

Человек-солидарный видит единство в многообразии. Солидарный фундамент образуется, когда принимается за главную ценность жизнь.

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PROCESS and INDIVIDUALITY

Whitehead's categories are notoriously difficult to sketch in a single paper's section, but his basic worldview isn't. Like all thinkers worthy of the name, Whitehead recognized the urgency to do *somehow* justice to *both* becoming and to being. With Bergson and Alexander (to name only two philosophers with who he enjoyed special *Wahlverwandtschaften*), he envisioned the ultimacy of time, i.e., of creativity and becoming. In other words, he claimed that if we start from substance-like premisses, i.e., from “being”, we will *not* understand “becoming” (as the history of philosophy eloquently proves); but if we rather choose to proceed with process-like premisses, i.e., from “becoming”, both dimensions can be coherently articulated.

If we turn specifically to the question of individuality, it seems at first hand that process thought, by exploding the substantialistic framework, makes any reconstruction of identity difficult, if not impossible. (Hume's critique of substantialism and his redefinition of individuality as a flux of perceived contents remains a landmark.) And indeed, Whitehead's philosophy is frequently presented as an unfortunate aggravation of the problem. On the contrary, this paper argues that, thanks to its epochal theory (або брунькоподібна теорія), Whitehead's processism institutes a significant improvement *both* from the perspective of substantialism and from the perspective of Greek or contemporary streamlined processism. A few further distinctions are in order before we can show this.

As a matter of fact, the basic criterion is *time*, i.e., whether time is taken “seriously” or not, whether there is a creative advance of nature or rather a bare

“block-universe”. And, Whitehead argues, time is *epochal*, i.e., involves discontinuous processes.[i] Among the various forms “process thought” has taken[ii], the non-temporal ones—read the non-epochal forms, i.e., the continuous ones—are the far most numerous. The Greeks had no concept of linear irreversible time, while the Moderns used only a spatialized form a temporality. Historically speaking, it is rather difficult to define when exactly the variable “time” has acquired significance in a domain other than eschatological. There are various candidates: the irruption of the notion of “progress” (1771),[iii] of the second law of thermodynamics (1865)[iv] or, more doubtfully, of Einstein's special relativity (1905)[v]—a relativity that neither Bergson nor Whitehead nor Prigogine accept at face value. Strictly within theoretical physics, however, the problem of time's arrow (and of the general temporal symmetry or asymmetry of processes), has a sharp christening date: Clausius, 1865. What matters is the shift from universal determinism and reversibility to relativism, irreversibility and indeterminism. Without these concepts, genuine novelty cannot be conceived—which does not mean of course that it wasn't actually happening. Now, even when time was acknowledged as an ultimate feature of reality, its epochal consequence did not follow: the atomic mechanism of Modern science understood the Universe as a lifeless (totally reversible) machine secured by external relations (basically allowing *and* requiring the fragmentation of gnoseological fields) and carved by a rational creator.

Two broad concepts of process are thus useful to interpret competing worldviews. On the one hand, a weak concept that simply pushes forward becoming, flux, change, unrest, movement, you name it, and does so in a spatialized way, i.e., under the main guise of continuity, of infinite divisibility. Its historical (but necessary) corollary has been a closed world. Its paradigm is the transformation or meta-morphosis of a pre-existing material. A good example is constituted by mechanical waves, that continuously (sometimes rhythmically) change patterns and do so with the same building-blocks (molecules of water). On the other hand, a strong concept that promotes the ultimacy of becoming in a temporal way—read: *durational* way—, i.e., under the guise of discontinuity. Its necessary corollary is an open universe and its paradigm percolation. A good example is constituted by the constant re-creation of the flame of a candle or, more to the point, by quantic phenomena, that become abruptly and randomly. Change in an open universe is no more simply transformative, it is creation. Accordingly, we use the concept of percolation in order to clearly differentiate epochal processes from continuous processes. Percolation advantageously synthesizes in one word the Whiteheadian scansion becoming/perishing/being, i.e., concrescence/satisfaction/transition.

In the light of these distinctions, we can reassess the question of individuality.

[i] Cf. of course SMW and PR, but also his 1926 “Time” conference, in Edgar Sheffield Brightman (ed.), *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, New York & London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1927, pp. 59-64.

[ii] For an inspiring review, see e.g. Nicholas Rescher, *Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy*, Albany (N.Y.), State University of New York press, 1996.

[iii] Although Ludwig Edelstein claimed in his posthumous book *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity* (1967) that “the ancients formulated most of the thoughts and sentiments that later generations down to the nineteenth century were accustomed to associate with the blessed or cursed word—progress”, eschatological origins put aside, the idea of *progress* or unbounded improvement (of individuals and societies alike) was brooding in the Dutch Republic (1579–1632), got expressed especially by Priestley (1771), was then fully specified by Condorcet (1793) and eventually sanctified by Spencer (1855) and Darwin (1859). Creativity —and the free rational subject— lie now at the heart of humans' existence and this has necessarily a strong impact on how society has to be thought: there has to be some form of enhanced bottom-up capillarity; the social order cannot be given anymore from above, once and for all. Cf. John Hope Mason, *The Value of Creativity. The Origins and Emergence of a Modern Belief*, Aldershot, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2003.

[iv] The so-called Second Law of Thermodynamics embodies the fact that the universe gets a little bit more disorderly all the time. Its history runs from Sadi Carnot's (1796–1832) and Rudolf Clausius' (1822–1888) first works to their expansion by William Thomson (1824–1907) in 1852 and the actual formulation of the entropy law by Clausius in 1865 (known now as the principle of Carnot-Clausius of the degradation of energy). Cf. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *La nouvelle alliance. Métamorphose de la science. Réédition augmentée* [1979], Paris, Gallimar, 1986, pp. 180 sq.

[v] Cf. his 1905 “Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper” (*Annalen der Physik*, t. XVII, ser. 4-17, pp. 891-921).

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ПРОЦЕС ТА ІНДИВІДУАЛЬНІСТЬ

Категорії Вайтгеда вельми важко викласти в розділі однієї статті, але справа легша з його основним світоглядом. Які всі інші мислителі які зробили собі ім'я, Вайтгед усвідомлює необхідність виправдання як становлення, так і буття. Разом з Бергсоном та Александером (якщо назвати лише двох філософів, з котрими він розділяє *Wahlverwandtschaften*) він передбачає фундаментальну якість (ultimacy) часу, тобто творчості та становлення. Іншими словами, він обґрунтовує, що якщо ми почнемо з таких засновків субстанції як «буття», ми не зрозуміємо «становлення» (що історія філософії красномовно підтверджує),