how Waltz, who first sparked off the debate in International Relations (IR) discipline, approached the issue in his book *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Observing the recurrence of wars throughout history, Waltz finds analogies among the behaviors of states in international affairs, regardless of their rulers and internal affairs. Waltz quotes Thucydides and John Adams and unfolds them by the statement of Frederick Dunn. Thucydides – “the growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war.” John Adams - “a war with France, if just and necessary, might wean us from fond and blind affections, which no Nation ought ever to feel towards another, as our experience in more than one instance abundantly testifies.” And Frederick Dunn – “so long as the notion of self-help persists, the aim of maintaining the power position of the nation is paramount to all other

considerations.” [8, p. 159-160] In other words, Waltz links the causes of war with the *anarchic* order of international relations. In this respect, he draws a precise line between domestic and international political systems. In his subsequent book, *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz describes the former as central and hierarchical, while the latter as decentralized and anarchic. [10, p. 88]

Waltz refers to some classical political philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) to illuminate his argument about the anarchic nature of international relations. Spinoza, just like Thomas Hobbes, associates the causes of violence with imperfect human nature. [11] He nevertheless offers the unification of people at the national level and thus the creation of a state instead of modifying human nature to overcome violence. According to Spinoza, states are like individuals, but the only difference between them is that individuals can create a state to avoid violence, states, by their very constitution, reject a similar path. Hence Spinoza concludes that war between states is inevitable. On the other hand, Kant defines men as being members of both the world of understanding and the world of sense rather than emphasizing mere flawed human nature. According to Kant, if human beings were a member of the world of understanding, there would be a universal harmony between them. However, since they are also members of the world of sense, their instincts overcome reason and lead to violence. Kant’s solution is consistent with Spinoza’s suggestion that it is necessary to form a state to avoid violence but unlike Spinoza, Kant considers peace among nations as of vital importance to achieve peace in the international domain. Sidestepping to use the concept of world government as an essential solution for constraining states, Kant points out that international peace ought to arise from the internal dynamics of states. In brief, Kant asserts that the internal structure of states needs to be improved to the

extent that they voluntarily avoid conflicts and confine themselves to international law. [8, p. 162-164]

Alongside Spinoza and Kant, Waltz sheds light on Rousseau's reasoning to look for the reason behind the outbreak of war. Rousseau, contrary to Hobbes and Spinoza, underlines the characteristics of humans acquired in nature. Rousseau emphasizes that Hobbes and Spinoza's depictions of human nature do not reflect reality due to the unobservability of the human being outside of society. He criticizes them for assessing the socially affected human nature while overlooking the societal constraints on it. Since they did not possess traits such as pride, envy, vice, thrift, or greed prior to the establishment of society, humans would not be inclined to violence. As mentioned, Hobbes and Spinoza point out that the formation of a state is the remedy to escape from the environment of everyman against everyman. On the contrary, Rousseau claims that the source of conflict is indeed social activity. He explains his argument with simple reasoning. Rousseau wants us to assume five hungry men coming together in the state of nature. The hunger of each can be quenched by the fifth part of a stag, so they agree to cooperate to ambush one. At the same time, anyone's hunger can be quenched by a hare. In the course of the stag hunting, one of the men finds himself in a convenient position to catch a hare and thereby seizes the opportunity to grasp the hare. While satisfying his hunger, the defector also permits the stag to escape. His immediate advantage outweighs the general interest of the group. The story underscores how members cannot trust each other in a group performance, even if it is in everyone's interest. The defector, in the stag-hunt instance, acts unilaterally rather than in the interest of the group. Of course, it would be reasonable for the defector to pursue the group's interest because, in the long run, it would bring more benefit to him. He is driven by a feeling of hunger, and therefore his move is one of passion. However, from his point of view, the reason also tells him that if he let the hare go for the sake of

the group's interest, the man next to him may grab it. In such a scenario, he would feel foolish for being loyal to the group plan. [8, 167-170] Therefore, the defector's act is also perfectly reasonable. For this reason, Rousseau argues that, unlike Spinoza, the main source of conflict should be sought not in human nature but in the very heart of social activity. According to Rousseau, man undergoes a tremendous transformation when he moves from the state of nature to the civil state. He argues that man possesses natural freedom in the state of nature, but this freedom disappears when entering the civil state. In return, he receives "civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses." [8, p. 172]

Since we have seen the human state of nature and its transformation in the context of the establishment of a civil state, now we can focus on inter-state relations. Like other classical theorists such as Hobbes, Spinoza, or Kant, Rousseau compares the behavior of states in international relations with that of men in the state of nature. For them, states develop a general will and thus act as a unit in the realm of international relations. This reasoning leads us to conclude that conflict among states is inevitable. At this point, the question may arise - does an increase in the number of *good states* (e.g., republican states) contribute to world peace? In answering this question, Kant says *Yes*, but Rousseau says *No*. Rousseau explains his view by arguing that the general will of every state may not be compatible with the rest of the world. Rousseau expresses his point of view as "it is not impossible that a Republic, though in itself well governed, should enter upon an unjust war." [8, p. 181-182] This is another way of saying that in the anarchic international order, there is no automatic harmony.

In brief, Kenneth N. Waltz, following Rousseau's reasoning, concludes that the cause of war lies at the heart of the anarchic international system, and thus, argues that to understand the behaviors of states in international relations one has to take the systemic level of analysis into account. Conflict is inevitable in the absence of higher authority over individuals/states, as in the stag-hunting

example. To this end, Waltz points out the significance of the enduring anarchic international system in determining state behaviors.

Waltz's explanation of war at the systemic level of analysis has been criticized by many scientists. Liberals and constructivists, in particular, find Waltz's systemic approach too parsimonious, and therefore they claim that it explains very little. According to Joseph Nye and David Welch, the systemic level of analysis falls short of explaining the highly complex social world. For them, in order to grasp the complexity of the social world, attention must be paid to the interaction between levels of analysis, which can be done with liberal and constructivist lenses. [7, p. 63-65] According to J. David Singer, the system-oriented analysis contains some genuine difficulties in terms of its explanatory capability. One of its deficiencies, Singer highlights, is that the systemic view inevitably requires assuming a high degree of homogeneity in the foreign policy of states. He claims that the systemic approach prompts us to think of states as *black boxes*. [9, p. 81] Jack S. Levy is another scholar who finds the systemic level of analysis insufficient, especially for understanding post-Cold War conflicts. Levy considers the necessity of individual, societal or bureaucratic-organizational levels of analysis to enlighten the international conflicts. [12, p. 9]

Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the levels of analysis to uncover various explanations of the causes of international conflict. To this end, it primarily focused on the individual level of analysis. Those who assume that the inception of war is related to human nature adopt the individual level of analysis. Those scholars are basically divided into two groups in terms of their evaluation of human behavior. The first group, who are also labeled as *pessimists*, considers that believing in achieving a peaceful world is nothing more than a naive approach

because human nature is imperfect and cannot be altered. The second group of scholars, also called *optimists*, points out that war is caused by the irrational actions of individuals. For them, we need to discipline human being through education or some other required means to eliminate war from the realm of international relations. Even though the individual level of analysis allows us to understand a range of conflicts in the international arena, it fails to explain war as a rational state action regardless of its rulers to be *good* or *bad*. Therefore, the chapter shifted its focus to the state-level of analysis to seek the origin of war.

The state-level of analysis mainly draws attention to the internal dynamics of states. In this respect, Marxist and Liberal approaches emphasize the importance of the political or economic structures of states in order to eliminate international conflicts. On the one hand, for Marxists, the source of wars lies at the center of the capitalist economic model. On the other hand, classical liberals place a premium on *free trade* to achieve world peace. Likewise, they attach great importance to the advancement of democracies to promote peace in international relations. While the state-level of analysis broadened our horizons in identifying the source of war, its inconsistencies reflected in history made it necessary to shift our focus once again.

Thus, the chapter lastly embraced the systemic level of analysis to add another aspect to our investigation of the causes of international conflicts. For this purpose, special attention has been paid to the work of Kenneth N. Waltz, who first inaugurated the systemic level of analysis in the discipline of international relations. Following Waltz's reasoning, it has been shown how the anarchic international system determines state behaviors in the international realm. The systemic level of analysis has been criticized by many scholars, mainly from liberal and constructivist schools, for being too parsimonious and thereby insufficient to enlighten the highly complex social world.

Consequently, this chapter has dealt with various levels of analysis to enrich our understanding in uncovering the causes of international conflicts. Although each of the aforementioned levels of analysis has certain advantages in its own right, their validities are questionable when considering time and space factors. In other words, the importance of each level may increase or decrease relative to a particular case study. It is therefore advisable to determine which level of analysis would be most relevant prior to commencing the investigation of a particular international conflict.

Questions for Self-control

1. Illustrate the importance of levels of analysis for exploring the causes of war.
2. Identify the capabilities and limits of individuals in initiating or preventing international conflict.
3. What factors matter at the state level of analysis to reveal the source of war?
4. How does the international systemic level of analysis, in the context of Kenneth N. Waltz's work, help to magnify our viewpoint in appraising the origin of war?
5. What are the advantages of determining the level of analysis before initiating research on an international conflict?

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CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Reader's Guide

Theories are essential to simplify understanding the complexity of the social world. In other words, they help us disentangle social events covered in maze-like winding details. Therefore, the present chapter delves into three mainstream IR theories to simplify (and classify) our way of thinking in appraising international conflicts. To this end, the chapter presents realism, liberalism, and constructivism in connection with the onset of international conflicts, respectively.

Taxonomy of the theme and learning outcomes:

1. Understanding the foremost of IR theories in enlightening the complexity of international conflicts;
2. Exploring the role of human nature and anarchy in initiating a war between states;
3. Evaluating democratic and undemocratic regimes in connection with the international conflicts;
4. Discovering the impact of free trade among international actors in promoting world peace;
5. Analyzing the relationship between agents and structure of international relations for widening our horizons in thinking of international conflicts.

Introduction

The previous chapters have discovered the concepts of conflict and peace and the cause of war. The first chapter analyzed the nature-nurture debate to seek an answer to whether conflict stems from imperfect human nature or is related to environmental conditions. Considering human behavior in the hunter-gatherer lifestyle, along with agrarian and industrial societies, it was concluded that conflict has always been part of human social life. Nevertheless, it is also realized that human aggression varies depending on the given circumstances. Additionally, the first chapter threw light on the concept of peace in a narrow and broad sense. It has been shown that conflict and peace are not two antithesis concepts but rather quite elusive and rigidly connected. In the second chapter, we have aimed to explore the reason behind the outbreak of international conflict at three different levels of analysis. Exploring the cause of war at the individual level, state-level, and international systemic level of analysis has helped us widen our horizons in understanding international conflict.

On the other hand, this chapter strives to introduce mainstream international relations theories in connection with their elucidation of the causes of war. Hence, the chapter introduces three theories of international relations among the others. Since it is beyond the scope of this work to elaborate the each of international relations theories such as post-structuralism, feminism, or green theory even though their viewpoint on the cause of war cannot be underestimated, this chapter examines realism, liberalism, and constructivism in relation to the outbreak of international conflicts.

Realism

Realism is one of the most dominant intellectual approaches in international politics that involves a wide range of philosophers from the ancient Greeks to

the present. Quest for power, supposedly embedded in human nature, is the central assumption of political realism. Possessing power, in the realist view, is the most convenient way to ensure the desired interest. States are no different from individuals in their pursuit of power. Realists do not believe in the existence of universal moral principles. Instead, they think that these principles serve to meet the interests of certain states in international relations. In order to understand realism and its point of view in assessing international conflicts, let's briefly look at the works of classical realist thinkers.

Thucydides (460-c. 390 BCE), a fifth-century Athenian historian and general, who authored an account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, captures the most features of the realist paradigm. The main hallmark of Thucydides in his explanation of the war was to distinguish his writing style from storytelling tradition. Indeed, he was aware that his approach was unorthodox, and his style would be boring as he underrated the uniqueness of the stories. He sought to find connections or similarities between the various narratives and aimed to develop specific rules as to their causes. [1, p. 20] Thucydides emphasizes the importance of power politics that is the central assumption of all forms of political realism. Thucydides presents an excellent sample of power politics in his work by pointing the dialogue between the generals of Athenian forces and the spokesmen of Melians. The dialogue is quite interesting in terms of power politics, justice, and morality. By promising not to harm their country, the Athenians offer the Melians to take into account the undeniable power imbalance and to surrender peacefully. Instead, the Melians, who do not want to surrender, highlight justice and thus claim that God will be on their side. In response, the Athenians state: "As the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." [2, p. 64] Moreover, Athenians summon opponents not to act emotionally to decide for self-defense but to be rational. On

human nature the Athenians underline:

Of the gods, we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us and shall leave it to exist forever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. [2, p. 266]

As a result, Thucydides emphasizes two main factors - power politics and human nature - that are the main pillars of classical realism. Another important figure in the realist view is Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). Like Thucydides, Machiavelli maintains that human nature is fixed and imperfect. In his well-known book *The Prince*, Machiavelli advises rulers to be pragmatic in governance and avoid emotional decisions that can cause destruction. He realizes very well the distinction between what a person “ought to do” and what he actually does. According to Machiavelli, in the state of nature, man does not follow the moral values revealed by Christianity. [3, p. 65]

In the part where Machiavelli advises a prince to be loved or feared, he argues that the sovereign should prioritize the latter. Machiavelli does not deny that being loved would be the desire of many leaders but suggests that this trait can often be perceived as a weakness. Machiavelli illustrates the reason behind favoring to be feared rather than loved in relation to human nature, which is claimed to be devilish. According to Machiavelli, people may stir up controversy by taking advantage of goodwill, but they are afraid of causing trouble to someone they fear. In short, by putting fear in the foreground, Machiavelli recommends that leaders be pragmatic rather than focusing on gaining sympathy. He adopts human nature, which is indispensable for classical realism, as a starting point for politics.

Along with Thucydides and Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) is

another classical theorist whose work stands at the heart of political realism. His standpoint of the state of nature holds a pivotal point in the realist theory of international relations. Hobbes rejects the idea that the laws of kings are secondary (inferior to God's law). Instead, he describes the law of the sovereign as an ultimate authority. He considers people in a state of nature in constant fear and rivalry who primarily strive to survive. For this very reason, Hobbes asserts, pursuing power becomes the only way to avoid danger and ensure the security of individuals. Although Hobbes did not evaluate the anarchic condition in terms of inter-state relations, contemporary realist thinkers perceive international relations within the framework of a Hobbesian world.

Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber, Carl von Clausewitz, E.H. Carr, or Hans J. Morgenthau are among the most quoted classical realists who underline the importance of human nature in understanding politics (both domestic and international).

Besides classical realism, there is another branch of realism called neorealism or structural realism. Structural realism as a distinctive version of realism gained momentum with the impact of Kenneth N. Waltz. In essence, structural realism, like classical realism, pays attention to the importance of power in international relations. However, structural realism differs from classical realism in answering the question of why states seek power. As can be already assumed, classical realists answer the question in connection with human nature. On the contrary, structural realism does not pay attention to human nature in explaining international politics. For them, the structure of the international system is the main driving force behind states' pursuit of power. Proponents of structural realists argue that the anarchic nature of the international system, which does not guarantee that one state will not attack another, leaves states any choice but to seek power to survive. [4, p. 78]

In brief, from a classical realist point of view, international conflict derives from imperfect human nature. Individuals are in a constant struggle in the state of nature and seek power to achieve their interests and ensure their survival. Furthermore, structural realists draw attention to the anarchic nature of the international system to shed light on international conflict. The conflict between states becomes inevitable as there is no higher authority above them in the international arena. Additionally, realists tend to consider states as only actors in international relations. They pay no heed to other actors such as international organizations. For them, international organizations serve only in favor of certain countries. In other words, these organizations are merely tools for the realization of the interests of great powers, rather than promoting justice, equality, or security in the international arena. The next section introduces the liberal approach in relation to international conflict.

Liberalism

The liberal approach is another conventional view of international politics that includes classical philosophers such as Hugo Grotius, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant. The main difference between realist and liberal approaches is that liberals view the world from a more positive angle than realists. While realists consider states as the only actors who constantly seek power in the international arena and thus create a more insecure environment, liberalists underscore the existence of different actors along with states in international relations. For liberalism, international politics is not based on a zero-sum game as realist thinkers envision it. In other words, liberals emphasize mutual interests between states and therefore potential cooperation in the international arena.

According to the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, states can be classified as *bad states* and *good states* in terms of their internal governance. [5, p. 33] He argues that the actions of good states will ultimately lead to the

proliferation of peace in the international order. For Kant, the most viable form of government is the republican one, which recognizes only constitutional law. Kant argues that thanks to the constitution, republican governments are more peace-loving and even peacemakers and thus programmed for more peaceful behaviors than other types of states. [6, p. 219] Yet Kant is aware that the existence of republican governments is insufficient to achieve lasting peace in the world order. Kant argues that being a republican state is inadequate to spread peace in the world order, and therefore good states have a responsibility to strive for international peace based on international law.

Kant considers human potential vital and therefore believes in social progress. In the modern era, Michael Doyle is one of Kant's most renowned advocates, offering detailed empirical studies to prove his democratic peace theory. In his masterpiece, *Ways of War and Peace*, Doyle lists a series of wars involving liberal states throughout history. States governed by the constitution, according to Doyle's findings, do not fight each other. Doyle describes the regions in which liberal states are located as a *zone of peace*. Nevertheless, liberal states can go to war with non-liberal states. This may be due to what Doyle calls "liberal imperialism" to export "liberal democratic values". [7]

Comparable arguments have been made by a number of other liberal scholars. John Rawls is one of the advocates of democratic peace. According to Rawls, not only do liberal states tend not to fight against each other, but they also avoid going to war with non-liberal states. John Mueller is another scientist who believes that wars can be diminished in the realm of international relations. Criticizing the realist approach, Mueller maintains: "War is merely an idea. It is not a trick of fate, a thunderbolt from hell, a natural necessity, or a desperate plot device dreamed up by some sadistic puppeteer on high." [8, p. 1] For Mueller, major wars among developed countries have already become obsolete, as a testament to the preventability of wars in international relations. According to

him, if people adopt alternative views such as institutionalism, wars can be eliminated from the international arena.

The prevalence of liberal peace doctrines prepared the ground for believing in international peace in the early 1900s. However, the outbreak of the First World War propelled liberals to rethink liberal values in relation to international conflict. World War I revealed that rudimentary accords on international peace were insufficient to prevent catastrophic events in international relations. According to the liberalists, international institutions were necessary for the establishment of order and peace in international relations. This was the main idea behind the founding of the League of Nations right after the world war. Although World War II ended the League of Nations, it laid the groundwork for an even stronger international organization, the United Nations (UN). [9, p. 66]

However, the international relations literature influenced by international developments, especially World War II, overlooked Kant's optimism about social progress and focused on the realist paradigm. This trend began to be questioned a few decades later (the 1960s - 1970s) when pluralism prevailed in the social sciences. In this context, liberalists affected by pluralism began to question the realist assumptions that states are unitary and rational actors. In other words, they alleged that it is "no longer possible to understand international relations simply by studying the interactions among governments." [10, p. 136] This understanding set the stage for the emergence of neoliberalism as a new variant of liberalism. Neoliberalists have drawn attention to the increasing influence of multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and pressure groups to illustrate that there are other actors besides states in international relations. [11, p. 329-349]

In essence, structural realists recognize the increasing importance of

international institutions in the international arena but believe that their role in mitigating conflicts in the global theater has been exaggerated by neoliberals. [12, p. 8] Moreover, like structural realism, neoliberalism regards the state as a unitary and rational actor programmed to maximize its interests. However, neoliberalism is one of the branches of liberal theory and therefore relies on fundamental liberal principles such as social progress. In this respect, they emphasize that international organizations set rules for states in certain international issues such as the Law of the Sea or International Air Law.

In brief, liberalists neither deny the anarchic nature of international relations nor come to the same conclusion as realists. As stated in the previous section, realists view international relations as a state of anarchy, and for this very reason, states pursue power to survive in this anarchic environment. States, in the view of realists, are unitary and rational actors who constantly seek to maximize their interests. Realists emphasize that any country can be attacked by another country at any time, as they do not recognize any supreme authority over states in international relations. In other words, realists enshrine power for the state and define international relations as a self-help system. On the contrary, liberalists believe that cooperation is possible among states even though anarchy prevails in international relations. According to them, international conflicts can be minimized if certain principles of liberalism are followed. They mainly underline two factors to prevent war in international affairs. The first concerns the governance model. For liberals, establishing or strengthening democratic governance models in internal affairs triggers international peace because democracies do not have a propensity to fight with each other. In addition, states are rational actors and therefore they can make rules and regulate international order through international organizations. The second factor which liberals pay attention to is free trade among states. Unlike realists who view inter-state cooperation as a zero-sum game, liberalists emphasize mutual utility and argue

that relative gain is a more appropriate concept in defining such relationships. Thus, liberals believe that international conflicts can be alleviated by promoting international free trade in the context of international organizations.

Case Study 3

European Union and Mutual Benefit

The European Union is a political and economic union established after the Second World War to promote free trade and thus minimize conflicts between countries and increase cooperation.

In 1953 the Union was formed by Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, and its priority was to prevent the spread of nationalism and initiate economic resource cooperation. Initially, it was dedicated to collaboration in sharing of energy resources such as nuclear and coal power. However, through the decades, the main ideas of the alliance have expanded from economic to political integration.

Nowadays, 27 European democratic countries are part of the alliance. Today, the Union shares the values of free trade and human rights, security, peace, and integration among its member states. The main objectives of the Union are to respect and protect cultural diversity; fight against social discrimination and exclusion; promote human rights and provide legal aid for violations of freedom despite differences in sovereign states; maintain price stability; to ensure economic stable development and harmony among member countries.

Overall, the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and freedom are the crucial characteristics of the Union. In this way, it promotes peace among its members and thereby helps to resolve conflicts. For example, European Union in the 1990s made an outstanding contribution to Northern Ireland Farming development, providing more than 30000 working places and, in this case, contributing to the stability of European countries' economies. On the other hand, the alliance attaches importance to military conflicts and supports organizations that aim to prevent conflicts and spread peace awareness in various regions. The European Union countries supported more than a thousand organizations dedicated to controlling extremism over the last decade, providing security from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Constructivism

Constructivism has been the main theoretical challenge to the neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives that were at the center of international relations theories particularly prior to the collapse of the Cold War. It is a relatively new paradigm in international relations that began to rise in the late 1980s. Constructivists focus on the role of identities, norms, rules, practices, and ideas to explain world politics. Constructivism is not a concise theory of international relations in the sense of making certain claims or predictions (such as realism or liberalism) about international politics, but rather a social theory that focuses on the relationship between agent and structure and questions their formulation process.

In essence, academic debates in the international relations (IR) discipline appeared in line with the specific historical and cultural circumstances. The debate, for instance, between realism and idealism was the reflection of the failure of the latter in explaining the rise of Hitler's regime and thus the Second World War. The international relations discipline has, therefore, witnessed the growing influence of realism and attempts of scientific approaches in the wake of the Second World War. When neo-realism and neo-liberalism failed to foresee the end of the bipolar world order, constructivism appeared as an alternative view in IR discipline to shed light on the change in the international order. Hence, the term *constructivism* was coined in the realm of international relations by Nicholas Onuf in 1989. In his book *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Onuf argues that people and societies construct or form each other and maintains that constructivism does not make a sharp distinction between social and material realities. To put it in his own words: "people always construct, or constitute, social reality, even as their being, which can only be social, is constructed for them." [13, p. 1] Let's

take a brief look at the following basic principles which may be evaluated in the context of constructivism to get some insight into how it interprets international conflict. [14, p. 316-317]

- ❖ International actors in world politics, regardless of being states or other actors, are socially constructed through both material and intellectual resources.
- ❖ The actors and subjects in international politics are constituted and endowed with collective identities and meanings through representations and practices. Practices can consist of both discursive and non-discursive components.
- ❖ As it is socially constructed, the structures of global politics are constantly changing. In other words, global politics is not static. Even though change is possible, it is not easy due to the relative durability of these structures.
- ❖ The attainment of unbiased knowledge of the structures, subjects, and practices of international politics is challenging because the facts are only achieved through mediation. Facts are nothing more than collective interpretations.
- ❖ Under these circumstances, interpretivism is the most appropriate methodology in research. The research interests are to explore how agents view and understand the world. It concentrates on the relationship between subjects and objects and how the former attach meaning to the latter.
- ❖ The purpose of theory is neither explanation nor prognostication in the context of transhistorical or ahistorical generalizable causal arguments but to thoroughly understand the outside world within a given space and time framework.

Basically, constructivism suggests that what exists today may not have existed and encourages us to think of the conditions that make those beings possible and

thus to consider alternative worlds rather than assuming the social world as fixed. As mentioned above, constructivism has scolded neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism due to their failure to explain the end of the Cold War and contemporary global developments. Michael Barnett illuminates the ever-changing social world with the example of the sovereignty principle of states. As it is known, the Peace of Westphalia, also known as the Westphalian Order, laid the foundation for the tenet of non-intervention in international politics. The principle of non-intervention has long been seen as the cornerstone of state sovereignty in the realm of international relations. Nevertheless, the principle of non-intervention has recently been ignored on various international issues. The sovereignty of states has been conditioned in line with developments in international norms, especially in terms of human rights. [15, p. 163] NATO bombing of Yugoslavia can be shown as a sample for the conditionality of sovereignty in contemporary world politics. In this sense, NATO had intervened in the war in Yugoslavia in 1999, under the pretext of protecting civilians. The so-called international humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia was carried out within the framework of the NATO mission, following the objections of China and Russia at the UN Security Council. The alike intervention had been carried out in Libya in 2011. Such international interventions have been common in international relations lately because citizens are no longer viewed as entities that states may treat as they please. Therefore, the Westphalian world order has been challenged by the newly emerged international norms.

In brief, constructivism is a social theory rather than a mainstream international relations theory such as realism or liberalism. However, it has enriched the International Relations discipline by moving beyond the boundaries of traditional international relations theories. Constructivism has enabled us to reconsider the basic concepts of international relations such as anarchy or power. Unlike realism and liberalism, constructivism has refused to accept

anarchy as a given condition of international relations. In this sense, Alexander Wendt, one of the foremost advocates of constructivism, named his 1992 article “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” [16, p. 391-425] Criticizing realists and liberals, Wendt stressed that neither agents nor the structure of the international system was independent of human activity. To this end, constructivism does not consider international conflict as an inevitable or preventable phenomenon but instead tries to show that it is caused by the activities of socially constructed agents or by the influence of socially constructed structures. It refuses to recognize states as rational actors seeking power to survive but pays attention to the norms or ideologies of societies in order to understand why the war breaks out in certain spaces and times. Thus, constructivism does not consider anarchy as a natural international mechanism that constantly produces wars but claims that anarchy is indeed what states make, and thereby international conflicts erupt as a consequence of states’ activities.

Case Study 4

The Orange Revolution

The Orange Revolution was a rebellion that broke out after the announcement of the results of the presidential election in Ukraine in 2004. According to the results, between the two competing candidates, Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko, the former was the winner with a slight advantage of 3%. However, due to the numerous threats and messages about ballot violations, the elections were considered fraudulent and led to the start of the revolution, which was, indeed, a manifestation of a number of issues.

In essence, Ukrainian society experienced an economic and cultural crisis that uncovered the disparities between eastern and western Ukraine. While the Western population of the country supported the integration of the European Union and favored the establishment of a European political course, the Eastern population preferred to promote Ukraine’s relations with the Russian Federation. In fact, then political leaders of Ukraine deliberately promoted and deepened the differences between eastern and western Ukrainians in order to consolidate their constituencies for their political goals. The turning point of the conflict between the West and the East took place during the 2004 Presidential elections, and some

groups in eastern Ukraine threatened secession from the rest of the country. The western part of Ukraine supported Viktor Yushchenko and his political bloc, including political figures such as Petro Poroshenko or Yuliya Tymoshenko. On the contrary, the eastern part of the country supported Viktor Yanukovich, financed by oligarchs like Rinat Akhmetov. A number of election violations were committed by Yanukovich's Party of Regions during the elections.

In this way, Orange Revolution was organized to maintain the democratic path of the country. Following the revolution, the election was reorganized, as a result of which Viktor Yushchenko became the new President of Ukraine.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced three foremost theories of international relations to broaden the horizons in understanding international conflicts. In this context, realism was first lightened up in connection with the eruption of international conflicts. Realist theory undeniably yields one of the most fundamental insights in discovering the reason behind the war between states. In this regard, classical realism finds the malformed nature of human beings as the main driving force behind the conflict in the international realm. According to classical realists, relations between states are just like relations between people. States, like people, seek power, and the main reason for doing this is power politics. In accordance with classical realism, structural realism also emphasizes the importance of power politics in inter-state relations. However, different from classical realism, it underscores the impact of the anarchic structure of the international system on state behavior. Structural realists stress that anarchy prevails in international relations that leaves states no other choice but to pursue power to survive. Thus, realists underline the following two points that constitute the origin of international conflicts. The first concerns the flawed human nature highlighted by classical realists. The second major argument of realists regarding international conflict is the anarchic nature of international relations. Realists, especially structuralists, point out that since there is no higher

authority over states in international relations, one state can attack another at any moment, and conflicts between states have become inevitable due to this insecure environment.

On the other hand, liberalism finds a direct link between undemocratic regimes and wars in the international domain. In the liberalist view, democratic states do not fight each other because the majority of citizens are involved in decision-making, albeit indirectly. Even though liberalism is compatible with realism in defining the nature of international relations as anarchy, it does not come to the same conclusion as realism. Liberalists believe in the potential of international institutions to resolve disputes between states. For this reason, they do not consider states as the sole actors in the international arena. Additionally, liberalists draw attention to the significance of free trade in reducing the number of international conflicts. In this respect, unlike realists who view inter-state cooperation as a zero-sum game, liberalists argue that free trade between states leads to a win-win situation and thus promotes peace in international relations. Thus, from the liberal point of view, war stems from the anarchic nature of international relations that can be abolished by the promotion of democratic regimes in domestic politics and the establishment of international institutions in the international arena. Besides, free trade ought to be encouraged between states to achieve lasting peace in international relations.

Finally, the chapter examined constructivism as a social theory that profoundly affected the International Relations discipline. The rise of constructivism in international relations coincides with the end of the Cold War. Since the mainstream IR theories failed to explain the end of the Eastern Bloc, constructivism began to question the tenets of those theories. It dwelt on the role of ideology, identity, norms, and rules, along with material elements, in explaining the social world. Constructivism refuses to consider the social world as a given condition but rather highlights the dynamic relations between agents

and structure. For constructivism, neither agents nor structures are static, but rather they tend to transform both themselves and each other because they are constantly in interaction. In this sense, constructivists claim that *anarchy is what states make of it*. For this reason, the intensity of international conflicts may vary depending on the time and space factors which include not only material but also ideational components.

Questions for Self-control

1. Why do we need to examine the theories of International Relations when studying international conflicts and the peace process?
2. What is the connection between human nature and anarchy in initiating a war between states?
3. Do democratic or undemocratic regimes matter in causing international conflicts or avoiding them?
4. What is the impact of free trade on international actors in promoting world peace?
5. What is the relationship between agents and the structure of international relations in analyzing international conflicts?

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CHAPTER 4

CONTROL OF MILITARY POWER AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Reader's Guide

The more widespread the conflicts between states, the more the approaches claiming to deal with these conflicts. Among other approaches claiming to cope with the international conflicts, this chapter outlines some of the most common. In this regard, the first section describes the balance of power approach and uncovers its pros and cons in achieving international peace. Subsequently, the chapter introduces the collective security principle and displays its role in ensuring peace among states. Besides, this chapter sheds light on the idea of eliminating weapons to wipe wars off the world stage. Finally, it clarifies four peaceful means (negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement) to resolve disputes between states.

Taxonomy of the theme and learning outcomes:

1. Engaging with the approaches that claim to thwart international conflicts;
2. Describing the balance of power approach in international relations and uncovering its role in maintaining the status quo;
3. Evaluating the tenet of collective security in comparison with the balance of power in terms of its effectiveness for deterring aggressor states;
4. Enlightening the ideas of disarmament and arms control and their potential in promoting world peace;
5. Analyzing the strengths and drawbacks of the four peaceful means

(negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement) in the resolution of international disputes.

Introduction

So far, it has been investigated whether the states of conflict and peace are embedded in human nature or whether they are certain features that people acquire depending on their environment. Besides, the causes of war have been explored at three levels of analysis (individual, state, and international) to find out what level to focus on to illuminate a particular conflict. Furthermore, conflict and peace concepts have been studied through three mainstream IR theories to widen horizons in comprehending the state of conflict and peace. This chapter, on the other hand, sheds light on the conditions necessary for the prevention of international disputes and the peaceful settlement of existing disputes. To this end, the first chapter introduces the principle of balance of power which describes a state of affairs where there is a power equilibrium between two major international actors or camps. The second section aims to expound on the understanding of collective security and its effectiveness in preventing international conflicts. The third part focuses directly on disarmament and arms control to reveal their role in building a peaceful international environment. In other words, the section explores the idea of eliminating weapons, i.e. means of war, in order to hinder international conflicts. The final section of the chapter clarifies methods of peaceful resolution of international conflicts such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement.

Balance of Power

The balance of power is one of the most common notions one may encounter in studying international politics. The notion is concerned with peace studies as it promises by some means to intercept the outbreak of war. Basically, the balance of power in international politics means that the power relations among states bear a resemblance to an almost or flawless equilibrium so that one party does not have an overwhelming advantage in military power over the other. The advocates of the balance of power presume that security in international society can endure only if there is a tantamount power relationship between the international actors. They stress that unbalanced power relations are perilous to stable international order because predominant power increases the risk of the inception of the war. The risk stems from the assumption that the stronger actor may incline to conquer, dominate or destroy the weaker states. Therefore, it is of vital importance to adjust power relationships delicately between states in order to achieve a stable international order.

Although the balance of power is one of the most common concepts in international relations, scientists cannot reach a consensus regarding its meaning. According to Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, the word *balance* does not fit well for a proper definition of the notion. For them, *balance*, if it assumes the perception of a pair of scales, implies two actors are in equilibrium. Brown and Ainley unveil the root idea behind the balance of power as: “the notion that only force can counteract the effect of force, and that in an anarchical world, stability, predictability, and regularity can only occur when the forces that states are able to exert to get their way in the world are in some kind of equilibrium.” [1, p. 98-99] The authors offer a *chandelier* to be used instead of *balance*. [1, p. 99] A chandelier remains stable as long as the weights affixed to it are shared out to such a degree that the forces they apply are in equilibrium. Brown and Ainley warn that the chandelier remains stable unless one of the weights

becomes heavier. This metaphor is much better suited to characterize the condition of balance of power in the complicated international system.

Joseph Nye and David Welch are other two scholars who draw attention to the perplexing character of the balance of power. In the opinion of scientists, the confusing feature of this concept is mainly due to its effectiveness in maintaining stability in the international arena. For instance, the eighteenth-century British philosopher David Hume described the balance of power as a stable rule of cautious politics, while nineteenth-century English liberal Richard Cobden named it as “chimera - an indescribable, incomprehensible nothing.” [2, p. 85] Similarly, Woodrow Wilson, then president of the United States blamed the principle of the balance of power for the outbreak of World War I. [3, p. 146] British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston, on the contrary strictly pursued the balance of power politics. Likewise, Prime Minister Winston Churchill embraced the balance of power politics. Although Churchill was a strict anti-communist, he did not hesitate to ally with Stalin's Soviet Union to thwart Nazi Germany from becoming a dominant power in Europe. In this respect, Churchill famously stated: “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.” [2, p. 87]

In brief, adherents of the balance of power argue that the anarchic structure of the international system attains stability when the power is evenly distributed among international powers. Although stability does not necessarily mean peace, the balance of power, its adherents claim, is critical to avoid international conflicts. The balance of power theory has been criticized for various reasons. One of the main criticisms directed to the theory is that it ignores the internal dynamics of states. The advocates of the balance of power presume that states ally against the rising power in international relations. In this sense, they tend to evaluate states as *black boxes*. For them, states react to growing forces by forming allies regardless of their internal affairs such as culture, religion, ethnic

identity, etc. Looking at history, needless to say, one can easily encounter myriad samples which both prove and disprove the balance of power approach. For example, when war broke out between Iraq and Iran in 1980, it could be assumed, after paying attention to the internal affairs of the warring parties, that all Arab states would support Iraq. Since the overwhelming majority of Arab states are Sunni Muslims, it would be reasonable to guess that Iraq will be backed up against Shia Iran. However, Syria opted to assist Iran regardless of its ideological division. Obviously, Syria preferred Iran over Iraq, fearing the growing power of its neighboring country. In this case, the balance of power approach proves its validity very well. On the contrary, when the United States participated in World War I in 1917, it would be plausible, from the balance of power point of view, to assume that it would join the German and Austria side rather than Britain, France, and Russia because they were the weak party. Still, the United States joined the latter side despite its strength compared to the former one. In this case, it can be contended that the balance of power approach failed to predict the coupling of states. All in all, it would be fair to allege that although the balance of power theory works quite well at times, it falls short in preventing international conflicts in many other cases. Therefore, it is still necessary to explore other options that claim to be effective in preventing war between states.

Collective Security

Collective security underlines the idea of ensuring international security through the agency of military power, based on the belief that peace can be maintained by a firm preponderance of power. In the context of collective security, the international community promises to stand up for the attacked member states by all means necessary. In this sense, it is thought that if the capacity of the possible aggressor state is to be surpassed by a collective force, then the

international system cannot be dominated by a sole power. From this point of view, since the aggressor force can be deterred by the superiority of the collective power, the onset of the war can be prevented, and thereby peace can be sustained.

Let's return to the anarchic nature of the international system for a moment to comprehend the collective security in connection with the balance of power. As it has been laid out in the previous chapter, the mainstream IR theories such as Realism and Liberalism recognize the anarchic nature of international relations, where is claimed to be the absence of any higher authority above states. In this respect, states are assumed to be sovereign in the context of the Westphalian state order. The sovereign states were thought to be the ultimate power over their people within the territories recognized in advance. This anarchic nature of the international system is also described as a *self-help* system. The self-help system is quite in line with the tenet of the balance of power. As we set out in the previous section, states tend to balance growing power in the international realm within the frame of the balance of power.

In both cases, although states cooperate to overcome the opponent, the principle of collective security is quite different from the balance of power. According to Ho-Won Jeong, the advantage of collective security over the balance of power lies in the effectiveness of the deterrence factor. [4, p. 85] Since the capacities of the sides are assumed to be in equilibrium in the balance of power, there may be a misperception in the calculation of the opponent's strength. However, the capacity of collective force is crystal-clear for the aggressor states, and therefore the commence of war is quite unlikely in the first place.

Collective security also assumes that all states benefit from the maintenance of peace. This understanding suggests that any attempt to undermine peace is a threat to the international system. States, therefore, ought to react

simultaneously against the aggressor. Jeong lists three basic prerequisites for the collective security policy to function properly. [4, p. 86] First, states must be prepared to forego their independent foreign policy, at least to some extent, for the sake of international peace. Whenever aggression takes place and threatens international peace, states must act in coordination to achieve an effective result. This is not always easy for states because they are considered to be sovereign actors in international relations. Some states may have good relations with aggressor states that they may not wish to spoil for many reasons. However, it is vital to act jointly and impose economic sanctions and even launch military operations against the aggressor for the sake of maintaining international peace. Second, Jeong emphasizes, member states of the collective security need to find out or decide if international peace is under threat or not. In other words, they must reach a consensus in determining exactly when and by whom the international peace is undermined. Third, the tenet of collective security works best if the power among international actors is widely distributed. This factor, which is also valid for the balance of power, is important in the sense that the attacker should not have greater power compared to the collective force.

Joseph Nye and David Welch identify three fundamental differences between collective security and the balance of power. First, the member states of collective security concentrate on the aggressive policies of states rather than their capacities. As mentioned, the tenet of the balance of power suggests that states must form an ally to balance any rising power in the international arena regardless of its aggressive or peace-loving policies. In contrast, the collective security approach pays attention to the malign policies of the states rather than their growing capacities. Second, coalitions in the frame of collective security cannot be formed beforehand, unlike in the balance of power where coalitions are formed in advance, due to the unpredictability of which state will be the aggressor. However, once the aggression took place, members of the collective

security must react swiftly and collectively. The last distinctive characteristic of the collective security from the balance of power is, Nye and Welch assert, its universality and globality. All states are expected to join the collective security organization because the presence of too many neutral countries weakens the organization's hand against the aggressor state. [2, p. 118-119]

In the modern age, the need for collective security occurred in the wake of World War I. It has been argued that the balance of power approach was the main reason behind the devastating war between 1914 and 1918. One of the most well-known advocates of collective security was Woodrow Wilson, the U.S. president during World War I. Wilson blamed the balance of power to be responsible for the outbreak of the war. In this regard, Wilson stated: "The balance of power is the great game now forever discredited. It's the old and evil order that prevailed before this war. The balance of power is a thing that we can do without in the future." [2, p. 117] Implying collective security, Wilson maintained: "There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace." Wilson strongly defends the necessity of collective security reflected in his following sentences:

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances that would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection. [3, p. 148-149]

The idea of collective security was not just a wish but was embodied in the League of Nations established in the aftermath of World War I. All member states pledged to protect the victim country against the aggressor one in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. States also agreed to submit their disagreements to arbitration instead of going to war in Articles 12 and 15.

Moreover, any war that violated the League of Nations Charter was considered a declaration of war against all members of the organization. [2, p. 119] However, as stated earlier, joining the League of Nations and thus accepting the principle of collective security was a great challenge for states. It was a challenge because states were not inclined to relinquish their sovereignty for the sake of international peace. This was the main factor behind the refusal of the United States to join its own creation, the League of Nations. Although the collective security in the context of the League of Nations achieved some minor successes throughout the 1920s, it failed to prevent the developments in the 1930s which led to World War II.

Case Study 5

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international organization established in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty among 12 countries. The background of the creation of the faction originated for several reasons. After Germany's defeat in WWII, the power of the Soviet Union expanded into Europe, which led to the growing influence of the USSR and the start of the Cold War. In this way, the alliance's primary purpose was to form collective security and defense to counter the Soviet Union's influence throughout the continent and prevent the expansion of nationalism by uniting the countries in Europe after the devastating war.

One of the most critical articles of the treaty is Article 5, which states that any threat to the sovereignty of any member state will be considered an attack on all allies. In this context, European countries have assured the US protection in case of an attack on their sovereignty. Nevertheless, NATO has adopted the Out of Area mission in the wake of the Cold War. In 2003, at the request of the UN and the Afghan government, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force mission, and thereby it made its first deployment outside Europe and North America.

Even though the United Nations replaced the League of Nations following World War II, it also could not avoid experiencing the fate of the League. Of course, the United Nations benefited from its predecessor in many ways, but in

general, the member states prioritized their national interests over the mutual interests aimed at preventing international peace. Nevertheless, unlike the League of Nations, the United States joined the United Nations, which can be considered an advantage of the latter over the former. In addition, the United Nations Security Council, which includes five permanent member states (Britain, the United States of America, Russia, France, and China), was created to identify the breach of peace and the aggressor. However, the incompatibility and clash of interests among the permanent members consistently prevent reaching a consensus in detecting aggressors or violations of international peace.

As a result, collective security developed in the modern era, mainly as a reaction to the principle of balance of power after World War I. While ostensibly, it does have advantages over the balance of power in preventing international conflict, its effectiveness in practice is questionable. Its incompetence can be easily realized if looking at history. While there are numerous cases where permanent members have exercised their veto power to block the decision-making process in the Security Council, there are only a few examples (such as Korean War or Gulf War) where coalition forces have been formed and reacted against the aggressor. Furthermore, the main actors (permanent members) often tend to act when a particular international issue is in line with their national interests. For this reason, the Security Council becomes dysfunctional as the national interests of one force are, in most instances, at odds with others. Therefore, it can be concluded that the collective security approach is often insufficient to sustain international peace. The following section investigates the usefulness of disarmament and arms control strategies in preventing inter-state wars.

Disarmament and Arms Control

The balance of power and collective security, defined in the previous two sections, deal with international conflict by sidestepping one of the major components of war - weapons. While the former strives to maintain stability by preventing any actor from becoming the sole force in the realm of international relations, the former puts faith in the preponderance of collective power in dealing with the aggressor. These approaches pay attention to neither the quantitative constraints on the arsenal possessed by the sovereign actors nor the destructiveness of those weapons. Disarmament and arms control, on the contrary, draw attention directly to the eventual elimination or reduction of weapons. Although disarmament and arms control are often used interchangeably, these two concepts are quite different in both their purpose and accessibility. Disarmament refers to a massive reduction of weapons and ultimately their eradication from world theater while arms control addresses restrictions on certain types of weapons. In this respect, reaching the state of disarmament is extremely difficult as it requires the revocation of the status quo, and for this very reason, the practices of arms control can be observed more often than disarmament in the international arena. While disarmament is difficult to obtain, the reduction of arsenal and the elimination of certain types of weapons can certainly lessen the chances of commencing war, and thereby it can contribute to human well-being.

According to Marc Pilisuk, a Peace and Conflict Studies scholar, the goal of disarmament is to yield such an environment that states do not seek weapons for ensuring their security. Pilisuk defines disarmament as “The dream of disarmament envisions a world in which conflicts still occur but the rules for their resolution preclude the possible use of lethal weapons.” [5, p. 96] Nevertheless, disarmament has not been or could not be widely implemented in the long history of warfare. Most efforts over the past century, however, have

focused on eliminating certain categories of weapons instead of absolute disarmament. Self-imposed disarmament is rare in the history of international relations, but disarming the opponent is quite desirable. Such occasions occur particularly in the wake of wars where the winner dictates the loser to be disarmed. This was exactly what happened after World War II when Germany and Japan were forced to be disarmed by the winners. Nonetheless, there are some cases where states prefer to disarm their own free will. Japan had given up and avoided the use of firearms in warfare for nearly 200 years, beginning in the mid-1600s, long before it was forced to disarm after World War II. Instead of firearms, the sword was the central weapon for fighting during that period. The prohibition of using firearms was lifted only in the mid-nineteenth century due to external threats to the intervention in Japanese affairs. [5, 96-97]

Early international efforts on the constraints of arsenal took place on the eve of World War I, at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and 1907. Although disagreement on the areas of weapons to be prohibited prevented achieving a general agreement, the peace conference itself was an important step for further initiatives. The magnitude of World War I calamity triggered new discussions on arms control. Some politicians, including Woodrow Wilson, made radical statements about controlling the arms race at the Versailles Conference, signed in 1919.

Several international attempts on arms control took place between World War I and II. Proportional lessening of naval forces was proposed at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922, where the distribution of the number of battleships owned by Italy, Japan, France, Britain, and the U.S. was determined in the ratio of 1.67, 1.67, 3, 5 and 5 respectively. Similarly, the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol even though its implementation was left to the goodwill of the countries. The protocol was strengthened in the context of the United Nations signed by 130 countries in

1993. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons came into operation in 1997 to implement the treaty.

In 1932, the Disarmament Conference was held within the framework of the League of Nations to eliminate offensive weapons. The conference could not produce fruitful results, as countries could not reach an agreement on which weapons were offensive and which were defensive. The French government made an interesting proposal to outlaw war between France and the United States, and this resulted in the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1927, a multilateral agreement to avoid war and resolve interstate disputes via peaceful means.

Following World War II, there have been various international attempts to halt or limit the use of particular weapons. Some of the agreements banned stationing deadly weapons in certain areas of the earth. The Antarctic treaty of 1959, for instance, ensured the demilitarization of the continent by banning the installation of permanent military bases. Similarly, the Outer Space Treaty signed in 1967 prohibits testing or positioning any weapon or engaging in military activities in orbit. Moreover, the Seabed Agreement (1971) prohibits placing lethal weapons in the bottom of the ocean beyond the 12-mile coastal line. Major deals on arms control have undoubtedly been made in the field of nuclear weapons. The Limited Test Ban Treaty signed by the major nuclear forces in 1963 prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, the atmosphere, and on the seabed. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968 to halt the dissemination of nuclear weapons to new countries. Another progress was made in 1993 when 130 countries signed the Chemical Weapons Convention at the UN General Assembly. The convention entered into force in 1997 and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was established to implement it. Besides, as of May 2021, 164 states have become party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their

Destruction (1997). [6] Nevertheless, some leading global actors such as the United States, Russia, or China have not signed the convention.

During the Cold War and its aftermath, some important agreements on arms control were made between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1972, SALT II in 1979, and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in 1991, treaties aimed to cope with the research, development, and deployment of various nuclear weaponry systems. The treaties particularly aimed to reduce the quantity of the weapons rather than dealing with their quality. Following the START I, the START II treaty was agreed on two summits between George H.W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin in 1993 though it never came into force.

Along with the above-mentioned treaties on arms control, several obstacles thwart the disarmament process. One of the most critical obstacles stems from the anarchic nature of international relations. As long as the self-help principle of international relations continues to exist, states tend to quest for power to maximize their chance to survive. Nevertheless, one state's military build-up automatically poses a threat to the other state(s). When a state strengthens its military capacity, even for defensive purposes, other states feel insecure, which creates a security dilemma. This is undoubtedly linked to the absence of an international institution that could impose sanctions on states to fulfill their commitments. In other words, the lack of global governance that could minimize distrust among international actors and direct them to disarmament constitutes one of the biggest obstacles in preventing the process of armament. Another obstacle to disarmament, Ho-Won Jeong underlines, is the cost of disposal of weapons. For instance, it costs just three US dollars to produce an anti-personnel mine that, once laid, can sustain active for up to 50 years and hinder efficient use of land and roads. However, it costs one thousand US dollars to deactivate a landmine. [4, 110] Furthermore, the cost of the destruction of chemical and

nuclear weapons is much higher. To put in perspective, the total cost of extermination of 31,000 tons of chemical weapons in the US arsenal in the early 1990s was estimated by the US General Accounting Office in 2004, to exceed 25 billion USD. [7, p. 1202-1203]

In short, disarmament and arms control are additional measures that some policymakers, particularly those from *non-realist* current, try to implement to prevent international conflicts. Unlike the balance of power and collective security, disarmament and arms control are directly concerned with the elimination of weapons to achieve peace in international relations. Even though there are several obstacles to achieving enduring peace, such as security dilemmas, lack of global governance, or the cost of extirpating weapons, a number of achievements have been made to reduce or control the arms race among international actors. Although the tenets of disarmament and arms control provide some degree of peace among international actors, they are far from yielding a peaceful international environment as long as the self-help principle of international relations exists. The next section uncovers some of the methods for finding peaceful resolutions to international conflicts.

Methods of Conflict Resolution

So far, three different approaches (balance of power, collective security, and disarmament and arms control) aimed at preventing international conflicts have been clarified. The first two approaches suggest a particularly hard power to sidestep conflicts between international actors. On the one hand, the tenet of the balance of power underlines the importance of the balance of power that states cannot defeat each other and therefore see no benefit in commencing a war. On the other hand, the principle of collective security draws attention to a policy of deterrence through a unified force to deter an aggressor state from going to war. Along with these two approaches, disarmament and arms control strategies,

which concentrate directly on the elimination of the means of war, have been elucidated. This section will briefly shed light on some methods of peaceful resolution of international conflicts such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement.

Not surprisingly, the conflicting parties have tried to find a peaceful solution to their disputes before starting a war throughout human history. This viewpoint is compatible with the following statement of Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese military strategist: “Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” [8, p. 11] Along with the historical samples, finding a peaceful solution to inter-state disputes is particularly popularized in the wake of World War I. League of Nations Covenant, for instance, requires states to submit their disputes to peaceful means, such as negotiation, arbitration, mediation, or investigation. Similarly, the UN Charter Chapter 6, titled *Pacific Settlement of Disputes*, calls upon states to resolve their inter-state disputes peacefully through the use of various methods, including inquiry, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, judicial settlement, and arbitration.

Undoubtedly, negotiation is one of the oldest methods used to halt international conflicts. To this end, dignitaries such as diplomats get involved in the negotiation process to seek common ground between the warring parties. The main purpose of international negotiation is to achieve an agreement between the conflicting parties through joint decision-making. Compromise, usually, is the keyword in the negotiation process. States try to maximize their national interests in negotiation by making concessions. However, states are mostly reluctant to make concessions when their national interests are at stake. In this respect, the possibility of making concessions depends directly on the influence of the state compared to its opponent. In other words, if there is a clear imbalance between adversaries, the weaker side is more likely to compromise,

while the dominant prefers to keep its original position as much as possible. Conversely, in power-balanced situations where neither side can dictate their terms to the other, compromise is more likely to occur. While power is a vital element and often determines the fate of the conflict, the negotiation process is critical in conditions of both imbalances and balance of power. It is important because negotiation provides a basis for the parties to clarify their arguments and understand each other's red lines.

Apart from negotiation, mediation is another common means of conflict resolution to find a peaceful settlement of international conflicts. The main difference between negotiation and mediation is the involvement of a third party in peace negotiations in the latter case.

Case Study 6

Normandy Format Talks

Following the Revolution of Dignity, a war has broken out in the Donetsk and Luhansk districts of Ukraine. Peace negotiation has been started in the context of the Normandy Format to seek a compromise between Ukraine and Russia.

In essence, the Normandy Format talks are the meetings among four countries (Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France) dedicated to finding a peaceful solution to the Donbas conflict. The first meeting, organized in honor of the 70th anniversary of the landing of the anti-Hitler coalition in Normandy, was held in France in 2014. At the first summit, the Heads of the states discussed the economic situation of Ukraine due to military conflict. The most productive meeting was held in Minsk in February 2015, when both sides of the conflict agreed on the Minsk Protocol to end the war in Donbas. However, none of the terms of the agreement were implemented, as Russia and Ukraine accused each other of sabotaging the conflict resolution. During the term of Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine and Russia agreed to take the first steps of termination of fighting by withdrawing heavy military equipment to a certain degree and exchanging military prisoners, and discussing how to fulfill the Minsk Declaration. Meanwhile, the Normandy Format talks stalled in 2016.

Talks were resumed in 2019 by Ukraine's new president, Volodymyr Zelensky. During the year, both Presidents discussed the full exchange of military prisoners and complete fulfillment of the Minsk Declaration. However, peace talks in the context of the Normandy Format have not yet ended the conflict due to disagreement between the parties over the

Sara Horowitz defines mediation in a conflict as “intervention of a third party unfamiliar to the conflict, trustable, unbiased and intending to be neutral.” For Horowitz, the mediator is “a facilitator, educator or communicator who helps to clarify issues, identify and manage emotions, and create options, thus making it possible to reach an agreement avoiding an adversarial battle in court”. [9, p. 51] Jacob Bercovitch lists some characteristics of mediation in a dispute resolution process, some of which include:

Mediation involves the intervention of an outsider - an individual, a group, or an organization, with values, resources, and interests of their own - into a conflict between two or more states or other actors... Mediation is a non-coercive, non-violent, and, ultimately, a non-binding form of intervention... Mediation is a voluntary form of conflict management. The actors involved retain control over the outcome (if not always over the process) of their conflict, as well as the freedom to accept or reject mediation or mediators’ proposals. [10, p. 343]

Mediation is usually more effective when the mediator is a non-state actor but is a representative of an international organization. For example, the Secretary-General of the United Nations sounds more impartial than any governmental agent loyal to a particular state. However, the influence of the mediators is not solely dependent on their neutrality but is closely related to the resources they possess to resolve the dispute. Therefore, even if representatives of international organizations are natural candidates to be mediators, the lack of resources to satisfy the disputants is their disadvantage. On the contrary, powerful international actors often have more influence as mediators due to their leverage on the warring sides. For example, then-US president Jimmy Carter pledged in 1978 to provide Israel and Egypt with 4 billion USD to end the long-lasting

conflict between them. [4, p. 127] Nevertheless, powerful states as mediators may back up one side in the negotiation process by somehow satisfying or threatening the other side. Therefore, mediation takes a complex form in practice and becomes blurred whether a mediator has a specific interest in ending the conflict in favor of one party. Although power is vital in resolving international conflicts, one should not completely underestimate the role of international organizations in their mediation activities. For instance, the UN has been involved in the peacemaking process (also called *good offices*) and has been successful to some extent in various situations including Afghanistan, Angola, Bougainville, Colombia, Cyprus, East Timor, El Salvador, the Former Yugoslavia, Guatemala, Georgia, Haiti, the Iran–Iraq war, Nicaragua, Tajikistan, and Western Sahara. [11, p. 416]

In addition to the negotiation and mediation methods mentioned above, there are two more peaceful means that states often prefer to resolve their disputes: *arbitration* and *judicial settlement*. Arbitration is a judicial procedure in which the disputing parties accept to submit a discord to the judges of their choice, who, in the form of a majority vote, make a legally binding decision. Conflicting sides agree in advance on the procedure and jurisdiction of the arbitration courts. While the decision of an arbitration court has a binding effect, submission of the dispute to the court is optional. When an arbitration tribunal is established, both parties choose their own arbitrators so that the court can be constituted fairly. The disputing parties can be represented by advocates in the arbitration court. On the other hand, judicial settlement can be defined as an institutionalized version of arbitration. The main difference between arbitration and judicial resolution is that states, in the latter case, do not have the freedom to choose judges. Unlike an arbitration court, where the judges are chosen by the parties to the dispute, the parties cannot decide which judges will carry out the case in a judicial settlement. They are members of international courts such as the

International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice. According to Franz Cede, arbitration and judicial settlement have five main features. [12] First, both methods seek the consent of the conflicting parties to acknowledge an independent judicial body's decision on the dispute. In other words, even though their decisions have a binding effect, arbitration and judicial settlement methods have to be agreed upon in advance by the disputants in order to be in charge of the case. Second, acceptance of the jurisdiction of a court may be expressed by the parties temporarily concerning a particular dispute or permanently about certain types of disputes. Third, the disputing parties have a great influence on the composition of the court chosen and the scope of its jurisdiction in the arbitration method, while the judicial settlement method (an institutionalized court such as the ICJ) imposes stricter conditions on the parties and limits their sphere of influence. Fourth, recognizing the authority of judicial settlement by the disputants means accepting the norms of international law as the basis of the judgment. The final feature of judicial settlement, Cede underlines, is about vertical jurisdictions that deal with individual controversies. The author finds this newly developing feature of judicial settlement primarily important in terms of the emergence of international public order.

In brief, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or judicial resolution are the most preferred peaceful resolution means of states when faced with international disputes. However, because of their decision's binding effect states often do not resort to arbitration and judicial settlement to settle their major international disputes. On the contrary, negotiation and mediation means of peaceful settlement are frequently seen in the resolution of international conflicts because of their non-binding effects.

Conclusion

This chapter has defined a set of conditions that claim to be effective in thwarting international conflicts. For this purpose, the balance of power approach has been presented first. Although the balance of power is one of the most frequently used terms in international relations, scientists cannot agree on its effectiveness in preventing conflicts between states. In this sense, they are clustered into two groups, realists and liberals. Realists underline the importance of power equilibrium between states in discouraging them from initiating wars while liberals blame the balance of power understanding as one of the sources of war. The chapter presents a few examples in which states pursue both the balance of power principle and behaviors that can be considered irrational in terms of this principle. Afterward, this section has examined the pros and cons of the collective security approach established to deter aggressor states in international relations. It has been primarily emphasized that although collective security organizations contribute, to a certain extent, to the maintenance of international peace, they are inadequate to restrain aggressor states. This failure stems mainly from the lack of unity among the members of the collective security. This chapter later has shed light on the elimination of weapons as an idea to overcome international conflicts. In this regard, although complete disarmament seems unrealistic, some progress has been made on arms control. Numerous international agreements have been made that prohibit the establishment of military formations in certain areas such as Antarctica or outlaw the use of certain types of weapons, such as chemical weapons. The final section of the chapter has been devoted to the most preferred means of peaceful resolution of international disputes. It has been underlined that the main feature of these methods for the fate of disputes is that their decision has no binding effect on the conflicting parties. On the other contrary, it has been shown that the decisions of arbitration and judicial settlement have a binding effect on

disputants. The factor limiting the impact of the above-mentioned methods on sovereign states is that all methods require the consent of the warring parties. Nevertheless, the development of global governance, which is at odds with the principle of the sovereign state system, should not be underestimated in terms of the advancement of peaceful methods in the resolution of international disputes.

Questions for Self-control

1. What are the best-known approaches that claim to tackle international conflicts?
2. What is the balance of power approach in international relations and what order does it propose in international relations?
3. Evaluate the tenet of collective security in comparison with the balance of power and demonstrate its effectiveness for deterring aggressor states.
4. What are the pros and cons of disarmament and arms control and thereby their potential in promoting world peace?
5. Analyze the strengths and drawbacks of the four peaceful means (negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement) in the resolution of international disputes.

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CHAPTER 5

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Reader's Guide

Uncovering the source of conflicts, as it is emphasized in the previous chapters, is substantial to overcome them and thereby to build a more peaceful international order. Since globalization as a process has been accelerated particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War it has two simultaneous effects in terms of conflicts. On the one hand, it contributes to the reduction of conflicts, on the other hand, it tends to pave the way for new conflicts. In this light, the present chapter probes into the nexus between globalization and international conflicts. To this end, it first outlines several definitions of globalization in order to make the concept clear. The chapter, subsequently, focuses on the discussion of the new war, which has come into vogue with the end of the bipolar world order, to reveal the most common types of warfare in the era of globalization. In the end, it shows under which conditions globalization can be the source of new conflicts and under what conditions it can contribute to the reduction of conflicts in the international arena.

Taxonomy of the theme and learning outcomes:

1. Engaging international conflicts in the context of globalization of world politics;
2. Understanding the concept of globalization by enlightening it's a number of definitions;

3. Evaluating the war literature in the light of new war debate;
4. Uncovering new war debate in the context of the accelerated globalization process;
5. Analyzing the nexus between the new source of international conflicts and peace and globalization.

Introduction

This book, so far, has enlightened some of the most critical cornerstones of international conflicts and peace. To this end, it first unclosed the concepts of peace and conflict. It paid, in that chapter, particular attention to investigating the origin of conflict within the context of the nature-nurture debate. In addition, the state of peace was questioned from a critical point of view. In this respect, the chapter delved into the state of peace from a number of viewpoints including the dynamic relationship between peace and conflict. The second chapter introduced an understanding of conflicts and peace at various levels of analysis. The chapter, in this regard, elucidated the role of individuals in the onset of international conflicts. Subsequently, it examined the causes of conflict at the state-level of analysis. Finally, the chapter clarified the source of international conflict through a systemic level of analysis which emphasizes the link between the structure of the international system and maneuvers of states. To widen the horizons of readers regarding peace and conflict studies, the third chapter examined mainstream IR theories. In this sense, it first defined the main features of political realism and its perspective on the source of international conflict. Successively, the chapter examined the liberal approach and introduced its standpoint about the origin of conflict. In the end, it presented constructivism and explained how this paradigm understands the states of peace and conflict. The fourth chapter aimed to explore the approaches claiming to cope with

international conflicts. The chapter, for this purpose, examined the concept of balance of power which is one of the ways out of political realism to deal with conflicts. Afterward, the chapter outlined the term collective security which is one of the main propositions of the liberal approach to eliminate conflicts from international affairs. The chapter also considered arms control as one of the means to overcome conflicts among international actors. In the end, it shed light on four peaceful means (negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and judicial settlement) asserting to tackle international conflicts.

The present chapter which is thought to be the final one aims to analyze international conflicts in the age of globalization. In this regard, the chapter will briefly throw light on the concept of globalization and then it will demonstrate the nexus between globalization and international conflicts. The chapter will particularly highlight the new war debate and its connection with the globalization process. It is of vital importance to comprehend if the nature of war has changed since the end of the Cold War or not. Therefore, the chapter will focus on the post-Cold War period to understand international conflicts in the contemporary age.

Globalization: How to Understand It?

Studying globalization has gained momentum particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War. However, it is beyond the main scope of this book to examine global studies in depth. At this stage, it is sufficient to understand what the concept of globalization means in general. There are numerous definitions of globalization that are worth mentioning, at least some of them, in order to get its content. Globalization, according to well-known scholar Anthony Giddens, is “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.” [1, p. 60] For Giddens, to comprehend globalization one needs

to pay attention to the driving forces of modernity. He underlines the intersecting processes of industrialization, capitalism, militarism, and statism as the impetus of globalization. Despite defining globalization as a long historical process that witnesses growing engagement of the world's major civilizations, George Modelski, in a similar vein with Giddens, underlines the link between globalization and modernity.

David Held and his colleagues define globalization as “a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact - generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.” [1, p. 68] Similarly, globalization is defined by George Ritzer and Paul Dean as “a trans-planetary *process* or set of *processes* involving increasing *liquidity* and the growing multidirectional *flows* of people, objects, places, and information as well as the *structures* they encounter and create that are *barriers* to, or *expedite*, those flows.” [2, p. 2] Another definition of globalization is introduced by Anthony McGrew as follows: “a historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents.” [3, p. 20] Globalization, for William R. Nester, is just “another word for the ever more complex economic, technological, psychological, social, legal, cultural, environmental, and, thus, political interdependence embracing, in varying ways and degrees, all nations and individuals on the planet.” [4, p. 1] Globalization, for Patricia J. Campbell et al., is “a complex web of social processes that intensify and expand worldwide economic, cultural, political, and technological exchanges and connections”. [5, p. 4] Manfred B. Steger, on the other hand, defines globalization as it “refers to the multidimensional and uneven intensification of social relations and consciousness across world-time

and world-space.” He then further shortens and simplifies his definition: *Globalization is about intensifying planetary interconnectivity.* [6]

As shown, a wide range of definitions of globalization can be noticed in literature. Even though expressed in a different way, they mostly refer to the intensification of social relations across world-time and world-space as Steger emphasized. Under these circumstances, this chapter focuses on the international conflicts and peace in the context of intensified social relations of the world community. It seeks the answer to the question of whether the intensifying globalization reduces the conflicts in the field of international relations or triggers multifaceted international conflicts depending on the intensity of the globalization process. However, before analyzing the nexus between globalization and international conflicts it is essential to look at the advancements in the war literature in the wake of the Cold War.

The War Literature in the Light of Globalization

Mary Kaldor divides wars into two categories: *old wars* that reinforced states’ monopoly on violence, and *new wars* that appeared as a result of the disintegration of nation-states. For Kaldor, old war refers to the wars that took place between the late eighteenth and the mid-twentieth century. She describes old wars as “the war between states fought by armed forces in uniform, where the decisive encounter was battle.” [7, p. 492] In this framework, Kaldor implies that Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of war corresponds to the old wars. According to the scientist, old wars were fought, at least in theory, according to certain rules which were supposed to minimize civil losses or to treat prisoners of war well, etc. For her, these rules were significant to legalize the wars. Put it another way, there was a clear distinction between criminals and national heroes or murder and legitimate killing. [7] By flirting with Charles Tilly’s argument, Kaldor claims that old wars caused the rise of nation-states. “Old wars were of

wars state-building.” [8, p. 212] However, new wars are just the opposite of old wars. They stem from the disintegration of the state structure. This tendency causes the state’s monopoly on violence to erode. While the influence of army and police formations decreases para-military and organized crime groups arise. [9, p. 506] Based on the Bosnia-Herzegovina war between 1992 and 1995, Kaldor came up with a reason that new wars involve criminals, non-state actors, and warlords whose goal is economic as much as political. In new wars, some groups are interested in prolonging the conflicts along with the actors who tend to end them. [10, p. 9]

Along with Mary Kaldor, several other scholars also assessed Clausewitz’s theory as an outdated work. One of those scholars is John E. Shephard. Three factors, according to Shephard, make *On War* (Clausewitz’s masterpiece) irrelevant for the contemporary world: The age of nuclear weaponry; transnational constabulary warfare; and the transformation of statecraft. [11, p. 85] Another well-known scholar is Martin van Creveld who attempts to refute *On War* based on the ‘trinitarian war’ concept. In this sense, Creveld argues that Clausewitz’s trinity consists of three elements: people, government, and army. Starting from this point of view, Creveld claims that Clausewitz’s understanding of war involves states as the only actors of international relations. [12, p. 33-63]

Kalevi J. Holsti asserts that since 1945, most of the wars are within the states rather than between. According to his research, almost 77 percent of the 164 wars which occurred during this period were not between states, but between armed groups within the states. [13, p. 21] For Creveld, the transformation of war is associated with the decline of the state structure. Eroding of state structure transforms war from being a rational activity into an irrational one. This process also contradicts the act of the war as a continuation of policy. Instead, the new wars, for Creveld, will be driven by technology, culture,

religious fanaticism, etc. According to him, the diminishing influence of states in international relations has accelerated the aging process of the Clausewitzian view. [14, p. 217]

Thus, Creveld argues that “if any part of our intellectual baggage deserves to be thrown overboard, surely it is not the historical record, but the Clausewitzian definition of war that prevents us from coming to grips with it.” [12, p. 57-58] John Keegan, another critic of *On War*, also believes that Clausewitzian thought cannot help us to understand the new wars. Referring to the conflicts in Balkan and the South Caucasus, Keegan asserts that these wars are no longer rational. They are ‘primitive wars’ which are the research field of anthropologists. [15, p. 58] Therefore, he states that the Clausewitzian definition of war is not applicable to these apolitical wars.

Scholars such as Heidi Toffler or Admiral William Owens point out that new technological developments in military affairs provide new opportunities that make the Clausewitzian theory of war invalid. In this sense, Owens published a book titled *Lifting the Fog of War based on Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)*. For him, advanced technology in the US military refuted ‘friction’ or ‘chance’ factors in wars. [16, p. 47-48] Moreover, William S. Lind et al. proposed another form of war concept. For them, modern human history has witnessed three generations of warfare, and the current world is experiencing a *fourth-generation war* (4GW). [17, p. 22-26] In this era, even though the Western countries obtain advanced military technology they are unable to resist the threats which come from the combination of terrorists and guerilla warfare. They are unable to do so because they still use military methods which belong to previous generations of warfare.

Emile Simpson is another scholar who investigates the relevance of Clausewitzian thought in contemporary wars. He argues that Clausewitz’s

definition of war makes clear that *On War* does not apply to all wars. Simpson points out that Clausewitz depicted war as a dual-action. However, contemporary multiplayer wars, such as the war in Syria, are excluded. Second, Clausewitz assumes that the enemy is a unified entity. Thus, he has no explanation for networked terrorist groups, where a military operation may not necessarily affect the whole parts of the network. Third, for Clausewitz, wars are combat-centered, and fighting is their only tool. In this regard, for Simpson, Clausewitz is insufficient to interpret hybrid wars composed of multifaceted elements such as cyber-attacks or economic sanctions. [18, p. 10-11] Following Stanley McChrystal's distinction between networked and hierarchical enemies, Simpson argues that the Clausewitzian definition of war fits the hierarchical one which represents *old wars*. [18, p. 15]

By approaching from a different perspective, Kaldor also claims that the Clausewitzian theory of war represents the wars that took place in Europe during the 19th and 20th centuries. She refers to Clausewitz's *absolute war* definition to shore up her argument. [19, p. 271] An *absolute war* for Clausewitz occurs when one side forces the other to react. In this regard, each of the sides eventually forces its rival toward extremes. [20, p. 75-76] Kaldor argues that, even though this is Clausewitz's absolute war definition, the inner nature of old wars has a similar tendency. However, she maintains, new wars have different inner nature. Unlike the old wars, new wars are "inconclusive, long-lasting, and tend to spread." [19, p. 271]

Although his works were banned under the rule of the Soviet Union due to his anti-communist worldview, one of the groundbreaking studies on future wars was realized by the Colonel of the Tsarist Army Evgeniy Messner who took part in the First World War and fought against the Bolsheviks in the course of the Russian Civil War. Messner, the most renowned Russian military theorist of the twentieth century, moved to South America after the Second World War. He

published a work called 'The Face of Modern War' in Buenos Aires in 1959. In this work, Messner concentrated on analyzing the covert characteristic of the Cold War. By noticing the emergence of a new phenomenon in war affairs, Messner formulated his new war theory (Мятеж Война). [21, p. 83]

According to the Russian military strategist, the boundaries between regular troops and civilians are blurred in rebellion wars. In other terms, Messner points out that conventional forces have lost their monopoly over the new form of warfare which ignores the law of war and morality. [22, p. 22-23] Moreover, he underlines the psychological aspect of the new wars. For Messner, rebellion wars fulfill the requirements of the irregular groups with lower social status such as terrorists, guerillas, or criminal groups. According to him, these groups constantly need motivation for fighting which increases the value of *information warfare*. Irregular groups emphasize their dissatisfaction regarding their status and accordingly aim to discredit the target state in order to influence the perception of the international community. Messner notes that while regular armies are organized based on self-discipline, the actions of irregular groups depend on the mental moods of their members. [22, p. 23] For this very reason, attacks of irregular groups become unpredictable. In Leszek Sykulski's view, Messner's theory is a forerunner of concepts such as asymmetric or hybrid wars which gained popularity after the 1990s. [23] His findings and observations contain alike elements of contemporary warfare. For example, Messner states:

One should stop thinking that war is when they fight, and peace is when they do not fight. States can be in a state of war without obvious fighting...The modern form of war is rebellion. It is a deviation from dogmas of the classical art of war...Violence (intimidation and terror) and guerilla warfare are the main arms in this war...using guerillas, wreckers, terrorists, saboteurs, propagandists will acquire immense sizes...In the past wars, the annexation of territory was considered as most important. In future wars, the annexation of souls of the enemy-

state will be considered more important. [21, p. 82-84]

William S. Lind and his co-authors joined the discussion of the new war with the article *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation* (1989). The article introduces the 4GW. This new generation warfare, according to the authors, is built upon the previous three generations. For Lind and his colleagues, first-generation warfare represented the tactics of column and line together with the smoothbore musket. In their view, these tactics were partly a response to the technological developments and partly to social conditions that were developed during the French Revolution. [17, p. 1]

The second-generation warfare, Lind et al. argue, reflects qualitative and quantitative development in weapons based on concentrated firepower. The second generation of warfare culminated during WWI. The driving force behind third-generation warfare was, however, ideas. In this context, the Germans had introduced completely new tactics in 1939. The third generation, the authors assert, was based primarily on maneuver which was the first example of nonlinear methods. The interesting point of this article appears in the description of the 4GW. Lind and his co-authors consider that 4GW is not about destroying the enemy physically but collapsing it internally. [17, p. 2]

In the 4GW, identifying the center of gravity of war is highly important. The purpose of war goes beyond the military and includes demoralizing the fighting population and undermining their culture. The authors underline:

The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ may disappear...Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. [17, p. 2-3]

Additionally, Lind and his co-authors draw attention to the psychological aspect

of the 4GW in the light of information/media intervention. Emphasizing technological developments, they also underscore prospective vulnerabilities of states in the future. In this case, the article stresses computer viruses as a new form of weapon which can be translated as cybersecurity in the contemporary world. [17]

Another work that holds similar elements of new wars appeared in 1999. Two Chinese Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui published their work that translated as *Unrestricted Warfare*. Liang and Xiangsui pay attention to technological developments and global economic interconnectedness. [24, p. 22] Their analysis defines warfare beyond its traditional domain. Liang and Xiangsui claim that the principles of new wars are “using all means, including armed forces or nonarmed forces, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” [25, p. 7] They presented this type of war as a completely new phenomenon. According to Liang and Xiangsui, in the past, the war was performed merely by military means. To win the battle, tactics, and strategies were planned in the realm of military thinking. In other words, destroying the enemy for an absolute victory was the main goal in the past. However, this is an outdated idea that needs to be modernized in the contemporary world. The Chinese military thinkers point out:

The great fusion of technologies is impelling the domains of politics, economics, the military, culture, diplomacy, and religion to overlap each other...All of these things are rendering more and more obsolete the idea of confining warfare to the military domain and of using the number of casualties as a means of the intensity of war. Warfare is now escaping from the boundaries of a bloody massacre and exhibiting a trend towards low casualties, or even none at all, and yet high intensity. This is information warfare, financial warfare, trade warfare, and other entirely new forms of war, new areas opened up in the domain of warfare. In this sense, there is now no domain that warfare cannot use, and there is almost no domain that does not have

warfare's offensive pattern. [25, p. 189]

Diversification of war affairs from military to 'information warfare', 'financial warfare', 'trade warfare', and many other realms raises a critical question: How to respond or how to deal with this new unrestricted type of warfare? Unrestricted warfare has been translated by Ronald R. Luman as "there are no rules; no measure is forbidden." [26, p. 2] For Robert Johnson, this translation is compatible with the 'ways' and 'means' of unrestricted warfare. However, political objectives in these wars remain immutable. Therefore, for Johnson, to counter unrestricted wars one should concentrate not on the enemy's 'means' but its 'ends' which are political objectives. [27, p. 152]

Apart from 'unrestricted warfare', 'compound warfare' is another war concept that contains elements in line with the new wars. Thomas M. Huber is the one who coined the term 'compound warfare'. Different from Frank G. Hoffman who emphasizes the distinctive characteristics of new wars, Huber describes compound warfare as a type of war that has existed throughout war history. According to Huber: "compound warfare is the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy." [28, p. 1] For Huber, conventional and unconventional forces together create a harmony with which only the enemy with regular forces can barely cope. Compound warfare is a combination of these two forces that are conducted under a unified direction by a single command and control center to accomplish the same goal. [28, p. 91]

For some scholars, compound warfare is the precursor that provides an intellectual basis for the hybrid war concept. Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson believe that Frank G. Hoffman constructed his definition of hybrid warfare based on compound warfare by including "a synergistic fusion of the elements with the inclusion of terrorism and criminal behavior." [29, p. 9] A similar argument has been introduced by Brian P. Fleming who explicitly

emphasizes that compound warfare ensures the intellectual framework of “the interest-based hybrid threat concept.” [30, p. 13] Hoffman himself admits that he benefited from the work of Thomas Huber. For Hoffman, Huber’s work, ‘Compound Wars: That Fatal Knot’, is not a well-appreciated gem. [31] Besides, Hoffman clarifies how the hybrid war concept is different from compound warfare.

Case Study 7

The Russian Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid Warfare has recently become a buzzword utilized to describe a number of events. After the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine, experts began to seek a new term to define Russia's new form of warfare. Hybrid warfare has become a catchword in the West to refer to Russia’s new wars since NATO overtly used the term in 2014. The term Hybrid Warfare was first conceptualized by Frank G. Hoffman in his 2007 study entitled *Conflict In The 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Hoffman defines hybrid warfare as the *purposeful and tailored violent application of advanced conventional military capabilities with irregular tactics, with terrorism and criminal activities, or a combination of regular and irregular forces, operating as part of a common design in the same battlespace.*

In this light, Russia’s involvement in the Donbas Conflict can be understood within the context of the Hybrid Warfare defined by Frank G. Hoffman. Russia supports separatist forces, irregular forces in Hoffman's terms, in the Donbas against Ukrainian Army. However, when Russia perceives that the Ukrainian Army is gaining strength against the separatist forces, it engages in the war directly, using its regular forces to support irregular forces. This was exactly what happened in the Battle of Ilovaisk in 2014. Russian regular forces engaged in the battle when Ukrainian Army was about to defeat the separatists in August 2014.

For Hoffman, irregular forces in compound wars are merely “second-rate conventional forces. This theory offered synergy and combination at the strategic level but not the complexity, fusion, and simultaneity we foresaw at the operational and even tactical level.” [24, p. 21] By agreeing with Hoffman’s opinion Joseph Dvorak considers that despite the similarities between compound

war and hybrid war, they are different from each other. In the case of compound warfare, for Dvorak, coordination is restricted to the strategic level. Conventional and unconventional forces operate in different parts of the battle rather than waging the battle together. However, hybrid war appears as a fusion of regular and irregular forces in the war. [32, p. 20]

According to Hoffman, in compound wars, two separate forces are exercised in harmony. Hoffman points out that in compound wars, irregular forces attack the enemy's conventional forces to compel them to disperse their units while regular units force the belligerent to focus on defense or to reach critical mass for final offensive maneuvers. [33, p. 34-39] Responding to Hoffman's understanding of compound war, Huber claims that Hoffman does not describe its standpoint properly. Huber considers that the dynamics which Hoffman describes are not historically new. [30, p. 15] In response to Huber, Hoffman once again underlines that compound warfare is made up of two separate forces, whereas hybrid warfare can consist of a single force or there can be various forces serving the same purpose. [30, p. 15-16] For Frank G. Hoffman, the most distinctive feature of modern war lies in the blurred or blended nature of the battle. He remarks: "hybrid wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare." [33, p. 37]

In brief, the abovementioned arguments concerning the new characteristics of warfare in the modern age have been intensified in the war literature. Apparently, contemporary wars contain new elements and are constantly fluctuating depending on the given circumstances. In a similar vein, Clausewitz states:

Every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific principles. It follows that the

events of every age must be judged in the light of their own peculiarities. [20, p. 593]

Analyzing the wars throughout world history shows that the constant character of war does not exist. As ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu portrays, war is like a shape of water that reformulates itself according to the given conditions. [34, p. 101] Besides, this does not imply that each age necessarily will produce its unique character of war. Similar features of war can show up in different times and spaces depending on the given circumstances.

Conclusion

The accelerated globalization process in the wake of the Cold War has been triggered a number of conflicts throughout the world. *The end of history* euphoria which appeared with the end of the bipolar world order disappeared with the rise of civil wars, terrorist attacks, ethnic strife, etc. The arguments of the American scholar Francis Fukuyama who claimed, “liberal democracy may constitute the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government, and as such constituted the *end of history*”, [35, p. xi] soon contested by the 9/11 attack which originated US-led *Global War on Terrorism*. After the 9/11 attack, international relations began to look more like the way Samuel P. Huntington described. Unlike Fukuyama, Huntington did not prospect the *end of history* when the bipolar world order came to an end. In his book entitled *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, [36] Huntington points out that the triumph of capitalism over communism will not pave the way for the spread of liberal democracies from the West to the rest of the world. Instead, he argues that future wars will take place between civilizations rather than states. In this sense, Huntington argued that cultures and religious identities will become the primary source of future conflicts. Observing the developments in the domain of international relations since the

end of the Cold War, it would be very challenging to disprove the overall arguments of Samuel P. Huntington.

As it is known, conflicts have not vanished from the agenda of international relations in the post-Cold War period. Even though inter-state wars have been diminished intra-state conflicts continued to occur. Intra-state conflicts began to take place more between different ethnic or religious groups, especially in countries with weak central governments. It should be added that such ethnic or religious strife has not developed independently of the advancements in global politics. For example, the collapse of the Eastern bloc led to ethnic conflicts in the Balkans. Similarly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union set the stage for intra-state conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. It also promoted interstate warfare, such as the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Although they appear as local wars, the twenty-year war that ended with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan or the Iraq War that lasted from 2003 to 2011 cannot be considered independently of the actions of major actors in international relations. In this sense, local wars are indeed quite international and thereby are interrelated with the developments in international politics. Besides, it should be emphasized that liberal democracies did not become the only political template to be followed by states. For instance, even though Russia showed its desire to adopt liberal democracy in the early 1990s, it soon began to consolidate an authoritarian regime. Similarly, China refused to adopt Western values including liberal democracy. Nevertheless, it has become the biggest challenge for the West, especially the United States. In this sense, globalization, even though intensifies the social relations throughout the planet, does not necessarily yield one-linear progress but rather diversifies political systems in international politics. In this respect, globalization provides an excellent ground for international actors to relate to each other more easily and faster and has the

potential to contribute to the reduction of international conflicts if the actors recognize each other's values rather than imposing their own values on each other.

Questions for Self-control

1. What are the common features of globalization defined by most scholars?
2. What are the main characteristics of international conflicts in the age of globalization?
3. Evaluate the war literature in the light of the new war debate.
4. What is the nexus between the new source of international conflicts and globalization?

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