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
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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Significance of the Research

After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine became an independent and sovereign actor which for many years hesitated and changed its course in the political arena, whether to follow the European course or to take a course in collaboration with Russia and former members of the USSR, such as Belarus. The course of integration into the European Union and joining NATO is a very complex and lengthy process, particularly for the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine. The fact is that the geopolitical location of Ukraine provides a number of advantages for strengthening NATO in this part of the continent, but at the same time, from the Kremlin's point of view, it creates a number of threats to Russia. The heads of the Russian state have repeatedly stated that Ukraine will not join NATO because they will not allow it. Being a neutral state for Ukraine is not possible for a number of reasons, and if we formulate it in one phrase, this is not the ability to defend oneself without outside help. The United States, as one of the leading NATO countries and one of the most powerful states in the world in the defense sector, is very important as an ally for Ukraine. As for the United States of America, Ukraine is a reasonable ally in terms of geopolitics. During the 21st century, Russia violated European security, and sponsored terrorism. It is very important for the United States of America to prevent Russia from realizing its terrorist plans, in particular, in Ukraine.

Studying US-Ukraine Relations is significant for mainly two reasons: The first is related to the security of Ukraine. As it is known, although the Ukrainian people are determined to defend their country, when the Ukrainian and Russian armies are compared, it can be said that Ukraine would not be able to withstand the Russian attacks for a long time. Therefore, the military and economic aid of the USA is of vital importance for Ukraine. The second reason why it is important to examine US-Ukrainian relations stems from the security of Europe and the consolidation of the West against an aggressor state. Since it is not very difficult to predict which

countries Russia will assert new territorial claims against after the invasion of Ukraine it is vital to help Ukraine defend itself, led by the United States. Moreover, the defeat of Ukraine means the weakening of faith in democratic orders in international relations and the strengthening of authoritarian regimes, which is in opposition to the interests of the Western world led by the USA. Hence, examining US-Ukrainian relations is vital to better understand Ukraine's security and the new world order.

1.2 Literature Review

The first book I worked on was *The Eagle and the Trident*. In the pages of the manuscript, the author of the book Stephen Pifer analyzes the successes and failures of American policy towards Ukraine since independence, describes the cultural differences of Ukrainian diplomacy and gives recommendations to the American government.

The author analyzes the mistakes and successes of the American approach to Ukraine. He pays a lot of attention to the signing of the document on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine - the Budapest Memorandum, in the development of which he was personally involved. The diplomat is convinced that nuclear weapons would not protect Ukraine from Russian aggression.

"I am not sure that if Ukraine retained its nuclear weapons, it would solve its problems with Russia. And in the event of a crisis between Ukraine and Russia, the use of nuclear weapons would not help either Russia or Ukraine. "[1]

"Ukraine did not have the infrastructure to keep nuclear weapons. Its creation would cost several billion dollars. But also, if Ukraine kept its nuclear weapons, it would be isolated, there would be no strategic partnership with the United States, there would be no Gor-Kuchma Commission, no invitations to the White House, Ukrainian leaders would probably not be wanted in Europe. there would be no special talks on cooperation with NATO, there would be no cooperation not only with the Association, but with cooperation with the European Union in general. And

if such a Ukraine asked for a low-interest loan from the World Bank or the IMF, a representative of each member state of these institutions would vote against. At the same time, Ukraine would pay a high economic and political price for its nuclear weapons "[2]

The expert analyzes why the Budapest Memorandum in the Ukrainian version provides "US guarantees" of security, but in the English version the word "assurance" is used.

"In January 1994, I and the heads of the Ukrainian and Russian delegations gathered in Moscow for a table. The issues we have discussed are the terms "guarantees" and "assurances". Because "guarantees" sound in Ukrainian and Russian. And I said that we have to agree on paper that the word "guarantee" in the document in English will be understood as "assurance". This was important to us, because in our language, "guarantees" are like commitments to NATO or Japan, they mean the response of the American army. And we explained to the Ukrainians that in case of violation of the memorandum, we are not ready to give Ukraine military guarantees, as before NATO. ... Kyiv understood this, it was their choice, "said the former US Ambassador to Ukraine. [3] Stephen Pifer disagrees when he hears that Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has been called a traitor. He considered another president a traitor.

"Yanukovich is the one who really betrayed Ukrainians. Because, in my opinion, he put his own strength and greed above all else and lost the opportunity to bring Ukraine to Europe." [4]

The author of the book considers corruption to be the greatest enemy of Ukraine.

"It is important for Ukraine to rise up against corruption, to reduce the political influence of the oligarchs, not only to create a normal state, but also to attract investment. Ukraine's corrupt image scares away investors. And this is what Ukrainian leaders must do. I don't think they are ready for that, so in my book I

recommend that the US government tie more aid to certain conditions and put more pressure on reforms, "[5]

To study any work, it is important to pay attention to historical sources, so the book of the Academy of Personnel Management "Ukraine's foreign policy from ancient times to the present" was developed. Since the beginning of Ukrainian-American relations, "the American side is interested in Ukraine's transit capabilities, as well as the capabilities of domestic missile technologies to create and improve intercontinental ballistic missiles. There are prospects for using Ukrainian missile technologies to create a national weapon. It is no secret that in Soviet times the main developers and manufacturers of intercontinental ballistic missiles were stationed in Ukraine, and since its independence, Ukraine has produced 70 rocket carriers that launched 150 satellites into orbit. Pivdenne Design Bureau and Pivdenmash Production Association have retained the potential for production and development in the field of defense missile construction and are involved in servicing the Russian appointment. Other countries have also taken an interest in Ukraine's development of an operational-tactical missile system.» [6] "Chain mail" and so on. The latter also affected Ukraine's relations with NATO. According to the observations of the US President's National Security Adviser Sat. Brzezinski, in addition to geopolitical centers that could potentially threaten the security of the United States (China, Russia, Germany, India and France), there are those whose independent policies can create geopolitical stability (balance) - Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey, Korea and Ukraine. The importance of Ukraine can be explained by several reasons. After Russia, Ukraine was one of the most important parts of the economic and military system of the USSR. And the close rapprochement of the two countries could be a bid to restore a powerful geopolitical force that is contrary to US interests. In addition, the unstable political and economic situation in Ukraine, the uncertainty of its future can significantly affect stability and security in Europe, in particular in the Black Sea region. "[7] and its positive development" The document outlines areas of cooperation: defense and security Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures

is expected to deepen, which is a common priority. In cooperation with the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the parties plan to agree on a structured plan to increase interoperability and coordination of capabilities between Ukraine and NATO, including in-depth training and equipment for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In the economic, trade, and energy sectors, Ukraine and the United States intend to expand cooperation to promote job creation, economic growth, support economic reform and liberalization, develop a trade and investment-friendly business climate, and improve access to markets for goods and services. The United States continues to support Ukraine in meeting its WTO commitments and strengthening investor protection. "[8]

"Ukraine is NATO. 20 years of partnership" by Andrei Piontkovsky, Vladimir Ryzhkov, George Friedman, Taras Wozniak, Igor Todorov, Tatiana Brezhneva. The author of the book clearly explains the situation regarding cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, the position of the alliance on the intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukraine "We consider the so-called" referendum. Constitution and international law, the members of the Alliance do not recognize its results "[9] and also analyze Ukraine's policy on neutrality and explain why Ukraine simply can not be neutral" And how did the neutrality of our country help? And for no reason, the only way out for Ukraine if it wants to preserve its sovereignty is to build cooperation with NATO. We have a lot of tools for this. The level of cooperation should be as high as possible at the moment. But that requires political will. "[10]

"International Organizations" by Tatyana Stroyko is an important source for studying the pros and cons of various international organizations. If we talk about the context of Ukrainian-American relations, it is important to study NATO as an organization and understand how it works and how it can be useful to Ukraine.. "The modern international environment is developing too dynamically. At the same time, there are acute problems of economic, political and social nature. Solve them in peaceful civilized ways - the task of international organizations." [11]

The next book is "Military Diary" by Alexander Mamaluy. To better understand how it all started in 2014, how events unfolded, you need to pay attention to such stories. To military stories was written not by a journalist or a writer, but by an infantry sniper. He wrote on an iPhone in tents and houses of base camps, on short-term vacations and even in the dilapidated building of the meteorological station of Donetsk airport. A sniper-border guard, who had returned from a 77-day business trip to the Land of Great Troubles, was putting them in a book. He was driving on the same scratched iPhone, during night shifts in the reserve mobile group on bail and during the truce. This book is not about heroes and saints, but about ordinary people who risked their heads so that house of ukrainians would not become a front, about people who tried to fight well - because they fought for the Motherland. The author dedicates it to all the soldiers and commanders of the sniper company of the 93rd Guards four-time mech brigade - both alive and dead ... "To your attention - notes about the war that I and my comrades had to fight. She was not particularly heroic, but we do not choose war. It is she who chooses us "[12] with such words the author begins his book.

"European Union. History and principles of functioning" by Valery Kopyko, Tatiana Shinkarenko. The proposed textbook highlights the history and analyzes the current state of European integration. The logic of presenting the material corresponds to the dialectic of integration processes in Europe, starting from the first postwar years and ending with the beginning of the XXI century. The structure of the manual is based on the main stages of European integration, which allows to reveal the patterns and sequence of the European integration process, the formation of a common economic, social, monetary and financial, political and legal, research space, freedom, security and law. Special attention is paid to the issues of relations between Ukraine and the European Union.

It was in the first month of the war that the President of Ukraine did everything possible and impossible to get as much support as possible from Western partners, communicated with the governments of many countries, and did not leave the

country despite the danger. It is these actions that have shown Ukraine as a strong country that does not give up and fights for its freedom and independence. Therefore, the book "Month of War. Chronicle of Events. Speeches and addresses of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky" Oleksandr Krasovytsky will be studied. "What are we hearing today? It's not just rocket explosions, battles, the roar of aviation. It is the sound of a new Iron Curtain lowering and closing Russia away from the civilized world. Our national task - that this curtain did not pass on our Ukrainian territory, and at home with the Russians .. "[13] All information contained in the book can be found on social networks of the President of Ukraine.

Ukraine and the Art of Strategy Kindle Edition next book by Lawrence Freedman. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Lawrence Freedman-author of the landmark Strategy: A History-provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of strategy. Freedman describes the development of President Putin's anxieties that former Soviet countries were being drawn towards the European Union, the effective pressure he put on President Yanokvych of Ukraine during 2013 to turn away from the EU and the resulting 'EuroMaidan Revolution' which led to Yanukovych fleeing. He explores the reluctance of Putin to use Russian forces to do more that consolidate the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, the failure of the Minsk peace process and the limits of the international response. Putin's strategic-making is kept in view at all times, including his use of 'information warfare' and attempts to influence the American election. In contrast to those who see the Russian leader as a master operator who catches out the West with bold moves Freedman sees him as impulsive and so forced to improvise when his gambles fail.

"On March 18, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Crimea, which was part of Ukraine, is now part of Russia. It was a territory seized by Russian special forces in cooperation with local separatists in late February. Soon a similar combination of forces took place in eastern Ukraine. Although these efforts did not

lead to further annexation, separatist enclaves were set up in Donbas with Russian support." [14]

Flashpoint in Ukraine: How the US Drive for Hegemony Risks World War III by Stephen Lendman .Flashpoint in Ukraine provides insight into today's gravest geopolitical crisis since second war Possible global war looms. Viewed from the perspective of Western mainstream media, the crisis arose due to pro-democracy activists overturning a brutal dictatorship, which led swiftly to Russian incursion into Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. "A potential civil war is looming. A regional war may ensue. It is threatened by its spread around the world. The most important thing is to prevent this. Now we are all Ukrainians. Mankind hangs by a thread. Flashpoint in Ukraine explains the main challenges ahead. Hegemons do not stop at anything for the sake of undisputed power. This is how global wars begin. It is worth repeating. Preventing World War III is of the utmost importance." [15]

"Ukraine & the United States: unexpected ways two nations affected each other" by Andy Lazko. The book will help the reader to learn about Ukraine and get insights into some events in the history of Europe and the United States. It is also intended to help the reader to understand the differences between Ukraine and Russia and have a glimpse into the history of the part of Europe. "No. Two completely different peoples! Even more than England, Scotland or Ireland. And the struggle for Ukraine's independence from Russia is probably longer and fiercer than the struggle for Scotland's independence from England, as depicted in Mel Gibson's famous film The Braveheart. In fact, this confusion between Ukraine and Russia is something that Russia has wanted to achieve for centuries - it has needed and still needs the history of Ukraine, Ukrainian traditions, culture and even language. Among other things, she has a habit of appropriating the achievements of Ukrainians"[16]

1.3 The subject of the Research

The subject of our interest is the prospects for cooperation between the United States and Ukraine in the defense sphere to counter Russian aggression, as well as for

cooperation in the future both with NATO and separately with the United States of America as the most powerful country in the defense area.

1.4 Research Question

This work is aimed at answering the following questions: How have Ukrainian-American relations developed since the 1990s? What factors have played in their formation since the independence of Ukraine? Is there a possible NATO membership for Ukraine? In particular, this study aims to answer the question, what are the main reasons for the colossal US military support since Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

1.5 Main Argument

The main argument is that the relations between Ukraine and the United States were formulated in parallel with the relations between Russia and the United States. Another important reason for the relations is connected to the internal dynamics of Ukraine. With the advent of a new president, Ukraine's foreign policy changed frequently. However, in 2014, the Ukrainians made their choice and chose European integration, for which they paid with the temporary occupation of the territories, and later with the war with Russia. Having invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia itself, without realizing it, strengthened relations between Ukraine and America. The United States has become one of Ukraine's main partners both in defense and diplomatic terms. It was the United States that began to react in the early days and support Ukraine by imposing sanctions on the Russian Federation and providing defensive weapons. It was the United States that began to support without hesitation from the first days of the war in Ukraine and in diplomatic terms, negotiations with the leaders of different countries to make certain decisions for the victory of Ukraine.

1.6 Methodology

The work was written with a theoretical approach and the following methods were used:

1. Method of induction. Using this method, the author was able to draw logical conclusions based on the information collected.
2. With the help of the classification method, the author was able in his work to distribute certain countries into certain groups.
3. The method of comparative analysis helped the author compare the similarities and differences of different events.
4. The synthesis method helped the author to combine the already known characteristics of specific events.
5. And the most important method of writing a work is the method of studying and analyzing literature, on the basis of which the author was able to draw certain conclusions based on the sources studied.

1.7 Structure of the Work

The diploma begins with an introduction, which consists of seven parts and explains the essence of the work, the literature review which was inspired by the author, the subject of the work, arguments, and main research questions. Further, the author divided the periods of research until 2014 and after 2014. Until 2014, full-fledged diplomatic relations between Ukraine and America were only born, and not only in the defense sphere but in general. In the second chapter, the author describes the process of the Budapest memorandum and the presidency of Kuchma and Yushchenko. The second chapter ends with an analysis of 2013-2014, which, on the one hand, became sad for Ukraine for a number of reasons, but on the other hand, it was these years that Ukraine returned to its European path. The chapter also contains the presidency of Yanukovich, his escape, and the consequences. The third chapter is a new stage in relations between Ukraine and the United States. It is after 2014 that a number of interesting processes take place, including the signing of

agreements and closer cooperation between Ukraine and the United States. Ukraine in the context of NATO is the fourth chapter, which indicates the principles of NATO, the cooperation of the alliance with Ukraine, and the author's vision of the prospects for Ukraine's further entry into NATO. The fifth chapter, conclusions, answers all the questions posed at the beginning of the work.

CHAPTER 2

2. US-UKRAINE RELATIONS BEFORE 2014

2.1 Relations from the Early 1990s to the Budapest Memorandum

The United States of America (USA) recognized Ukraine as an independent state on December 26, 1991. Following the USA's recognition of Ukraine's independency diplomatic relations were established on January 3, 1992. In the spring of 1992, the first president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk flew to the USA on his first working visit. During the working visit, a number of agreements were signed, namely the Political Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding between the governments of Ukraine and the USA. Also during the working visit, the United States insisted on the earliest possible ratification of the Budapest Memorandum, as Ukraine inherited a part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States also insisted on early ratification of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START I) and the Ukrainian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation, as well as accession to the multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. [17] During the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine maintained a neutral status, but this fact did not prevent Ukraine from actively building relations with NATO. In 1992 Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). Note that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is an international forum that promotes a partnership based on dialogue and cooperation between NATO and non-member states in Europe, Asia and the Caucasus. Participants consult on a range of politico-military and regional and global security issues. Within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, a special role is played by the Partnership for Peace program, which promotes practical bilateral cooperation between a particular partner country and the alliance, taking into account its ambitions, aspirations and desires. In 1994 Ukraine was the first of the post-Soviet republics to join the Partnership for Peace program and opened a NATO Information and Documentation Center on its

territory. Later in 1994, a very important document was signed at that time, namely the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, according to which Ukraine renounced nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees from the United States, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and Russia. An important aspect of the treaty was the clause "This law shall enter into force after the nuclear states provide Ukraine with security guarantees formalized by signing a corresponding international legal document. [18] In simple words, the countries that signed the treaty pledged to refrain from putting pressure on Ukraine that would threaten its sovereignty. On the one hand, this document played a role in establishing constructive relations between Ukraine and Western countries, as well as allowed Ukraine to receive funding from the West. On the other hand, there were plenty of doubts about its implementation. Ukraine was the only state at the time that had given up its nuclear capability at will, and the first president Kravchuk had doubts at the time the treaty was signed. According to the ROSBALAT source, at the 1994 OSCE summit in Budapest, French President Francois Mitterrand said "Son, don't believe this document, you will be deceived," Kuchma said. [19] Also, the third president of Ukraine, Yushchenko, was also reviewing the treaty, although he did not explicitly say so. Surprisingly, years later, the treaty still has not fulfilled its function, because in 2014 it was unilaterally violated by Russia. On December 5, 2015, Alexander Turchinov, secretary of the RNBO of Ukraine, declared the disarmament pointless and reproached the West for not implementing the Budapest Memorandum. Later, the second president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, gave an interview to Radio Svoboda: where he said that the Budapest Memorandum was one of the mistakes made by the Ukrainian authorities throughout the history of Ukrainian independence. Analyzing the above, we can say that under Kravchuk the foundations of Ukraine's pro-Western foreign policy were laid.

When looking at Kravchuk's foreign policy as a whole, we can say that his main priority was, first of all, to show independent Ukraine, ratify the agreements on recognition of Ukraine's independence with the world community, and leave the

USSR peacefully by avoiding any escalation. Though, the speech of the US President George Bush on August 1, 1991 in Kiev, where he spoke out in favor of preserving the USSR and supporting Gorbachev, was not a problem for Kravchuk. At the time, it was a period of painful reassessment of foreign policy priorities for the United States. The U.S. State Department followed "Moscow tendencies" and demonstrated a fatal misunderstanding of the profound processes that were taking place in the post-Soviet space. On the other hand, sober politicians, in particular R. Cheney, Z. Brzezinski, H. Kissinger and others, were aware of the need to recognize Ukraine's independence and establish full-scale interstate relations with it. However, these politicians were in the minority for most of the period from 1991 to 1993. By recognizing Russia as the sole legal successor to the USSR, the United States effectively blocked political and economic relations with Ukraine.

Thus, the main goal of Ukrainian foreign policy in the American direction during this period was to get the United States to recognize Ukraine as an equal partner and ally was achieved.

In January 1993 President Clinton came to power. He spent a lot of time thinking about what foreign policy to pursue with regard to Ukraine. President Clinton considered two directions. First direction is continue with the policy pursued by former President Josh Bush. Another one is look for new approaches to Ukrainian-American relations. After much deliberation, he has chosen a different path. The U.S. Congress played an important role in making this decision.

On May 9, a delegation headed by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Special Advisor of Secretary of State for Newly Independent States S. Telbot came to Kyiv. The special advisor declared the desire of the USA to start a new stage in relations with Ukraine, emphasizing the fact that not only the White House, but the whole administration was conducting an intensive review of the US policy towards Ukraine. The U.S. also suggested that a Ukrainian-American charter of partnership, friendship and cooperation be developed and signed at the highest level. [20]

From these facts we can conclude that by these actions the foundation was laid for taking Ukrainian-American relations to a fundamentally new level. Undoubtedly, the approval of financial aid to Ukraine in the amount of 350 million dollars by the U.S. Congress on September 30, 1993, was an important evidence of positive development. [21] Also, on October 24-25, 1993 U.S. Secretary of State Christopher B. paid an official visit to Kiev. As a result, it was agreed that the U.S. would facilitate Ukraine's accession to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and establish constructive cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Christopher also invited Ukraine to join the U.S.-initiated Partnership for Peace program. Later on, tensions in Ukrainian-American relations flared up again because, in the opinion of the US, Ukraine had inconsistently and incompletely fulfilled its obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START-1 agreement made in Lisbon on May 23, 1992.[22]

To solve this problem, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, agreement on November 18, 1993. [23] Undoubtedly it was of fundamental importance for the further improvement of Ukrainian-American relations.

After all, it was a real breakthrough in the uneasy relationship that has developed between Ukraine, the U.S. and Russia. The statement made the historic point that the U.S. and Russia were willing to provide Ukraine with security guarantees. This allowed Ukraine, on February 3, 1994, to withdraw the reservation of the Verkhovna Rada of November 18, 1993.

2.2 US-Ukraine Relations under the Kuchma Presidency

In Ukraine in 1994, Kuchma won the presidential election. Ukraine's foreign policy towards the U.S. and the West during this period was repeated, since then Ukraine's second president Kuchma did not choose a definite course for his country. President Kuchma was considered the father of "multi-vector" policy, that is, he oscillated

between the West and Russia. [24] It is an interesting fact that Kuchma first became president thanks to pro-Russian rhetoric. Undoubtedly, thanks to this fact, he was able to ease tensions toward Russia, namely to put an end to Crimean separatism, to complete the partition of the Black Sea Fleet, and to sign an agreement on cooperation and friendship between Ukraine and Russia.

Ukrainian-American relations became even more dynamic and defined after Kuchma's victory in the 1994 presidential election. This concerned not only the political sphere, but, most importantly, economic cooperation.

It is safe to say that the state visit of President Leonid Kuchma to the U.S. on November 19-23, 1994 was the beginning of a new stage of the international cooperation. The Charter of Ukrainian-American Partnership, Friendship and Cooperation signed at the White House on November 22, 1994, became the basis of the new political document. Presidents L. Kuchma and B. Clinton recognized that the existence of a free, independent and sovereign Ukrainian state, its security and prosperity are of great importance for the United States. Also, 1994 ended with the triumphant chord of the OSCE Budapest Summit on December 5-6, where Ukraine received national security guarantees from the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and France.

By becoming a non-nuclear weapon state under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine gained considerable international prestige and took a very important step toward deepening its partnership with the United States of America. Political contacts between the countries became even stronger. President Clinton's state visit to Kyiv on May 11-12, 1995, and Leonid Kuchma's working visit to Washington on February 20-22, 1996, were important aspects of this. The joint statement of the presidents of Ukraine and the United States of America of May 11, 1995, in which the U.S. expressed support for democratic and market transformations in Ukraine, its political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also a new element of cooperation between the two states was the Joint Ukrainian-American Intergovernmental Commission that was headed by the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma and the

US Vice President Alexander Gore. The legal basis of the bilateral relations between Ukraine and the United States of America was gradually expanding. As of January 1, 2000 the United States and Ukraine had more than 70 signed and ready to sign treaties and other joint documents for cooperation. And this was the right step, because at that time the U.S. was the main investor in Ukraine. The components of financial and economic support to Ukraine were grant aid, loans from the Eximbank, the IMF and the World Bank, humanitarian aid from non-governmental organizations[25] (the Chernobyl Fund for Children, the American-Ukrainian Fund, etc.). The instrument of state aid is the U.S. Agency for International Development, whose office is in Kiev.

Military-political cooperation developed intensively. Cooperation was realized both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace program. Ukraine and the USA also successfully developed cooperation in space exploration. At this stage it is safe to conclude that Ukraine and US relations have good dynamics. But prospects of Ukrainian-American relations largely depend on optimal investment climate in Ukraine, and also on dynamics of its advancement through democracy and reforms. And on the other hand, they also depend on how our partner USA will support the political and economic course that Ukraine will choose.

During U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Kiev on June 5, 2000, a range of important questions was discussed. A number of international agreements were signed, in particular on deepening of investment and trade cooperation, Ukraine's accession to World Trade Organization cooperation in the sphere of science and technology etc.

The U.S. called Ukraine a very important geopolitical partner in the post-Soviet space, but now things are different. Relations between the countries are undergoing a serious test of their strength, which they have not been able to withstand.

It should be noted that this heightened attention and interest in Ukraine by the West is not incidental. Thanks to foreign financial aid, investments and loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and other Western financial institutions, Ukraine was finally able to stop its domestic economic crisis. In 1996, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a democratic Constitution. Despite significant disagreements in relations with Russia, the parties managed to improve their relations. The result was signing of the Treaty on the Black Sea Fleet in 1997, as well as a bilateral political treaty in which Russia finally recognized Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukraine managed to deepen existing cooperative relations with the North Atlantic Alliance. There is no doubt that relations with the United States have benefited Ukraine but these achievements were not enough.

Over time, the perception of the geostrategic importance of Ukraine's place in the West, especially in the U.S., began to gradually change. The U.S. side replaced the self-sufficient perception of the potential impact Ukraine could have on security in the region with the realization that without strengthening the state internally, its potential could not be exploited. However, previous long discussions about Ukraine's "key role" have led Ukrainian officials to believe that it is possible to fully join the Euro-Atlantic community only through its own geostrategic position, without much effort for domestic development. [26] But, as it turned out, no matter how effective Ukrainian foreign policy has been at times, it has proven incapable of compensating for all the internal problems in the country.

For a long time, having invested much in reforming its "strategic partner", the United States was dissatisfied with the fact that positive changes were too slow. The possibility of a more or less equal "strategic partnership" between the two states in the future began to be questioned. While in 1994-1996 Ukraine was viewed in the U.S. as a very promising partner, which temporarily experienced difficulties, this was not the case.

After that, United States sought to move as quickly as possible from the stage of providing material assistance to Ukraine to a stage where economic relations between the two countries would be developed through the natural interest of American private capital. Ukraine has shown its inability to provide a favorable investment climate for foreign investors. Without the backing of high-profile promises of implementation success, Ukraine has exhausted the credibility associated with them. Therefore, the U.S. has increasingly begun to say that unconditional assistance to Ukraine from them should shift to a "reward for achievement" approach.

Before 1994, Ukraine was often referred to in the West as a future Yugoslavia with nuclear weapons. In 1994-1997 its success gave reason to draw analogies with the successful example of Poland in overcoming the difficulties of transition. Since then, Ukraine has increasingly become a typical CIS state with a range of different types of problems typical of most in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine's desire to be a European state was very much at odds with reality. "On the one hand, the external attributes of Western democracy were present. [27]

Moreover, if earlier the personality of the second president of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma was associated with hopes for a quick reforming of the country and its democratization, later in his regime the West increasingly noticed authoritarian tendencies of government. There were many reasons for this, namely serious violations of law during the presidential campaign of 1999. In addition, the referendum on changing the Constitution of Ukraine in the spring of 2000. Demonstrated the tendency of the presidential-parliamentary form of government toward the dominance of the presidential part.

One of Ukraine's most important achievements in domestic politics was the formation of a leftist pro-presidential majority in Parliament. The relations between the legislative and executive powers have become much more constructive. The decision-making process, which used to be often blocked by disagreements between

the presidents and the parliament and by attempts by each to pursue their own policies, has speeded up considerably.

Also at the end of 2000, Ukraine took a back seat to the United States. Almost all attention was focused on US presidential election campaign. The uncertainty about the winners and the many surprises of the election led to the assumption that Ukraine and its problems would not be resolved any time soon. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin, elected that year, had already begun to pursue a foreign policy that was aimed at bringing Ukraine closer to Russia. In the foreign policy concept adopted on July 30, 2000, Russia for the first time openly declared the need to dominate its neighbors. In the text of the concept approved by presidential decree, one of the goals for the future was to create a belt of good neighbors around Russia, "the most powerful Eurasian power . [28]

One of the first signs of a change in foreign policy was the dismissal, on September 29, 2000, of pro-Western Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk under pressure from Moscow, which had a reputation for supporting Ukraine's integration into NATO and the EU. His place was taken by Anatoliy Zlenko, Kravchuk's first foreign minister, who was more acceptable to Russia.

It turned out that for Ukraine, the consequences of Western indifference were much stronger than Russia's encroachment on it. The hopes of Ukrainian diplomats to "play" on presenting "European Ukraine" as a buffer against "Eurasian Russia" failed, as the West found it politically and psychologically difficult to make the final choice between a partnership with Ukraine and a partnership with Russia.

The end of the third phase of Ukrainian-American relations coincided with the end of Bill Clinton's presidency. During his last visit to Ukraine as U.S. head of state on June 5, 2000, in his speech he repeated the words of Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko several times: "Fight - win!!!". [29] This literally meant that only after Ukraine overcomes its internal problems can we talk about deepening Ukrainian-American relations.

Upon coming to power, Republican candidate George W. Bush was the first to abandon the practice of his predecessor B. Clinton to create bilateral commissions headed by the vice-president. Thus, Ukraine's hopes of replacing the Kuchma-Gore commission with the Kuchma-Cheney commission did not materialize. However, some of the committees that were part of this commission remained operational (committees of economy, foreign policy, and defense).

At the beginning of his presidency, George Bush showed toughness in his approach to Ukraine. From that moment on there were more than ever statements of concern about the internal situation in Ukraine, and especially about the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens. People continued to talk about Ukraine's potential role in the region, but not as loudly as before. Ukraine was made to understand that without appropriate reforms, Ukraine's geostrategic position would lose its significance.

The fact that the first visit of a high-ranking representative of the new administration of President Donald Rumsfeld to Ukraine took place in June 2001, five months after the official change of government in Washington, also testifies to the change in U.S. attitude toward Ukraine. Moreover, while in neighboring Poland in mid-June, George W. Bush did not visit Ukraine, although this was discussed in talks with Polish officials. Ukraine was repeatedly invited to follow Poland's experience in choosing its development path. President Bush also said that "Poland has played a very important role for Ukraine. Poland, the United States and other European countries must work with Ukraine to help it make good decisions and choices in the future. These decisions are freedom, democracy and open markets." [30] Critical statements about Ukraine's domestic situation and future NATO enlargement plans, which have not yet affected Ukraine, were tempered by talk that "the Europe we are building must include Ukraine. Nevertheless, it was clear that Ukraine still needed to prove the strength of its own European aspirations.

Instead of focusing on the problems of Ukraine, as Clinton had, George W. Bush began to pursue policies aimed at normalizing relations directly with Russia. The

role the previous president gave Ukraine in influencing Russia has not been demanded. The concepts of the "Russocentric" "school of thought" presented by J. Matlock and S. Huntington became popular. Huntington, became popular in the new presidential administration. [31] The Bush administration did not give up on Ukraine, but the demonstrative interest in the Ukrainian issue on the part of the U.S. was left behind.

Here was a very important event at the meeting of the National Security and Defense Council on May 23, 2002, where Ukraine's intention to join NATO was officially declared for the first time. On June 19, 2003, the Verkhovna Rada enshrined this statement in the law "On the Fundamentals of Ukraine's National Security. The national military doctrine approved by Kuchma in June 2004 included a provision for Kiev to pursue a policy of Euro-Atlantic integration with the ultimate goal of joining the alliance. [32]

Another important event took place in spring 2004 when NATO held its regular summit in Istanbul that welcomed new members of the alliance - Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. NATO leaders also congratulated Ukraine on the progress made in the NATO-Ukraine commission. NATO members expressed gratitude for Ukraine's international peace support efforts, such as Kosovo Force. During the commission, Ukraine offered to support operations in the Mediterranean Sea (NATO naval operations, which are designated to prevent the movement of terrorists with weapons of mass destruction). Issues in the field of defense cooperation between NATO and Ukraine were also considered and a possible partnership for the Peace Trust Fund was launched. NATO representatives welcomed Ukraine's aspiration to achieve full integration into the Alliance, but stressed that integration is impossible without many military reforms, as well as commitment to the values underlying the Alliance: democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech, transparent elections, etc. The NATO Secretary General criticized Kuchma for harassing the press and for the terrible preparations for the Ukrainian presidential election in November 2004.

Later, President Kuchma amended the Military Doctrine, which stated that Ukraine was preparing for full membership in NATO and the EU. Initially the doctrine stated that Ukraine's national interests conditioned a significant deepening of relations with NATO and the EU, and based on the fact that both of these organizations are guarantors of security and stability in Europe, Ukraine was preparing for full membership in them. [33]

In the new wording, which the president made, the phrase "preparing for full membership in these organizations" was shortened. The point that intensification of Euro-Atlantic integration with an orientation towards NATO membership belongs to the priorities of Ukraine's foreign and domestic policy is stated without the wording about accession to NATO. [34]

Such changes to the Military Doctrine were made taking into account the results of the Ukraine-NATO commission meeting at the highest level, which took place at the end of June during the NATO summit in Istanbul, which was held in Turkey. Such changes also take into account goals and objectives of Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic policy at the current stage.

Also, Kuchma's European course was hampered by a series of scandals: the allegedly unproven supplies of Kolchuga air defense systems to Iraq, bypassing sanctions, led to the international isolation of the Ukrainian president. This complication of relations with the West prompted Kuchma to reorient himself once again toward Russia - he announced his intention to join the pro-Russian Common Economic Space (CES). [35]

2.3 US-Ukraine Relations under the Yushchenko Presidency

Another not more important achievement for Ukraine was the formation of a new government headed by the former chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko. The new Prime Minister of Ukraine had a reputation as a pro-Western politician and immediately after coming to power began to implement long-awaited reforms. During Yushchenko's presidency since 2006 Ukraine finally adopted a

balanced budget, restructured the energy sector, carried out an agrarian reform that promoted private initiative in the sector, and privatization became more transparent. The results of the reforms began to be felt almost immediately as Ukraine saw positive GDP growth, growth in agriculture and industrial development, an increase in the taxes collected, wage and pension debt repayments, and a rise in income.

But unfortunately, the political changes that led to positive economic and social changes proved to be temporary. Moreover, the parliamentary majority disintegrated soon after its formation. There were significant disagreements that began to appear between the prime minister, who tried to pursue an independent Ukrainian policy, and the president, who could only allow this to a certain extent. The reforms of the third president, Yushchenko, aimed at reducing the share of shadow capital in Ukraine's economy affected the interests of influential financial circles that had supported Kuchma in power. Therefore, the pace and scale of reforms soon slowed markedly.

It should be noted that the U.S. and Western countries noted the success of the reforms undertaken by President Yushchenko, but the support was not forthcoming to the extent that Ukraine had hoped for. During Kuchma's official visits to Western capitals, and Washington in particular, the Ukrainian president made it clear that awards for achievements should be expected as soon as possible and reforms should continue. Viktor Yushchenko, who took over as prime minister not without the support of the West, including the U.S., was accused of giving IMF experts false information about Ukraine's financial situation in order to obtain larger loans. Yushchenko's planned visit to the U.S. was postponed after the Clinton administration announced it would only take place after a proper "government cleanup. Here we can conclude that Yushchenko's position in the U.S. government was significantly undermined at the very beginning of his presidency. Throughout most of Yushchenko's presidency, namely December 2005 to February 2010. Ukraine was cut off from any form of IMF assistance, while the previous governments of Viktor Pustovoytenko and even P. Lazarenko received it. An interesting situation

arose: with demands for more intensive reforms, Ukraine was denied the funds necessary for their implementation.

Viktor Yushchenko, who became president of Ukraine thanks to the "Orange Revolution," restored Ukraine's course toward the West, and accession to NATO became a state policy for Ukraine.

On April 27-29, 2009 Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg visited Ukraine, accompanied by White House staffer David Lipton, which was interpreted as a signal that Ukraine remains a strategic partner for Washington, and that the revision of U.S. relations with Russia will not take place at Ukraine's expense. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko held a meeting with James Steinberg. In a press interview, Steinberg noted the need to develop the already existing consultative bodies, deepen cooperation on the basis of the road map and the charter on strategic partnership. He named energy, trade, as well as security issues as the priority issues of the relations. On July 20-22 of 2009 the Vice-President of the USA Joseph Biden visited Ukraine. In the course of negotiations of President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko and Vice-President Joseph Biden an agreement was reached on creation of Ukrainian-American Commission on strategic partnership, the first session of which is planned for autumn 2009. [36]

It is not unimportant that then the cooperation between Kyiv and Brussels in the format of an intensified dialogue, which included a number of reforms in the Supreme Court of Ukraine in order to adapt them to the standards of the alliance. Yushchenko's pro-NATO policy was actively supported by the Bush administration, which pursued an expansionist policy in the post-Soviet space. Counting on high patronage, the Ukrainian leadership asked Brussels in writing for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine. But despite strong pressure from Washington, at the NATO summit in Bucharest (April 2-4, 2008) Germany and France, which did not want to strain relations with Moscow, flatly refused this proposal. A total of 15 countries at the summit were against forcing the process of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine (and Georgia). Also at the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin

threatened that if Ukraine joins NATO, it can cease to exist as a single state. The Russian newspaper Kommersant reported about this statement by Putin at a closed session of the Russia-NATO Council, citing a source in the delegation of a NATO country. "When it came to Ukraine, however, Putin got angry. Turning to Bush, he said: "You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Some of its territory is Eastern Europe, and some of it, and a significant one, is a gift from us!" . [37] And here he hinted very transparently that if Ukraine is still accepted into NATO, this state will simply cease to exist," said the source. "That is, in fact, he threatened that Russia could begin to tear away Crimea and Eastern Ukraine," [38]. the source explained. Meanwhile, already on Saturday after this statement, a number of around-Kremlin political analysts and experts on Russian TV channels started talking that Ukraine's accession to NATO could lead to the collapse of the country and that, they say, that is why Ukraine will never join NATO.

2.4 Yanukovich Effect on the US-Ukraine Relations

In April 2010, Viktor Yanukovich became president of Ukraine and signed decrees that eliminated the interdepartmental commission on preparing Ukraine for NATO accession and the national center for Euro-Atlantic integration, noting that Ukraine's relations with NATO would remain at the level reached under President Viktor Yushchenko. Also, the question of NATO membership was removed from the agenda by the state law "On the foundations of domestic and foreign policy" adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 1, 2010. The new foreign policy positioning of the Ukrainian authorities in the U.S. and NATO was perceived quite skeptically as reflecting the foreign and domestic political weakness of modern Ukraine, which faces the need for deep reforms that may cause discontent among the broader population. During her visit to Kiev in July 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described Ukraine's new foreign policy course as a policy of "strategic balancing".[39] The U.S. considered Ukraine's refusal to join NATO a temporary phenomenon and showed readiness to support a change in Ukraine's position, if it occurs. It should be noted that after the pro-Russian team of President

Viktor Yanukovich came to power in Ukraine, Ukrainian-American relations took a turn for the worse. The crisis in relations considerably worsened after the arrest of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and representatives of her former government.

On September 22, 2012, the US Senate approved Resolution 466 on Ukraine, in which it condemned the actions of President Viktor Yanukovich aimed at the politically motivated imprisonment of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The U.S. Senate called on the Yanukovich administration to immediately release Tymoshenko and other political prisoners. The Senate also asked the OSCE to apply multilateral diplomatic pressure on Yanukovich to release Tymoshenko and called on the U.S. State Department to issue a visa ban on those responsible for Tymoshenko's imprisonment and mistreatment. According to the document, the resolution was in addition to international analysis and protests about the abuses that were taking place in Ukraine.

In response, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that they did not consider it appropriate to comment on the resolution because it was adopted in a "dubious manner" and is declarative, not binding. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry also accused Tymoshenko's supporters of discrediting the country.

It is safe to say that the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich was an attempt to continue Kuchma's multi-vector policy: Kiev abandoned its NATO course in favor of Moscow (because it did not promise any economic preferences), but maintained an independent game in its relations with the EU.

As a result, Yanukovich declared a non-aligned status of Ukraine, and the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea (the Kharkov Agreements of 2010) was extended for another 25 years, until 2042.

2.5. US-Ukraine Relations Towards the Euromaidan Revolution

At the same time, the course towards the EU was formally continued. But three years later, at the Vilnius summit, Yanukovich, under pressure from Vladimir Putin,

unexpectedly refused to sign the already-agreed Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and the Free Trade Area Agreement. This came as a real shock to European foreign policy and also led to mass protests in Ukraine. After the use of force by the security forces against the protesters, the conflict escalated - more than a hundred activists died under the bullets of the security forces of the Yanukovich regime. Yanukovich himself, who then agreed to EU-mediated negotiations and even signed up for an early presidential election, fled to Russia anyway.

From the very beginning of the mass protests in Ukraine, the U.S. supported the Ukrainian population in advancing its demands and exerted considerable pressure on the Ukrainian authorities.

Also, U.S. Ambassador Jeffrey Pyatt, a few hours after the November 29-30 crackdown on Euromaidan, reacted to the current events on his Twitter page as follows: "While working to understand what happened, but I certainly condemn the use of force against peaceful protesters." [40] On December 11, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland visited the Maidan of Independence camp in Kiev with Geoffrey Pyatt and arranged for food distribution to demonstrators. On the eve of the event, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland met with Ukrainian opposition leaders and described the meeting as fruitful. On the same day, Victoria Nuland met with President Yanukovich, telling him that the methods used by the authorities to disperse the protesters were unacceptable. At the end of the meeting, Victoria Nuland said that Ukraine has a chance to return to the path of European integration and that she wants Yanukovich to move in that direction as well as to resume talks with the IMF. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki then first mentioned that the U.S. administration was considering several options to influence events, including imposing sanctions against the Ukrainian authorities]. A month and a half later, in January 2014, the U.S. Department of State revoked U.S. visas for Ukrainian citizens whom the United States believes were involved in the violent dispersal of Euromaidan in November and December 2013. [41]

On January 30, 2014, US State Department spokesperson Jennifer Psaki said at a briefing that the US believes that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich should continue negotiations with the opposition "to form concrete steps for a peaceful settlement". [42] According to Jennifer Psaki, US Vice President Joe Biden spoke to Viktor Yanukovich three times by phone in the preceding days: "We demanded that the Ukrainian authorities and the opposition ensure that the new Ukrainian government is able to promote political unity, economic recovery with IMF support and meet people's aspirations for a European future... These are three points that Vice President Biden noted in his conversations as important when the (Ukrainian) government considers its next steps." [43]

According to Jennifer Psaki, the day before, US Secretary of State John Kerry held a conference call with Ukrainian opposition leaders during which "the Secretary of State emphasized the unequivocal support for the democratic aspirations of the Ukrainian people for association with Europe and applauded the anti-violence statements of these opposition leaders, their brave work to defend democracy, the progress towards peace goals" and "expressed concern about reports of human rights abuses". [44] The U.S. demanded that the Ukrainian government establish a legal commission to investigate these crimes and bring those responsible to justice.

On February 14, the U.S. State Department issued a statement calling for the formation in Ukraine of "a multi-party technical government with genuine separation of powers and responsibilities that can earn the trust of the Ukrainian people and restore political and economic stability. The document welcomed the announcement of the release of all those detained during the protests as "an important step toward de-escalating tensions and creating space for a peaceful, nonviolent resolution of the political crisis in Ukraine.

To further build confidence, the State Department urged Ukrainian authorities "to cease all investigations, arrests, detentions, and prosecutions of demonstrators and civil society activists associated with the Euromaidan protests." [45]

On February 21, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry issued threats against the Ukrainian leadership in connection with the mass bloodshed in the streets of Kyiv, saying that "the people of Ukraine and the international community will hold accountable those responsible for what happened... We unequivocally condemn the use of force against civilians by security forces and urge the recall of those forces." [46] He also said that the protesters should exercise their rights peacefully. U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden warned Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich that the United States was prepared to impose new sanctions on officials responsible for the violence against civilian protesters. Biden sharply condemned the violence and called on Yanukovich to immediately withdraw all security forces - militia, snipers, military and paramilitary units, and "irregular forces. He also called for immediate and tangible steps toward cooperation with the opposition. U.S. President Barack Obama said in an interview with CNN on February 1, 2015, that the U.S. "mediated the transition of power in Ukraine. [47]

CHAPTER 3

3. US-UKRAINE RELATIONS AFTER 2014

3.1 US Reaction to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The U.S. supported the authorities in February 2014 and sided with Ukraine after the events in Crimea in 2014, describing Russia's actions as aggression, occupation and annexation of part of the Ukrainian territory, as well as undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. The U.S. initiated sanctions against Russia, as well as tried to organize its international isolation. On 12-13 March, the head of the Ukrainian government, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, traveled to the United States, where he held talks with US President Barack Obama and addressed the UN Security Council. [48]

In connection with the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation in Donbass, on April 17, 2014, quadrilateral talks on de-escalation of the conflict in Ukraine were held in Geneva with participation of the highest diplomatic representatives of Ukraine, the EU, the USA and the Russian Federation; as a result, a joint statement of the parties was adopted but, unfortunately, no agreement was reached between the confronting parties. [49]

From the very beginning of the armed conflict in Donbas, the U.S. Congress has been advocating for permission to supply arms to Ukraine and in 2014 passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act authorizing such supplies. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama prevented the implementation of this plan, fearing that it would lead to U.S. involvement in the conflict in Donbass. Due to these facts, military aid to Ukraine under Obama was limited to the provision of "non-lethal" equipment. . [50] However, the U.S. accuses Russia of interfering in the conflict - in particular, the use of regular troops in combat operations on the side of the rebels, the supply of weapons and, among other things, financial support.

In 2016, Marie Jovanovich was appointed U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, replacing Geoffrey Pyatt. Since 2017, Ukraine, based on the fact that the process of resolving

the Ukrainian crisis in the "Normandy format" (based on the Minsk agreements) has reached a stalemate, the Ukrainian government has bet on mediation by the new American administration of Donald Trump. Donald Trump's election campaign was held under the slogan of improving relations with Russia, and his victory caused serious concern in Ukraine, which was clearly betting on Hillary Clinton's victory. However, everything changed after Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's visit to Washington in late June, one of the main results of which was the signing of an agreement to supply Ukraine with American anthracite. [51] As early as July 7, Kurt Volker, known as a staunch opponent of the Normandy format, which, in his opinion, was beneficial only to Russia, was appointed special representative of the U.S. State Department for Ukraine.

Introducing Kurt Volker in Kyiv on July 10, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said: "The U.S. goal is to restore the territorial integrity and unity of Ukraine, to which we have already given \$600 million since the crisis began. In my discussions with Russian leaders, I have repeatedly stated that Moscow must take the first step toward de-escalation, in particular a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons... We are disappointed with the lack of progress in implementing the Minsk agreements, we call on Russia to implement their terms, in particular to get the separatists to cease hostilities. The EU and U.S. sanctions on Russia will remain in place until Russia halts the actions that caused them." [52]

3.2 US-Ukraine Relations Under Donald Trump

At the end of December 2017, the U.S. State Department confirmed the U.S. administration's intention to start supplying Ukraine with lethal weapons. President Donald Trump thus, unlike his predecessor Barack Obama, yielded to pressure from Congress, which since 2014 had advocated the provision of "lethal military aid" to Ukraine. At the same time, while calling the weapons supplied "purely defensive," the U.S. does not consider this step a violation of the Minsk agreements. The lethal weapons, whose deliveries began in 2018, include Barrett M107A1 large-caliber sniper rifles, ammunition and parts for them, as well as advanced FGM-148 Javelin

(210 anti-tank missiles and 35 units worth \$47 million) anti-tank systems (in January 2018 Kurt Volker announced restrictions on the use of the delivered anti-tank systems - they can only be used when necessary to repel a tank attack, not "for attack and use in the conflict line in Donbas). [53] Russia's reaction to the decision to supply U.S. weapons to Ukraine was predictably negative: Russia believes that it encourages supporters of a military solution to the conflict and promotes U.S. involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. According to the U.S. Department of Defense data the U.S. has sent more than \$1 billion in security support (military training and military equipment purchases) to Ukraine between 2014-2018. In July 2018, the Raytheon - Lockheed group of US companies received a contract from the Pentagon to produce Javelin anti-tank missile systems, including for Ukraine. Valery Chalyy, Ukraine's ambassador to the United States, said in late August 2018 that Ukraine sent the U.S. an official request to buy three air defense systems. According to him, Ukraine also needs UAVs, counter-battery radars and counter-sniper systems. These needs were also voiced during Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump and his national security adviser John Bolton. [54]

In March 2018, Kurt Volker said that the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics should be liquidated because they do not comply with the Constitution of Ukraine. According to him, these republics "are entities that were created by Russia to help disguise Russia's role and reinforce the ongoing conflict." [55] And as expected, this statement provoked a harsh reaction in Russia.

On July 25, 2018, the U.S. State Department released a statement from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the so-called "Crimea Declaration," which stated that the U.S. would continue to insist on restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity. Pompeo stressed that the U.S. "stands by its long-standing principle of refusing to recognize the Kremlin's claim to sovereignty over territory seized by force in violation of international law," and called on Russia to "end its occupation of Crimea." "In concert with allies, partners, and the international community, the United States

rejects Russia's annexation of Crimea and pledges to support this policy until Ukraine's territorial integrity is restored," .[56]

Pompeo said in a statement. The Secretary of State also said that Washington intends to keep sanctions related to the annexation of Crimea in place until Russia returns the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine's control.

After Vladimir Zelensky won the spring 2019 presidential election, Kurt Volker, in an interview with the Hungarian online media outlet Valasz Online, issued a warning to the newly elected president, noting that if he tried to resolve the conflict in Donbas by giving up some territories in favor of Russia, he would very quickly turn compatriots against himself. Volker expressed his conviction that the best way to resolve the conflict is to develop the proposal to send a UN peacekeeping mission to Donbas, as well as to continue Ukraine's reforms. .[57]

At the inauguration of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on 20 May, the United States was represented by U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, U.S. State Department Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker, U.S. Ambassador to the EU Gordon Sondland, Director of European Affairs at the National Security Council Alexander Widman, and the head of the U.S. diplomatic mission to Ukraine Joseph Pennington. In a meeting with the U.S. delegation attending the inauguration, Zelensky urged the U.S. to tighten sanctions against Russia to help Ukraine deal with "Russian aggression." "The U.S. is a powerful and very serious partner for Ukraine, first of all in overcoming Russian aggression. We will not be able to overcome Russian aggression in Donbas and Crimea on our own. That's why we need your help," [58] President Vladimir Zelensky said.

On May 28, a week after Volodymyr Zelenski became president, Kurt Volker answered questions from the world media, explaining U.S. policy toward Ukraine after the last presidential election there and the U.S. vision of a settlement in Donbas. Calling the fight against corruption one of the main tasks of the new Ukrainian leadership, Volker avoided evaluating the activities of the previous leadership and

the reasons for Poroshenko's defeat in the elections and said that he "has done a great job aimed at carrying out transformations in Ukraine." [59] Also, Volker in his answers actually presented Volodymyr Zelenski as a continuer of the reforms initiated by Petro Poroshenko, but called for their implementation even more decisively. A significant part of Kurt Volker's remarks concerned the conflict in Donbas and ways to resolve it. Volker said that in terms of the implementation of the Minsk agreements, "Ukraine cannot do more than it has already done," and called the cause of the conflict "the Russian occupation." [60]

In late May 2019, a bill was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives entitled "Providing Support for Ukraine to Protect its Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity." The key point of the bill was a provision on the possibility of granting Ukraine the privileged status of a major non-NATO ally, which would be valid until Ukraine's possible accession to NATO. If the bill is approved, the list of U.S. weapons provided to Ukraine could include anti-tank, anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems. [61]

In early July 2019 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward the idea of expediency for the US and the UK to join the Normandy process in order to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The US State Department, however, did not support Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to change the format of negotiations on the situation in Donbas.

On August 28, 2019, US Presidential National Security Adviser John Bolton visited Kiev. At the talks Bolton and Zelensky discussed a number of issues, namely: priority measures to strengthen the strategic partnership between the states, the possibility of deepening cooperation in the areas of security and defense, energy security, as well as in the reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Ukrainian defense industry. Zelensky thanked the US side for its "strong support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, consistent official policy on Crimea and efforts to achieve progress in the peaceful settlement in Donbas." [62]

Earlier, The Wall Street Journal reported that one of the main topics of the meeting between Bolton and Zelensky was supposed to be the forthcoming purchase by the Chinese companies Skyrizon Aircraft and Xinwei Group of more than 50% of the shares of the Ukrainian aircraft engine plant Motor Sich, which the United States intends to prevent, as it could significantly increase the military-industrial potential of China. However, the press service of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine reported that on August 27, John Bolton discussed with Oleksandr Danylyuk, secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the issue of "protecting the Ukrainian industry from the unfair economic behavior of China." [63] In November 2019, the U.S. media reported on the negotiations with the leadership of Motor Sich of American businessmen close to the leadership of the Republican Party of the United States.

On August 29, it became known that U.S. President Donald Trump ordered an audit of spending on military aid to Ukraine to make sure that the money was spent in the best interest of the United States itself. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and Assistant to the President for National Security John Bolton were in charge of the audit. The \$250 million in 2019 funding has been temporarily frozen. According to the Pentagon, U.S. military aid to Ukraine has totaled \$1.5 billion since 2014. [64]

But in the end, the U.S. Presidential Administration decided to unblock \$250 million allocated for Ukraine's military needs. The Ukrainian embassy in the United States welcomed this decision and explained that it was 250 million from the Pentagon's Security Assistance Initiative program, 115 million from the State Department's International Military Financing program from the 2019 budget, and 26.5 million from the same program from the 2018 budget - a total of 391.5 million dollars. Also, Trump urged European countries to allocate more money to support Ukraine and warned that Washington could suspend the allocation of money if European countries do not increase their spending. [65]

3.3 US Response to Russia's Military Build-up along the Ukrain's Borders

On December 19, 2020, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky, in an interview with the American newspaper The New York Times, expressed gratitude to the United States, which continues to support Ukraine and remains a strategic partner of Ukraine. At the same time, Zelensky expressed hope for the strengthening of US-Ukrainian relations after Joseph Biden came to power in the USA. . [66]

In the spring of 2021, the United States provided diplomatic support to Ukraine amid escalating tensions in the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine, as well as a build-up of Russian troops on the Russian-Ukrainian border. On April 2, Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Zelensky had a telephone conversation. On April 13, in a telephone conversation between the presidents of Russia and the United States, Biden, as the White House said, "stressed the unwavering commitment of the United States to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The President expressed our concern over Russia's sudden military build-up in occupied Crimea and on Ukraine's borders, and called on Russia to de-escalate tensions. In early May, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Victoria Nuland, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, visited Kyiv. . [67]

The working visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to the United States, which took place in late August - early September 2021, took place in the extreme conditions of the end of the 20-year American presence in Afghanistan and the threat of new terrorist attacks. The failure of the Afghan campaign pushed the Ukrainian agenda to the back burner for the U.S. As Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on the eve of the trip, in the political block Vladimir Zelenskiy was going to achieve a new level of strategic partnership with the U.S., the economic block was aimed at stimulating the inflow of U.S. investments in Ukraine, including in the aerospace and defense industry, and the third block concerned the activation of bilateral defense cooperation to deter Russia. On August 27, U.S. President Joe Biden ordered to provide Ukraine with up to \$60 million in aid "for defense products and services from the Department of Defense (including Javelin anti-tank missile systems), as well as military education and training." In total, the U.S. has allocated

\$2.5 billion (including \$400 million in 2021) since 2014 to strengthen and develop Ukraine's defense capabilities. [68]

Before the meeting with Biden, President Zelensky called the issue of security in "temporarily occupied by Russia" Donbas and Crimea, as well as in the Black and Azov seas, a priority, and said he wanted to discuss the problem of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Especially loud was the announcement of Ukraine's accession to NATO, which President Zelensky raises at every opportunity. Zelensky said he would also like to discuss the role the U.S. could play in Ukraine's economic revival and in the process of resolving the conflict in Donbas. He also asked Biden to help free more than 450 people detained in the unrecognized republics of Donbas and in Russia. [69]

A joint statement on the strategic partnership between the USA and Ukraine was adopted at the end of the talks. The document contains an agreement to intensify the work of the Strategic Partnership Commission, which should develop a new Charter of Strategic Partnership. During the visit, Ukroboronprom and U.S. military-industrial companies, including Lockheed Martin, Harris Global Communications, Global Ordnance and Day & Zimmermann Lone Star LLC signed agreements worth \$2.5 billion. [70]

In the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the U.S. and Ukraine, the parties noted such promising areas of cooperation as infrastructure, defense, agriculture, healthcare, digital economy and energy. The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank) will provide guarantees for export of goods and services to Ukraine in the amount of 3 billion dollars. The USA have announced about their intention to give Ukraine 463 million dollars till the end of 2021 to implement reforms directed to consolidation of democracy, improvement of human rights, fight with corruption, 12,8 million dollars to fight against COVID-19 and 45 million dollars as the humanitarian aid to Donbas.

Ukraine's prospects for joining NATO as a result of the talks, however, remained completely unclear. In a joint statement, the U.S. only supported "Ukraine's right to determine its foreign policy course freely from external interference, including Ukraine's aspiration to join NATO. The U.S. side stressed that it would never recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea. Russia was in fact named as a party to the conflict in Donbas: it was called upon to fulfill its cease-fire obligations and "truly participate in the efforts to resolve the conflict. The statement also said that the U.S. and Ukraine had finalized a strategic framework agreement on defense issues, which would become the basis for their cooperation in this area. Among other things, the cooperation will concern defense industries, intelligence and "countering Russian aggression." As for the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, the U.S. promised to make efforts to preserve Ukraine's transit role and prevent Russia from using energy as a geopolitical weapon against Ukraine. [71]

In September, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine rejected the initiative to ask the U.S. to grant Ukraine the status of a Major Non-NATO Ally. The pro-presidential "Servant of the People" party explained why: such a status could harm the country's advancement into NATO and does not give it security guarantees. In 2014, the U.S. Senate supported a bill granting Ukraine such status, but it was not approved by the House of Representatives. In 2017, the Rada had already passed a resolution asking the U.S. Congress to grant Ukraine this status. In 2019, the House of Representatives again introduced a bill under which Ukraine could be granted this status, but this initiative also went nowhere. [72]

On October 19, Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin visited Ukraine to discuss defense reforms with Ukrainian Defense Minister Andriy Taran and President Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as cooperation between Washington and Kiev in the Black Sea region. Speaking at a briefing at the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, Lloyd Austin said, "...Let's be clear: Russia started this war, and Russia is an obstacle to a peaceful resolution. In the meantime, for our part, we will do all we can to support Ukraine in its efforts to build up its ability to defend itself. No third country has the right to

veto Ukraine's membership in NATO. Ukraine has the right to shape its own policy itself, without any external interference.... We again call on Russia to end its occupation of Crimea, to stop continuing the war in eastern Ukraine, to stop destabilizing activity in the Black Sea and along Ukraine's borders, and to stop constant cyberattacks and other provocative actions against Western democracies.”

[73]The day before, on the night of October 17 to 18, the second line of logistical supplies for the Ukrainian army arrived to Ukraine from the USA. Ukraine received five modern mobile hospitals worth \$20 million, field surgical kits, field X-ray units, individual first aid kits, as well as precision-guided weapons and armor-piercing ammunition. [74]

At the end of 2021 the activation of contacts of representatives of the American administration with Ukraine was connected with the next increase of tension in the area of Russian-Ukrainian border. On November 2-3, CIA chief William Burns visited Moscow. According to CNN, the purpose of the trip was to convey to the Kremlin Joe Biden's concerns about the situation on the border with Ukraine.

On November 8, the first meeting of the bilateral Strategic Partnership Commission in three years was held in Washington, D.C., with the participation of Dmytro Kuleba. The parties discussed Ukraine's security amid tensions in the east of the country and in Belarus, energy security (including in the context of the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline), trade development, as well as the increase in U.S. investment.

In mid-November the new head of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Oleksiy Reznikov visited Washington D.C. and met with the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. According to Foreign Policy magazine, during the visit Reznikov asked to increase arms supplies. In particular, the question was about the American arms destined for Afghanistan (Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters and ammunition). According to the newspaper, Ukraine also wants assistance from the USA in the field of air defense and anti-ship defense, as well as electronic warfare. [75]

On 26 November, US presidential national security adviser Jake Sullivan discussed the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border with the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration, Andriy Yermak. On November 29, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken went on a tour of Europe, during which he attended a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Riga and an OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Stockholm, as well as a number of multilateral consultations and bilateral meetings. The main purpose of the trip was to discuss the situation in the field of European security, which has escalated due to the developments on the Russian-Ukrainian borders. According to The Wall Street Journal, at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Riga, the United States was going to offer its allies a choice of two models of relations with Moscow in response to "military pressure on Ukraine": a game of aggravation, increasing the threat of military conflict, or a reduction of NATO military activity in Europe. In Riga, Anthony Blinken said that "highly effective economic measures" could be used against Russia in the event of an invasion of Ukraine. [76]

On December 7, Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden held video-conference talks. As noted in a White House press release, Ukraine was the main topic of the talks: "President Biden expressed the deep concern of the United States and our European allies about Russia's escalation of forces around Ukraine and made clear that the United States and our allies would respond with strong economic and other measures in the event of a military escalation. President Biden reaffirmed support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and called for de-escalation and a return to diplomacy. The White House later offered further explanation. According to the White House statement, U.S. and European leaders "agreed to maintain close communication about a coordinated and comprehensive approach in response to Russia's military build-up on Ukraine's borders." [77] In a briefing to reporters, Jake Sullivan, national security adviser to the president, said that Biden "was candid with President Putin" and told him directly "that should Russia further invade Ukraine, the United States and our European allies would respond with strong economic

measures ... We will provide additional protective resources to the Ukrainians beyond what we already provided." [78]

In the days that followed, the topic of Ukraine became central to the U.S. and its allies' foreign policy efforts. Having recognized the situation around Ukraine as the main security threat in Europe, the West changed their strategy in support of the Ukrainian authorities. While continuing to speak of "terrible consequences" for Russia in case of its "aggression", they made it clear that they would not defend Ukraine by armed force in case of Russian "aggression".[79]

Despite the importance of the Ukrainian problem, Joe Biden's phone conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky took place only on December 9. Biden reiterated "the unwavering commitment of the United States to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity," called Russia's actions aggressive and threatened it with economic measures in case of military intervention on Ukrainian territory. According to a White House press release, "Biden emphasized U.S. readiness to support measures to advance the implementation of the Minsk agreements in support of the Normandy format. At the same time, U.S. President Biden stated unequivocally that the U.S. does not consider the use of military force in the conflict with Ukraine. Neither Biden himself, nor his administration officials who commented on the talks with Russia mentioned Crimea once. On December 9, the Associated Press agency, citing an informed source, reported that high-ranking officials at the US State Department had conveyed to the Ukrainian leadership that Ukraine could not expect to become a NATO member in the next decade. Moreover, the publication said, the USA might put pressure on Ukraine to encourage it to move towards granting certain autonomy to the non-controlled regions in Donbas. [80]

At the meeting of the foreign ministers of the G7 countries, held on December 11-12, the U.S. called on the allies for a decisive common response to the alleged "Russian aggression" - it was an agreement that, if severe sanctions against Russia are necessary, "a broad group of countries, including other G7 member countries" should be ready to quickly join them. However, none of the statements made during

the meeting mentioned the possibility of defending Ukraine by force of arms. U.S. President Joe Biden himself, who spoke to journalists on December 11, promised "devastating consequences" for the Russian economy in the event of a military intervention in Ukraine, but explained that to deter Russia, "the unilateral use of force by the United States is not on the table now. According to him, the response to "aggression" could be the redeployment of American troops to the countries of the so-called "Bucharest Nine" (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and "all countries to which we have a sacred obligation to protect them from any Russian attack. Asked why the U.S. refused to deploy troops to Ukraine, Biden said, "Such a possibility was never considered. Meanwhile, the U.S. television network NBC reported, citing sources in the U.S. administration, that Washington has suspended sending \$200 million in military aid to Ukraine - presumably to avoid an escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. [81]

On 14-15 December, US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Karen Donfried visited Kiev before her trip to Moscow. The main topic of her trip was preliminary contacts in order to resolve the situation around Ukraine and discuss security guarantees requested by Russia. Ahead of her visit to Moscow, the U.S. State Department said that "the Assistant Secretary of State will emphasize that we can make diplomatic progress in ending the conflict in Donbas by implementing the Minsk agreements with the support of the Normandy format.

In Kiev, Karen Donfried held talks with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba, coordinating Ukrainian and U.S. positions ahead of her trip to Moscow. In a video message posted on Twitter by the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, Donfried explained that her visit to Kiev was a result of agreements reached by Putin and Biden at a Dec. 7 video summit and that the goal of her visit was to de-escalate the situation amid Russian military preparations. Donfried said the U.S. leadership listened to Ukraine's requests for more U.S. diplomatic involvement in the resumption of the peace process: "The idea that we would push Ukraine to make concessions in negotiations

and dialogue with Russia is pure misinformation ... The truth is that we have joined with Ukraine, our NATO allies and partners around the world in an effort to resolve the conflict diplomatically and achieve de-escalation of a dangerous situation, but these efforts are not concessions," she said. [82]

3.4 The US Reaction to Russia's War against Ukraine

On the morning of February 24, Vladimir Putin announced the conduct of a special military operation. Russia has attacked Ukrainian military infrastructure and border guards. Explosions were heard in many cities of Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has declared martial law throughout the country. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg denounced Russia's insane attack on Ukraine and announced that he would convene an allied meeting today to coordinate NATO's response to new Russian aggression. "This is a flagrant violation of international law and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security," he tweeted. [83]

The United States, its allies and partners will respond unitedly and decisively to the decision of Russian President Vladimir Putin to launch an invasion, said US President Joe Biden. According to him, only Russia is responsible for the death and destruction that the attack will bring. "The world will hold Russia accountable," the US President assured. [84] He promised to meet with G7 colleagues soon and announce "the further consequences that the United States, our allies and partners will impose on Russia for this unnecessary act of aggression against Ukraine and global peace and security," the US president promised.

At the beginning of the Russian invasion, the United States and its allies set as their goal the preservation of Ukraine as a state, imposed financial sanctions against the Russian Federation in order to weaken the economy, banned entry into their countries and confiscated the real estate of politicians and their families in the EU countries. [85] At the beginning of the war, the world community only supported the integrity of Ukraine, but over time it already believes in victory. The Forbes edition

has formed a rating of "friends of Ukraine", that is, a list of countries that most help Ukraine in the war during the period of February 24, and based on 11 criteria compiled this list. The United States of America came in second after Poland. The most important criteria are basic assistance, the recognition of the genocide against the Ukrainian people, the expulsion of diplomats from the country and their number, financial assistance, visits to Ukraine. [86]

Around March 7, 2022, Russia became the world leader in the number of sanctions imposed. They began to apply sanctions against Russia since the beginning of the war in Donbass and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Also a couple of days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as separate states, for which it received a number of major sanctions from many countries, including the United States. [87]

Not less important is the support of the United States is the adoption of the land lease. On the eve of the vote in the US House of Representatives for a land lease for Ukraine, the American television channel CNN, citing high-ranking sources in the US Department of Defense, said that in Stuttgart, in the area of responsibility of the United States European Command, a coordination center has been established. What kind of armament will Kyiv receive under the law on land lease, and how will it happen? Wolfgang Richter "First of all, there will be a significant increase in arms supplies," said Wolfgang Richter, a retired Bundeswehr colonel and military expert at the Berlin Foundation for Science and Politics (SWP), in an interview with DW. [88] tanks and anti-aircraft weapons, ammunition, artillery, drones will be supplied - that is, what has already been supplied. The United States will also provide howitzers, and logistical support will be provided. " It is unknown at this time what he will do after leaving the post. In this case, it will be necessary to establish logistics chains through which Ukraine would receive spare parts and ammunition, and to teach the Ukrainian military to use these types of weapons. In any case, the amount of military support from the United States will increase significantly. Thanks to this, as well as the supply of weapons from the arsenals of other Western allies, Ukraine

will be able to more successfully resist Russian attacks and, in a favorable scenario, recapture some of the occupied territories, said Wolfgang Richter. In addition to armaments, Ukraine will receive additional financial assistance in much larger amounts than before. President Biden has already asked Congress for \$ 33 billion (about \$ 31 billion) in additional support for Ukraine. 20 billion of them will be provided to the country in the form of military aid, the rest will be allocated for economic and humanitarian support. "The scale of financial assistance has increased significantly, which means that a basis has been created for long-term and significant arms supplies, which in this case point to long-term scenarios rather than short-term solutions," said a German military expert. [89]

CHAPTER 4

4. UKRAINE-US RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO

4.1 NATO's Principles and Benefits to Ukraine

Since 2013, the U.S. has actively supported Ukraine in joining NATO as well as in fighting Russian aggression. Future NATO members must conform to the basic principles spelled out in the Washington Treaty, such as democracy, individual liberty, and other relevant provisions set forth in the preamble to this treaty: "The parties to the present Treaty, reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments, determined to defend the freedom, the common heritage of their peoples and their civilization, based on the principles of democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law, desiring to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area, resolved to combine their efforts for the realization of collective defense and the maintenance of peace and security. [90]

For Ukraine at this time it is very important to join NATO for a number of reasons, first, Ukraine's membership in NATO will have quite certain economic benefits. Undoubtedly, security and economic prosperity are directly related. Investors want to do business only with those countries whose stability and political future they would have no serious doubts about. From the negative point of view Ukraine's accession to NATO is only Russia's reaction.

The territorial integrity and security of Ukraine will be greatly enhanced by its accession to NATO. All military, political and economic power of the NATO member countries, the total population of which is 850 million and provides more than 60% of world defense expenditures, provides protection to the members of the alliance. [91]

Undoubtedly, it is through relations with NATO that Ukraine has already received important psychological support from the most powerful military alliance. Although, unfortunately, NATO still has no real commitments other than the promise to consult

with Ukraine in case of aggression against it, it is important to note that such cooperation is of considerable practical importance. The Charter on a Special Partnership between Ukraine and NATO and other multilateral documents have been signed by democracies trying to avoid violating their treaty obligations. In the case of a threat, Ukraine has had the opportunity for ten years to convene the Ukraine-NATO Commission at the level of Ambassadors, Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and to raise the issue of assistance from the Alliance. In this case, given that NATO notes Ukraine's importance to the Alliance's security, it can expect no less than political support for its legitimate security interests.

Ukraine refrained from using this mechanism in the conflict situation with Russia over the island of Kosa Tuzla in October 2003, because it hoped that a bilateral settlement of the situation would prevent a radical deterioration in relations with Russia. At the same time, a number of NATO members, including the U.S., France, Canada and Turkey, without waiting for Ukraine's decision to apply to NATO, announced in October 2003 their support for Ukraine's territorial integrity. [92]

Under the Washington Treaty, any attack on NATO members in Europe or North America is considered an "attack on all," and each member state has pledged to assist its allies. This treaty applies to the territories of all signatory nations, as well as to the islands and ships and aircraft of all treaty members in the Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer, and in the event of an attack on the troops of any NATO ally in Europe. [93]

The Alliance has both the national armed forces of its members and integrated military formations under direct NATO command. The total number of all NATO member states' forces is about 3.9 million military personnel (despite NATO's expansion in 2004, the number of troops in NATO's European members remained roughly unchanged, due to the reduction of armed forces of the old members of the Alliance). As of 2005, the U.S. had 1.38 million troops and the European allies and Canada had 2.57 million troops. [94]

Under the North Atlantic (Washington) Treaty, member nations pledge to maintain and develop their defense capabilities and individually and collectively undertake collective military planning. NATO security is based on the following "pillars": dialogue and cooperation with non-NATO members, support of collective security, conflict prevention, crisis management, reducing war in its initial stages, preservation of territorial integrity of all NATO members, solidarity, equal security, etc. Thus, the territorial integrity of Ukraine at the accession to NATO will be under strong protection. [95]

It is no secret that in the case of NATO expansion in the region will create a favorable climate in which the interests of Ukraine as a subject of international politics can be satisfied to a much greater extent than in the case of Russian or other state domination and Ukraine, which is larger than its neighbors in the West, has important geopolitical - not accommodation and sufficient resources to exercise its influence within the military and political alliance and can count on an important position in NATO.

At one time it was thanks to NATO that Russia recognized Ukraine's borders. This happened during the signing of the interstate treaty in 1997, which was concluded a month and a half before the NATO summit in Madrid, the results of which made Moscow dread the invitation of Ukraine to NATO. The same applies to Romania. Also, the treaty with Ukraine was ratified by Romania the day before the opening of the NATO Madrid Summit, at which Romania hoped to receive an invitation to the Alliance. This happened because NATO requires applicants for membership to renounce territorial claims against their neighbors, and Romania had to put up with that for the sake of joining NATO. [96]

Cooperation with NATO for Ukraine is a stimulating factor for internal political and socio-economic reforms in all spheres of social life, harmonization of legislation with legal norms and democratic principles of NATO member countries, accelerated transformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, establishment of civil democratic control over defense and security of the state.

Ukraine, as an important partner of the Alliance, will directly participate in processes of formation of European and Euro-Atlantic security, which not only concern interests of national security of Ukraine and NATO, but also form modern environment of Euro-Atlantic security, including Ukrainian security.

Ukraine will get additional unprecedented opportunities to ensure state sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders. The deepening of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO and the process of comprehensive reforms will contribute to improving the country's investment attractiveness in the eyes of international investors. It is impossible to give an exact figure for the financial injections Ukraine may receive, but the experience of Central and Eastern European countries testifies to a significant increase in foreign direct investments. In 1997 2.7 billion dollars were invested in Poland's economy, in 1998 - 5 billion, and in 1999 - the year of Poland's accession to NATO - 8 billion dollars. As for the Czech Republic and Hungary, the figures are even more impressive. In 1997, direct foreign investments in these countries' economies were 4 and 6.2 billion dollars, respectively, in 1998, 9.8 and 10.2 billion dollars, and in 1999, 12.8 and 14.5 billion dollars. After Bulgaria's accession to NATO, foreign investments in the country's economy doubled. In 2004, after Romania's accession to NATO, the volume of foreign direct investment increased by 141% compared to 2003. [97]

As for the positives that Ukraine already has today, we should mention the NATO project on creation of the Trust Fund for elimination of surplus obsolete ammunition in Ukraine, and we have 133 thousand tons of it, 1.5 million units of obsolete small arms and 1 thousand units of portable anti-aircraft weapons. On December 1, 2005, in the Kharkiv region, the first three-year stage of the project began, for which 4.1 million euros have already been allocated, and the cost of the whole first stage will be about 8 million euros. In general, the project is designed for 12 years, and it is expected to spend more than 25 million euros on its implementation. [98]

NATO provides not small assistance to Ukraine in solving the problems of military personnel discharged from service. It is thanks to NATO that Europe's largest

polygon Yavoriv in Lviv region has been preserved, for the maintenance of which a large number of civilian private companies of small and medium-sized businesses are involved, getting permanent jobs and orders for the provision of domestic and other services.

Ukraine's cooperation with NATO will have deep civilizational significance for our country. After all, cooperation with the Alliance means for us, first of all, joining the family of nations with common democratic values that are fully shared by Ukrainian people. It is in Ukraine's national interest to cooperate with NATO member states in the fight against international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, human trafficking, environmental protection, the development of civil society, and so on.

Accession to NATO removes Ukraine's so called "buffer zone" status. The stay of Ukraine in the so-called gray zone between Russia and the West is quite dangerous because of the potential possibility of conflicts for influence over Ukraine, as well as because of the excessive dependence of the state of security of non-nuclear Ukraine on external factors, in particular the relations between Russia and NATO. The economic situation does not allow Ukraine to develop an army sufficient to defend itself against full-scale aggression in the near term. It is through Ukraine's integration into NATO that political Europe gets generally completed, which will contribute to a reduction in conflict potential in Europe, since contradictions between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia will no longer have as much ground as the uncertainty of other states' geopolitical affiliation. At the same time, NATO enlargement in Europe eliminated the distribution lines left over from the Cold War and significantly reduced the geographic size of the gray zone - territory not covered by NATO or Russian security guarantees. Specifically, it is in Ukraine's state interests that the government find a place in the latest geopolitical situation that would reliably guarantee sovereignty, territorial integrity, state security, stability and progressive development.

Guarantees of external security from NATO have a favorable impact on democratization processes in the state. NATO norms and standards compel political elites to refuse foreign policy adventurism, strengthen international responsibility and prevent the authorities from instigating foreign conflicts to solve their domestic political problems. These norms are embedded in the preamble of the Washington Treaty - "democracy, individual freedoms and the rule of law. According to Article 10 of the treaty, applicants for NATO membership must adhere to the same principles. [99]

The interest in the democratic development of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, which traditionally is primarily interested in security issues, has a simple explanation. First, NATO countries have united to a large extent on the basis of support for democracy and human rights, as opposed to totalitarian states. Democracy has become one of the main "calling cards" of Western countries. Once the threat of war in Europe has diminished, democracy is brought to the forefront of Euro-Atlantic integration as the threat of confrontation diminishes, thereby reducing the weight of military priorities that NATO expects to receive from the accession of certain countries.

Moreover, a country with an authoritarian or totalitarian political regime is not seen by the North Atlantic Alliance as an ally as reliable as democratic countries. After all, in democracies, foreign policy is influenced by public perception. In turn, public opinion cannot change as quickly as the wishes of those running authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Thus, the solidarity of member states and the credibility of NATO would suffer from the presence of totalitarian or authoritarian states in the Alliance.

Specific requirements for the political situation in aspirant countries are affirmed in the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) adopted at the NATO Washington Summit in 1999.

1. "demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law and human rights;

2. resolve ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including claims for territorial secession or international legal disputes, by peaceful means consistent with OSCE principles and the promotion of good neighbourly relations;
3. to establish appropriate democratic and civilian control over their armed forces;
4. to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN;
5. ... demonstrate a commitment to stability and prosperity through economic freedom, social justice, and environmental responsibility. [100]

Moreover, NATO puts forward such non-traditional for organizations of defense character requirements, as obligatory respect for national cultural heritage of member countries, recognition of their contribution to civilizational development, special merits in formation and ensuring promotion of democracy and human rights in the world.

If talking about current framework of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, it is worth mentioning that the foundation of NATO-Ukraine relations remains the Charter on Special Partnership, 1997. The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NOC) directs joint cooperation activities and is a forum for consultations between NATO and Ukraine on security issues of common interest. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament meetings can take place at a variety of levels, including at the level of Heads of State and Government, foreign or defence ministers, permanent representatives, as well as in a variety of working level formats.

The 2009 Declaration on the Supplementation of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Special Partnership, signed in 2009 as a follow-up to the decisions taken at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, affirmed the central role of the National Security Council in fostering regular political dialogue and cooperation to support Ukraine's reform efforts related to its Euro-Atlantic aspirations for NATO membership. The main vehicle for supporting this process is the Annual National Program (ANP), which reflects Ukraine's national reform goals and annual implementation plans. The NAP

consists of five sections focusing on political and economic, defense and military, resource, legal, and security issues. This includes reforms related to areas such as good governance, anti-corruption, rule of law, human rights, and the security and defense sector in line with Euro-Atlantic principles and standards.

NATO countries conduct annual assessments of the implementation of the gross national product. The responsibility for its implementation lies primarily with Ukraine. The Commission for the Coordination of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, provides overall coordination of its implementation by government agencies. [101]

4.2 NATO-Ukraine Cooperation Areas

Support for cooperation on the ground is provided indirectly by the NATO Mission in Ukraine. It includes the NATO Information and Documentation Center (NIDC) and the NATO Liaison Office. The NATO Information and Documentation Center was established in 1997 to promote public information efforts on NATO activities and the benefits of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. The NATO Liaison Office was established in 1999 and plays a key role in facilitating cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. Its key contact points are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, the Presidential Administration, the National Security and Defense Council, the Verkhovna Rada, and other Ukrainian institutions. The NATO office in Ukraine plays a leading role in providing strategic-level advice under the auspices of the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. [102]

Even though Ukraine is not a full NATO member at this time, Ukraine's cooperation with NATO is mutually beneficial and includes different areas of cooperation.

NATO provides indirect support to Ukraine's defense and related security sector reform through the Joint Working Group on Military Reform, the PfP Planning and Review Process, the NATO Building Integrity Program, the NATO Military

Education Enhancement Program, the Joint Working Group on Military Technical Cooperation, and the Consultative Mission to the NATO Representation in Kyiv.

Since 2016, as part of the Comprehensive Assistance Package, Allies have supported Ukraine's goal of implementing defence and security sector reforms in line with NATO standards through strategic-level advice through the NATO Representative Office in Ukraine and support through 16 capacity-building programmes and Trust Funds. [103]

Since 2014, in response to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, several dedicated projects have been launched to support force generation and sustainable capacity building in key areas: Command, Control, Communications, and Informatics (C4). The Command, Control, Communications and Informatics Trust Fund provides assistance to Ukraine to reorganize and modernize its C4 structures and capabilities, also facilitates their interoperability with NATO and contribution to NATO-led exercises and operations, and enhances Ukraine's ability to provide for its own defense and security. Four projects have been agreed upon and are in various stages of implementation that address regional airspace security needs; secure tactical communications; knowledge sharing; and situational awareness. [104]

Logistics and standardization. This trust fund is intended to support ongoing reforms of Ukraine's logistics and standardization systems for the Armed Forces, as well as other national military structures, including the National Guard and the State Border Guard Service, as needed.

Medical Rehabilitation. This trust fund seeks to ensure rapid access to appropriate medical care for patients, including Ukrainian military men and women on active duty or discharged, and civilian defense and security sector personnel. In addition, the trust fund aims to support Ukraine in strengthening its medical rehabilitation system to ensure the provision of long-term sustainable services.

Retraining former military personnel in civilian occupations. This trust fund supports Ukraine in developing and implementing a sustainable, effective and

integrated approach to the social adaptation of military personnel embedded in Armed Forces personnel policy.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This Trust Fund provides direct support for specific individual recommendations contained in NATO's Plan for Assistance to Ukraine in EOD and Counter-IED. The fund provides selective support for civilian humanitarian clearance activities, including IEDs, and assists in laying the groundwork for transforming EOD clearance and counter-IED development in Ukraine.

Cyber Defense. This trust fund, which has achieved its goals and was already completed in 2017, was aimed at helping Ukraine develop exclusively defensive technical means of countering cyberthreats. As part of the assistance, an incident management center was established to monitor cybersecurity incidents, as well as laboratories to investigate these incidents.

Participation in the PfP planning and analysis process helps Ukraine set and achieve ambitious but realistic goals for defense and security sector reform, transformation and capacity building; also to enhance the ability of its forces to operate alongside forces from NATO member and partner nations in crisis response and peacekeeping operations; and to enhance Ukraine's ability to host forces from NATO member and partner nations for exercises and training.

In October 2005, the Professional Development Program was launched for civilian specialists working in Ukrainian defense and security institutions. In 2014, the program's budget was doubled to support transformation and reform processes. In 2017, the program launched new concepts, including the 100 Champions project, which supports Ukrainian civil servants directly responsible for Euro-Atlantic integration processes. [105]

Since 2007, Ukraine has participated in the Ethical Framework Initiative, which provides practical assistance and advice on strengthening ethical frameworks, accountability and transparency in the defense and security sector. In October 2019,

nine Ukrainian defense and security sector institutions completed a self-assessment and peer review on strengthening NATO's ethical framework that provided a thorough assessment of institutional needs and vulnerabilities and proposed a series of sector-level policy recommendations to improve good governance and implement sustainable anti-corruption reforms in the defense and related security sector. On this basis, the targeted program of activities will continue to provide assistance on two levels: providing institutions with specific expertise to improve good governance and management of defense resources (financial, human and material) and conducting training and education activities to develop individual capabilities and strengthen the organizational culture of ethics.

The Military Education Enhancement Program assists in improving and restructuring military education and training systems, focusing on eight military training institutions in Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Odesa and Zhytomyr and five NCO training centers in Desna, Yavoriv, Starichi, Mykolaiv and Vasylkiv (including a partial restoration of the capacity of the Naval Academy in Odesa). Furthermore, the Program provides advice on academy and university management, including support for faculty in teaching methods and the development of courses on leadership development and decision-making. [106]

NATO provides cyber defense capacity building to strengthen interagency cooperation and coordination and to support the development of Ukraine's national cyber security strategy.

Since 2004, the Joint Military-Technical Cooperation Working Group has been working to enhance cooperation in capacity building, military equipment procurement processes and the development of technical standards. This includes standardization, codification, logistics and lifecycle management, as well as cooperation with the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the NATO Science and Technology Organization. The Joint Working Group is also a forum to discuss Ukraine's efforts to reform the defense industry. [107]

Ukraine joined the Air Data Exchange Program in July 2006. The program reduces the risk of potential cross-border incidents and optimizes response to terrorist attacks involving civilian aircraft. Due to the Russia-Ukraine crisis, NATO has increased the area over which air situational awareness information is provided. [108]

Participation in a wide range of military activities and exercises under the Military Committee Work Plan with Ukraine aims to improve the interoperability and operational capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and makes a significant contribution to ongoing defense and security sector reform.

Ukraine's active participation in the NATO Operational Capabilities Concept Assessment and Feedback Program supports further development of the Armed Forces while enabling the Alliance to develop tailored force sets that can be deployed in support of NATO-led operations and missions.

A legal framework was developed that allows Ukraine and NATO to further develop the operational component of cooperation; it includes the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Status of Forces Agreement (entered into force in May 2000); the Host Nation Support Agreement (ratified in March 2004); and the Strategic Airlift Agreement (ratified in October 2006). [109]

In June 2020, Ukraine became the sixth partner with enhanced capabilities. This status is granted to those members of the NATO Partnership Interoperability Initiative who have made particularly significant contributions to NATO operations and to other Alliance goals. Advanced Partner status facilitates cooperation by giving Ukraine preferential access to NATO's interoperability tools, including exercises, training, information sharing and situational awareness. Other enhanced partners include Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden. [110]

Ukraine is also building capacity and increasing interoperability through participation in the NATO Response Force. Against the backdrop of Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine, the NATO-Ukraine Hybrid Warfare Platform was created at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. [111] It provides a

mechanism to better identify hybrid threats and build capacity to identify vulnerabilities and build state and societal resilience. Current projects support research, training and expert consultations that focus on lessons learned, countering disinformation and building resilience.

A number of trust fund projects support the destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, ammunition, small arms and light weapons in Ukraine. Another trust fund supports the disposal of radioactive waste from former Soviet military facilities in Ukraine.

NATO supports the social adaptation of former servicemen to civilian life through a wide range of projects, assisting in professional retraining and providing psychological rehabilitation services to alleviate post-traumatic stress disorder among demobilized servicemen. In addition, a specific trust fund project provides advice on creating an integrated, comprehensive retraining system for former servicemen in civilian professions (see above).

Since the beginning of the 2014 crisis in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, experts have provided advice on contingency plans and crisis management measures related to risks to critical energy infrastructure and civil protection risks. Further, the collaboration is focused on enhancing national civil preparedness and resilience in the face of hybrid threats. In 2019, the Resilience Support Advisory Group developed recommendations for Ukrainian agencies to improve national resilience. The Joint Civil Emergency Planning Working Group oversees cooperation in this area. Ukraine also regularly participates in events organized by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center and has hosted numerous disaster response exercises itself.

Since 1991, Ukraine has actively participated in the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program. The Joint Working Group on Scientific and Environmental Cooperation contributes to identifying priority areas for practical scientific cooperation under the Science for peace and security program. In April 2014, in

response to the crisis in Ukraine, civilian and security-related science and technology cooperation was strengthened, and since then, Ukraine has been the biggest beneficiary of the SPS program. Today, leading areas of cooperation with Ukraine under the SPS program include advanced technology, counterterrorism, radiological, chemical, biological and nuclear (CBRN) protection, and energy and environmental security. Among these activities is Ukraine's participation in the Dexter program, which is developing an integrated system for detecting explosives and firearms in public places. [112]

NATO is supporting Ukraine in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The NATO Liaison Office leads NATO's advisory support for Ukraine's security and defense sector reforms. The NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv supports the efforts of national authorities and non-governmental organizations to inform the public about NATO and to explain the relationship between NATO and Ukraine. NATO also provides advice and financial support to build the capacity of Ukrainian authorities in public diplomacy, media relations, and strategic communications. [113]

Support for NATO-led operations also important topic. Ukraine has supported peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and continues to participate in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), including contributing a heavy equipment engineer unit with counterimprovised explosive device capabilities. [114]

In support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Ukraine has provided overflight rights, allowed the transit of supplies and provided medical personnel to support provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, as well as instructors to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. After the ISAF mission ended in 2014, Ukraine supported the follow-on Resolute Support Mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces. Besides, since March 2005, Ukraine has contributed officers to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, which ended in December 2011. [115]

From 2007 to 2010, Ukraine deployed its ships six times in support of Active Endeavor, a counterterrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2013, it also participated in NATO's counterpiracy Operation Ocean Shield. Since the start of Sea Guardian Maritime Operation in 2016, Ukraine has continued informing NATO with situational awareness in and around the Black Sea. [116]

4.3 Ukraine's NATO Membership Conundrum

All efforts by Ukraine to move closer to NATO have so far failed. To some extent, and because of the position of Germany. If Ukraine were a member of NATO, in the event of Russian aggression, all members of the Alliance would be collectively obliged to defend it. This is provided for in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. In other words, strategically, the situation would be radically different than it is now, when only NATO and its members decide individually whether and to what extent they provide support. [118]

Since Ukraine's independence, Kyiv administrations has regularly expressed their desire to join NATO. At that time, in 1991, Ukraine was particularly strong militarily: along with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, it had nuclear weapons. However, Kyiv voluntarily renounced its nuclear status, while Russia remained a nuclear power.

Instead, in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the United States and Britain pledged to guarantee Ukraine's sovereignty. However, during Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea in 2014, it became clear that these security guarantees were irrelevant. Many Ukrainian politicians and the military regret the then decision to abandon nuclear weapons. [119]

Kyiv has tried even harder to seek protection from NATO, particularly during the 2005 presidency of pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. However, NATO's doors in Brussels under Yushchenko were not open. Although the Alliance's cooperation with Ukraine has been significantly strengthened since the signing of the Ukraine-NATO

Charter in 1997, [120] the prospect of Ukraine's full membership in the Alliance in Brussels has been criticized.

The counterarguments still sound the same today: Ukraine's accession to the Alliance could provoke Russia, a nuclear power with a veto in the UN Security Council. And a commitment to help would mean that other members of the Alliance could be easily drawn into the war with Russia.

In 1999 and 2004, a number of former members of the Warsaw Pact, a Soviet-led military alliance, became members of NATO. Among them are the Baltic states - the former Soviet republics.

Earlier, numerous US military, diplomats and security experts in an open letter to then-US President Bill Clinton called the decision to join the state "a political mistake of historical proportions." NATO's eastward expansion, however, has taken place. Although the objections of at least one member of the Alliance could prevent this. [121]

Former US President George W. Bush believed that Russia's relative weakness could be used to expand NATO further east. And he presented this proposal in 2008 at the NATO summit in Bucharest.

"We need to make it clear that NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's aspirations to join the Alliance and offers them a clear path to that goal," Bush said at the time. He added in an address to Vladimir Putin: "The Cold War is over." [122]

Looking back, it is striking that the current CIA director, then ambassador to Moscow, William Burns, wrote in a warning to the Bush administration that joining NATO "would pave the way for Russian intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine." . [123] This is exactly what happened almost six years later, without Ukraine's accession to NATO.

As a result, others approached the goal of Ukraine's accession to NATO, especially the then German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

At that time, they also wanted not to irritate Russia once again and not to risk destabilizing the situation in Eastern Europe.

Thus, at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, Ukraine did not receive the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Allies then agreed to give Ukraine and Georgia the prospect of NATO membership, and the MAP was to be the next step.

However, the ongoing conflict with Russia is not conducive to strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic area. And there is a consensus in NATO not to admit new members who are in conflict. This puts the lever in President Putin's hands: by supporting the conflict, he could block Ukraine's accession to NATO. He recently warned of the threat of war between Russia and NATO if Ukraine joins the Alliance and tries to regain Crimea: "There will be no winners," Putin said at the time. [124] So will Ukraine's dream forever remain just a dream? German diplomat Christoph Heusgen, the future head of the Munich Security Conference, recently said in an interview that denying Ukraine NATO membership "neither politically nor morally" is unacceptable.

According to him, one should think about the time after Putin: "Perhaps Putin's successor will say:" Given the competition with China, I am interested in a greater focus on Europe, international democracy and the rule of law. "I do not rule this out." In such a situation, Ukraine could become a member of NATO, Goisgen said [125]

5. CONCLUSION

The development of Ukrainian-American relations has gone far since the independence of Ukraine. Since the proclamation of Ukraine's independence, the United States has supported Ukraine as an independent and sovereign actor in international relations. Originally, great expectations were placed on Ukraine, as Ukraine has a good geopolitical position, rich natural resources, and would be an important strategic mate of the United States. However, the practice has shown that it is not as simple as it seems. Numerous times, investments in Ukraine have been in vain. There were a number of problems in the country, the most important of which was a corrupt government that contradicted America's core principles of democracy, transparency, and the rule of law. Latterly, Ukraine, or rather the pro-Russian government, chose a course towards Russia, which, of course, wasn't supported by the United States, because corruption only flourished and there was no rule of law. An illustration of this was the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko. The United States condemned the action of the Ukrainian authorities and called for the release of Tymoshenko. After some time, the people of Ukraine rose up and called on the authorities to abdicate, because Ukrainians wanted to integrate into Europe, not the Russian Federation. The government, led by President Yanukovich, also held on to its seats and didn't want to leave its *warm* place. They tried to disperse the crowd by force, but they didn't succeed. Still, the Ukrainians achieved their goal and President Yanukovich fled to the Russian Federation. It was the will of Ukrainians that led to the enhancement of Ukrainian-American relations, as Ukraine aspired to the European Union, to the principles of, democracy and the rule of law, to which the United States adheres to. Terrible effects happed in Ukraine during the achievement. The Russian Federation took advantage of Ukraine's weak position and occupied Crimea by holding an illegal referendum that wasn't honored by the international community. In addition, the Russian Federation has funded the occasion to undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity by financing terrorism in numerous Ukrainian metropolises. Unfortunately, the terrorists managed to seize part of the

Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Nevertheless, such attempts in other metropolises such as Odesa or Kharkiv failed. The United States and the international community condemned the conduct of the Russian Federation but supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The Russian Federation itself considered this an internal conflict of Ukraine and denied the presence of its *colors* in the domestic affairs of Ukraine.

In fact, the occupation of Ukraine until 2022 had close ties with the Russian Federation in both the political and social spheres of life. Rubles were introduced in the occupied territories, broadcast only by the Russian media, and all inventories of any products were made by the Russian Federation. It is also a fact that the Ukrainian side requested a United Nations peacekeeping force but the Russian side objected to it. It was clear that Russia was financing terrorists, but it couldn't intermedicate in terms of military support. First, Russia has not officially declared itself a party to the conflict, so there was nothing to negotiate with, therefore Ukraine didn't want to negotiate with terrorists, because they were only intercessors. Second, NATO intervention in Luhansk and Donetsk would complicate the conflict with the Russian Federation. Since Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum by attacking Ukraine and annexing Crimea, the international community and Ukraine formerly understood that the Russian Federation can not be trusted, because for Russian authorities agreements and international law meant nothing.

The United States has been a middleman in the conflict since 2014. It tried to convince Russia to give up its aggressive attitude towards Ukraine. However, the US efforts could not save Ukraine from Russia's aggression. Since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States was one of the first to do everything possible to support Ukraine in the fiscal and military spheres. The United States has also put pressure on the European Union to put sanctions on the Russian Federation as soon as possible. It was after Russia's invasion that Ukraine proved to be a truly strong and insuperable state fighting for its independence. The signing of the Lend Lease for Ukraine is another piece of evidence that the United States is an ally of

Ukraine. Yes, the United States can not intermediate in the service because it's veritably dangerous in terms of the nuclear trouble from the Russian Federation, and not just because it'll lead to World War III. That's why the United States is a dependable supporter and ally of Ukraine, and, of course, relations will only ameliorate, because Ukraine proves its place and part in the transnational community every day, albeit at such a price.

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APPENDIX

In the wake of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the sole superpower in the international realm since its main rival, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. Therefore, relations with the USA are of vital importance for most international actors. Ukraine is, obviously, not an exception in this matter. To this end, analyzing the US and Ukraine relations is crucial to understand not only the domestic politics of Ukraine but also the European security architecture in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

This thesis entitled *US – Ukraine Relations Since the 1990s* and written by undergraduate student Kateryna Viskunova grasps the origin of the relations between the two countries very well. The thesis seeks to answer the question of what factors have played the formation of US – Ukraine relations since the independence of Ukraine? To answer this question, Viskunova examines US-Ukraine relations since the early 1990s. Examining relations since the 1990s, Viskunova concludes that the relations between the USA and Ukraine developed in parallel with the relations between the USA and Russia. Besides, she reveals the fact that Ukraine's dynamic domestic political environment is constantly affecting relations between the two countries. Furthermore, Viskunova shows that Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine has taken the US-Ukraine relations to another dimension. She argues that since Russia invaded Ukraine, the US-Ukraine relations have become stronger than ever, and Ukraine's victory in the fight against Russian aggression depends on the US military assistance along with the will of the Ukrainian people.

In this respect, *US-Ukraine Relations Since the 1990s* would be a highly useful source for those who wish to examine the dynamic relations between these countries.

Consequently, as an undergraduate thesis, this work is well written and structured. I believe it is an adequate work that may enable an international relations student to obtain a bachelor's diploma.

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