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
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Гіро К.В.

(прізвище та ініціали)

Керівник



підпис

Доцент Мурадов І.Я.

наук. вчене (прізвище та ініціали)  
ступ. звання

Рецензент



підпис

Асист. Проф. Орхан Фаїк

наук. вчене (прізвище та ініціали)  
ступ. звання

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1. Significance of the Study**

The era of globalization, which covers all spheres of life, inevitably brings new opportunities and challenges for all countries. Therefore, it is especially important to understand how globalization processes affect foreign policy activity. Studying the foreign policy of Ukraine in this aspect is necessary to understand the preconditions, causes and consequences of the current political situation in the country, as well as to predict possible scenarios for the future of Ukraine in the international arena. The significance of this research stems from the fact that changing foreign policy orientations of Ukraine, which is connected to its domestic dynamics, has an impact not only on the regional but on the global level. Therefore, it is very important to analyze Ukraine's foreign policy in relation to global issues in order to uncover the driving forces behind current local, regional, and international developments.

#### **1.2. Literature Review**

Many Ukrainian and foreign researchers have studied this issue, created a large number of books and articles that highlight the characteristics and features of foreign policy strategies under different presidents of Ukraine in the context of major global political trends and movements. The works of the First Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Zlenko A. deserve special attention. His work "Stages of formation of Ukraine's foreign policy: how was it?"[6] and "Formation and Implementation of Conceptual Foundations of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" [11] reveal the peculiarities of the formation of foreign policy concepts of independent Ukraine in the transition from the USSR to a full member of the international community, the difficulties faced by Ukrainian diplomacy and the successes it has achieved.

The scientist Aleksievets M. paid a lot of attention to the problems of Ukraine's foreign policy. A number of his works, among which the most comprehensive "Ukraine's Foreign Policy: From Multi-Vector to Non-Alternative" [20], demonstrate the causal links of various foreign policy strategies for Ukraine. The following domestic scientists also made an important contribution to the study of this issue with their works. For example, Gevko V. in research "Ukraine in the context of modern world development trends" [15] reveals the main world trends in politics, economics, human rights, ecology and others, and their relationship with the leading manifestations in Ukraine's foreign policy. Thus the author gives a detailed and well-founded explanation of the international activities of the Ukrainian government in different periods.

Ukrainian researcher Vidnyansky S. in his work "Ukraine's foreign policy: the evolution of conceptual principles and problems of implementation" [14] also considers the problem of Ukraine's foreign policy as an interdependent part of various international processes. Shows the causes and consequences of adherence to various concepts, principles, their evolution, as a manifestation of society. Much attention in this work is paid to the fluctuations of Ukraine between different vectors of development, defeats and failures in the implementation of foreign policy goals and their consequences.

A great value in studying the main problem of this research has the work of Priydun S. "Ukraine in the system of international relations: some features and problems (1991-2011)" [4]. This research examines the main features of Ukraine's foreign policy in the period from 1991 to 2011. However, despite this time period, it provides a strong basis for understanding further developments in modern Ukrainian history. This study also reveals the interdependence of internal and external factors in the context of successes and failures in the foreign policy aspect.

The works of foreign researchers also deserve attention, as they are more objective and mostly do not have the author's personal attitude to the research question. For example, Charles F. Furtado in work "Nationalism and foreign policy in

Ukraine” reveals the concept and role of nationalism in the context of Ukraine's foreign policy. The author expresses the opinion that it is nationalism that determines the choice of the Euro-Atlantic direction of development as the main goal of Ukraine's foreign policy.

Rosaria Puglisi analyzed the big and important problem of Ukrainian politics and society – the power of the oligarchy, as well as its impact on the formation of foreign policy priorities in research “A window to the world? Oligarchs and foreign policy in Ukraine”.

### **1.3. The subject of the Research**

The subject of this thesis is the foreign policy of Ukraine from the period of independence in 1991 to the present, in the context of globalization processes. It analyzes the foreign policy of Ukraine under different presidencies and turning points since the independence of Ukraine.

### **1.4. Research Question**

This thesis seeks to answer the following question: What are the characteristics of Ukraine's foreign policy orientations in the era of globalization? In particular, the research asks how Ukraine's foreign policy is shaped in the course of the interaction of domestic and global developments.

### **1.5. Main Argument**

By analyzing the foreign policy directions of Ukraine since the 1990s, the thesis reveals that Kyiv aimed, first, to develop a multi-vector foreign policy which is failed after the occurrence of the Orange Revolution. Following the Orange Revolution, it observes a West-oriented foreign policy course in Ukraine. By contrast, Ukraine adopted a pro-Russian foreign policy direction from 2010 until the end of 2013 under the pretext of a non-alliance / pragmatic foreign policy tenet. However, the developments following the Revolution of Dignity led Kyiv to alter its foreign policy course once again to the West. Therefore, this thesis argues that as long as Russian aggression continues, Kyiv will maintain and strengthen its West-oriented foreign

policy while reparation of its relations with Moscow seems unrealistic neither in the short nor the medium term.

## **1.6. Methodology**

The following methods were used in writing this research:

1. analysis of existing literature and electronic sources related to the research issue and synthesis of available information;
2. abstraction and formalization of the received information according to the set tasks of research;
3. generalization of research results and formation of conclusions

## **1.7. Structure of the Work**

The work consists of:

- an introduction: define the subject, the aims of the research, review the methods involved in writing the thesis and give a brief survey of the literature on the topic of the research;
- 3 chapters reflect three periods in Ukrainian foreign policy, corresponding to the terms of all presidents: 1991-2004 (Kravchuk and Kuchma), 2004-2014 (Yushchenko and Yanukovych), 2014-2022 (Poroshenko and Zelensky). They provide a chronological account of the most important events in terms of the research topic, as well as their analysis and conclusions;
- The general conclusions of the entire research paper. contains a summary of all the most important events set out in the main body of the paper.
- List of references: contains a list of all the sources used in writing the research paper, information

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **2. FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE FROM FROM 1991 TO 2004**

#### **2.1. Foreign Policy of Ukraine under the Kravchuk Presidency**

1991 was the year of great national revolution in Ukraine. This year in August 24 Ukraine officially became independent country from USSR. And this was a start of national development. All the world understood that Ukraine was a large and powerful country in the middle of Europe, which had four main features like:

- size of territory – second largest country in Europe;
- one of the largest populations in Europe;
- the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world;
- the largest number of natural resources in Europe [1, p.18].

The role of the newly independent state on the political map of the world was to be that Ukraine should become the border between European civilization and the rest of Eurasia, the middle between East and West. This position is instable and requires from governments the only one clear position and orientation in development, because, as history shows, in such geopolitical conditions, Ukraine cannot remain multi-vector in its foreign policy. Thus, during the years of independence, Ukraine has gained significant, albeit very bitter experience internal development and formation of foreign policy. These are two inseparable components of the vital activity of the state organism [2, p.189].

So the analysis of the foreign policy interests and objectives of the Ukrainian state begins from the reign of the first President of Ukraine Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk. He won the democratic elections held on December 5, 1991. The main task of his presidency was establishing and consolidating the international prestige of independent Ukraine. As well as promoting global recognition of the principles of the

new Ukrainian democracy, government, and integration of the state into the world political community.

First steps in this direction were made even before independence. The Declaration on state sovereignty adopted in July 16, 1990 by Verkhovna Rada and, of course, the Act of Independence Ukraine (August 24, 1991), approved by the All-Ukrainian referendum on December 1, 1991. These documents and decisions opened new perspectives on Ukraine's foreign policy as an independent state and equal member of the world community. So all of further actions and decisions of the Ukrainian authorities were aimed at forming the conceptual foundations of Ukraine's foreign policy, regulatory and legal implementation [4, p.180].

In this regard, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a number of documents such as "About succession of Ukraine "(September 12, 1991)," To the parliaments and peoples of the world "(December 5, 1991), "On the effect of international agreements on the territory of Ukraine" (December 10, 1991), "On establishment of diplomatic relations with the states-subjects of the former USSR "(December 11, 1991), "On the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the North Atlantic Assembly (PAA) "(June 3, 1992)," On Ratification of the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on reduction of strategic offensive weapons restrictions ", signed in Moscow on July 31 1991 and the "Protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon signed on behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992." (November 18, 1993), "On Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Non-Proliferation" weapons of July 1, 1968 "(November 16, 1994) and also one of the most important is "On the main directions of Ukraine's foreign policy" (July 3, 1993) [5]. These documents approved Ukraine's entry into the international arena as an independent entity.

Thus, Ukraine legally recognized the supremacy of democracy, the assertion of state sovereignty and human rights as the highest value of Ukrainian society. Then in early 1990s Ukraine's foreign policy were formed and in general they have not changed during the entire period of independence that is for almost 31 years. The



main tasks were ensuring the stability of the international situation, to maintain national interests, to become active membership in international organizations, and thus develop political, economic, spiritual and cultural life in Ukraine. And also to develop the national self-consciousness of the Ukrainian people as a separate full-fledged members of the international community.

In the context of these tasks and their implementation since Independence, famous Ukrainian diplomat and scientist A. Zlenko identified and outlined several stages in Ukraine's foreign policy in particular for this period:

- 1990-1991 - the preparatory period of formation subjectivity of Ukraine in international relations;
- 1992–1994 - institutional, personnel and the conceptual formation of Ukraine's foreign policy and diplomatic service system of international relations [6, p.29].

Of course, the newly created Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs faced with some problems. Former Soviet diplomatic buildings became the property of the Russian Federation, and also Ukrainian diplomats did not have sufficient experience and skills for their independent activities. However, all problems were gradually resolved, in particular with the active assistance of the Ukrainian diaspora [7, p.2]. In a few months, Ukraine has been recognized by more than 140 countries.

Over the next few years, Ukraine has established diplomatic relations with many countries around the world, including the United States, Canada, countries of Europe, Asia, and Russia. So in the summer of 1992 a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed with France. At the same time Ukraine joined the Paris Charter for a New Europe. Ukraine also became a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (later is OSCE), as well as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund [9, p.3-5]. Thus, at the beginning of 2004, Ukrainian diplomats created and concluded more than 10,000 bilateral and multilateral

international agreements, arrangements and treaties of various legal levels [10, p.769].

The new government in independent Ukraine tried to promote the state as widely as possible as a reliable and open partner for cooperation. Despite the already existing pro-European direction of development, which is still closer to the Ukrainian political culture, in contrast to the Eastern direction, Ukrainian diplomats tried to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy.

One example of such multilateralism is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Creation of this union was justified by the need to establish and regulate a new type of relations in the post-Soviet space [12, p.66]. Protocol to the CIS Agreement was signed by leaders of 11 states (except Baltic states and Georgia) of the former Soviet Union On December 21, 1991, in Alma-Ata [13, p.27].

For Moscow, the creation of the CIS was an opportunity to maintain supremacy in the region and continue to influence neighboring states under the auspices of the "brotherhood" and long common history. The alliance was also encouraged by the United States, as the friendly coexistence of the nuclear-weapon states ensured a peaceful situation in the region [12, p.66].

Theses on friendship and mutual assistance formed the basis of the CIS statute, which was adopted on January 22, 1993. The guiding principles of this organization were cooperation in all spheres of state life, inviolability of state borders and respect for the national interests of all members.

Despite all these seemingly attractive conditions, Ukraine has never become a full member of the CIS. A number of actions were taken to maximize the integration and assimilation of member countries. that is, in fact, this union was to become something of a successor to the "great fraternal USSR." Ukraine did not turn away from its neighbors, seeing them as powerful strategic partners, but did not intend to get too close to Russia again.

Nuclear status was an important issue for Ukraine's full membership in the world international community. Due to the fact that Ukrainian-Russian relations were quite tense at that time, the political leadership of Ukraine could not come to a single and clear decision on nuclear weapons for a long time, because they understood that it could become a guarantor of security and possible in conflicts with the Russian Federation.

In particular, Ukraine did not support the ideas of military-political integration within the CIS, and accordingly did not participate in the discussion of the idea of creating a peacekeeping force within this union [13, p.33].

Thus, Ukraine recognized the existence of the CIS as an opportunity for soft integration from the republic within the USSR to a fully independent state, with its own foreign policy orientations and priorities. However, she opposed the transformation of the CIS into a new state entity and denied giving it the status a subject of international law [8, p.35].

However, due to the fact that Ukraine has set itself the priorities of compliance with international law, as well as support for international peace, Kravchuk signed a document determining the future of the Black Sea Fleet and nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine.

These were the Massandra Accords, signed on September 3, 1993. After that, 4 more documents were adopted at September 3, 1993. All of this agreements reveal in more depth and detail the issues and ways to address each of these issues:

- Protocol on settlement of issues of Black Sea Fleet
- Basic principles of utilization of nuclear weapon of Strategic Nuclear Forces located in Ukraine;
- Agreement between the government of Russian Federation and the government of Ukraine on utilization of nuclear warheads;

- Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on implementation of assured and authoritative supervision for operation of strategic missile systems of Strategic Forces located on their territories [8, p.35].

Thus, the intention to make Ukraine non-aligned and neutral was realized. This showed the state's readiness to adapt its foreign policy to a "new life" in Europe. However, at the same time, no document at the highest legal level hindered the security of national and European security. So, the idea of permanent neutrality and non-alignment has lost its importance among the priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy.

Also it is important to make a point of this idea. Abandoning the foreign policy course of non-alignment and neutrality is a pragmatic and appropriate, from the point of view of state evolution. This is a manifestation of understanding and acceptance of existing political realities, in order to maintain the basis of national interests. The concept of neutrality has no prospects in the modern world, because the guarantor of the integrity and security of the state is, first of all, not its military power and potential, but the absence of external and internal enemies [11, p.613].

Summarizing all the foreign policy of Ukraine under President Kravchuk, it becomes clear that it has not achieved any real results. In fact, Kravchuk also failed to resolve the "Crimean issue" or the demarcation of borders [8, p.36].

His goals were too extensive, and of course detachment from the internal problems of the state, did not allow to implement at least part of them. Working on a positive image of Ukraine, the president forgot that the country begins, however, from within, with the way its citizens live.

"Kravchuk had the only chance - to give Ukraine statehood, to give the people independence. He took great advantage of it. But, unfortunately, he was not able to bring the country to the highest European and world positions...» [8, p.35].

## **2.2. Foreign Policy of Ukraine between 1994 and the early 2000s**

The political legacy left by Ukraine's first President Kravchuk, to his successor Kuchma, was rather complex and ambiguous. On the one hand, he conveyed a promising, world-renowned Ukraine. But on the other hand, it was a country without a clear understanding of which path it should take, a country stuck in foreign and domestic debt, a country without a constitution and without much influence in the world political arena.

Of course, the multi-vector policy pursued for almost a decade has helped to establish international relations with the world's major "poles": the European Union, Russia and the United States. The conditions in which Ukraine was in those years dictated that the only correct solution was multi-vector.

However, Ukrainian politicians at that time could not correctly calculate their own forces without the experience of state-building and self-government. Not taking into account the causal links of foreign policy, Ukraine has concluded strategic partnership agreements with at least 20 countries that have competed with each other to some extent [14, p.62].

Anyway, the European Union became the main direction of political, economic and cultural integration. This direction was defined and consolidated in 1994, and in June 1998 The Strategy for Ukraine's Integration into the European Union was adopted and officially proclaimed Ukraine's membership in the EU as a long-term strategic goal [16, p.80]. Ukrainians understood that it will be long and complicated way to become the full-fledged member of European community. But only this option could be the key to real development, not stagnation, constant crises and, as a consequence, a return to independence from Russia like from the Soviet Union.

However, some researchers, such as Galchynsky, determine that in the first stages of shaping this course, Ukraine did not see any economic interest in European integration, but saw it only as a political project [16, p.18].

The development of Ukrainian-American relations had also a good success. The period of the second half of the 1990s was especially marked, after Ukraine achieved the status of nuclear disarmament, which was encouraged and supported by the United States.

On May 11-12, 1995, US President Bill Clinton visited Ukraine. During the visit, the President expressed his intention to provide practical assistance to Ukraine in implementing democratic and market reforms. Ukraine became the third country to receive financial assistance from the United States in the winter of 1996 (after Israel and Egypt) [16, p.119].

In February 1996, Kuchma also paid a visit to the United States. This showed the determination of the parties to establish strategic bilateral relations. These diplomatic relations reached their peak in June 2000, when President Clinton paid a second visit to Ukraine and signed "the Joint Statement on Deepening Strategic Partnership". However, it should be noted, that traditionally American diplomacy interprets the declared "strategic partnership" much lower than relations with "friends" or "allies" [18, p.83].

The period of positive dynamics in the formation of diplomatic relations with Western countries coincided with significant changes in Ukrainian-Russian relations. these transformations took place under the influence of negotiations on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, which lasted until 28 May 1997 [19, p.81]. Such processes and agreements, which were adopted as a result of numerous long discussions, led to the logical conclusion of a strategic agreement on friendship, cooperation and partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine (May 31, 1997). But however, in fact, the meaning of the concept of "strategic relations" was devalued due to the huge number of other concluded "strategic" agreements of Ukraine with different countries [20, p.39].

It is possible to trace the multi-vector of Ukraine's foreign policy. This course was announced by the President in 1997. But, in my opinion, it looks more like a bipolar orientation: Orientation to the East and the West. Or, more precisely, tripolarity: Europe-US-Russia.

Unfortunately, integration in the Western direction has often encountered a huge number of obstacles, both external and internal. And a strategic partnership with Russia is a more forced measure. Historically and geopolitically, Ukraine is forced to have close relations with its eastern neighbor. And usually by renouncing one's own national interests [2, p.192].

Also, uncertainty in foreign policy priorities is related to the population factor: in fact, the Ukrainian people were not yet ready for a sharp turn towards a clear national identity, due to centuries of oppression by the Russian state. That is, the spirit of patriotism alone is not enough to build a new and prosperous democratic state on the ruins of socialism.

These factors also include the reluctance of government officials to be true servants of the people. Political competition only further divided and alienated society, showing Ukraine as a weak part of the former Soviet empire.

Well, such a balance in foreign policy has allowed Ukraine to distance itself from Russia. On the other hand, such political uncertainty contributed to the gradual isolation of Ukraine, and ruled out both the possibility of integration into the West and integration with Russia and, accordingly, other CIS countries [20, p.634]. The basis of this principle of policy was a kind of concept of "geopolitical circle". This meant that any direction that in its perspective could bring economic cooperation between countries and fitted the national interests of Ukraine was considered acceptable. The main goal of this was unimpeded and equally accessible movement in all possible directions: membership in international organizations, bilateral

interstate relations and participation in regional and subregional cooperation [11, p.614].

Aware of the importance of the geopolitical situation, analyzing certain results achieved during the years of independence and gaining diplomatic experience in conducting international relations, in 2001 Ukraine officially abandoned the policy of "multi-vector" and chose the course of Europe.

### **2.3. Foreign Policy of Ukraine towards the Orange Revolution**

At a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council Ukraine under the chairmanship of Leonid Kuchma (May 23, 2002) recognized that neutrality is for Ukraine unpromising and decided to develop a strategy that would provide Ukraine's accession to NATO [20, p.39]. In the Law of Ukraine "On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine" (June 17, 2003), among the main ones foreign policy tasks were singled out "ensuring full-fledged Ukraine's participation in pan-European and regional collective systems security, membership of the European Union and the Organization North Atlantic Treaty while maintaining good neighborly relations and strategic partnership with the Russian Federation, other CIS countries, and also by other states" [22].

However, the change of government in the USA and the coming to power of George W. Bush has significantly affected relations between Ukraine and the United States. And in general, Ukraine has failed to gain a foothold in the European and Euro-Atlantic direction [20, p.39]. Relations with Ukraine have receded into the background for the United States in connection with rapprochement with Russia, especially on counter-terrorism issues following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

In general, in relation to Ukraine, there was inertia. In fact, the newly elected President of USA continued to develop the position of his father, the 41st President of the United States George H. W. Bush: "Freedom is not the same as independence.



Americans do not support those who seek independence in order to change the former tyranny by local despotism” [23, p.9].

Improving Russian-American relations after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 contributed to Ukraine's withdrawal from US geopolitical plans, and the return of Ukraine to Russia's area of responsibility. "The Gongadze Case", "Cassette scandal" and the situation surrounding the sale of Ukrainian "Kolchug" to Iraq, interrupted the dialogue with the United States at the highest level [20, p.39]. All this has led to a significant deterioration in relations between the United States and Ukraine. And now the issue of not only strategic partnership was not considered, but the very notion of friendship between these countries was simply erased.

Significant in the bad sense was the fact that at the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002, the organizers were forced to seat the leaders of the participating countries on a special principle so that the presidents of the United States and Ukraine were not close to each other. Due to the diplomatic protocol and etiquette, this was an unprecedented case. This position reflected even a kind of hostility

Having been left without the support of one of the most influential countries in the world, Ukraine was forced to change its plans and return to the path of development of the "Eurasian" vector. However, the direct necessity and importance of European integration was not excluded from the agenda.

Eurasianism is, in essence, Russia's well-thought-out strategy for rapprochement and unification of post-Soviet countries. The CIS is one of the tools to achieve this goal. As noted earlier, in order not to lose influence and position, Russia has tried in various ways, by creating political, economic and social programs, to "tie" the already independent countries as much as possible. In particular Ukraine this has always been of special interest to the Kremlin.

The principles of Ukraine's foreign policy are based on the idea of an advisory and negotiating function of the CIS, which should promote the formation of new

forms of relations between member states and help solve common problems. It should be noted that Ukraine's attitude to the CIS is based primarily on the realities of economic expediency of the Commonwealth and strives to ensure that European standards become a guideline for the CIS, which will help all member states to enter the path of sustainable economic development.

In economic terms, the Commonwealth should be a mechanism for mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation, based on the functioning of a free trade area in the format of 12 states, taking into account the requirements of the World Trade Organization.

Moreover, not only Ukraine's economic or political integration into Russia's sphere of influence was envisaged, but most importantly, cultural and national. In my opinion, this was the biggest mistake on the part of the Ukrainian authorities which hindered for many years the formation of a healthy national self-identification and recognition the unity of the Ukrainian nation by the world community.

In particular, to understand the level of assimilation that was supposed to be achieved by various foreign policy instruments, one can consider the personal visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Ukraine's independence. This emphasized the new special format of relations between states. It cannot be said that such a plan met with significant approval from ordinary Ukrainians. Despite the fact that for about 10 years Ukraine has been an independent state that develops in its own way, according to many Russians and even the part of Ukrainians who were Russian-speaking, Ukraine was no more than part of a large Russian federation. And measures to assimilate one culture with another only reinforced this perception as true. That is, it has now become even easier for Russia to dictate to Ukraine what to do and with whom to be friends.

2002 was the year of Ukraine and 2003 was the year of Russia in Ukraine. This contributed to the consolidation in the minds of Ukrainians and Russians the idea of

friendly fraternal people. Meetings between the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia became regular, and cooperation at all political and economic levels became intensive. Ukraine has even intensified its activities within the CIS: on September 17, 2003, Ukraine signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Common Economic space between Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. Of course this step was important to get and hold support from Russia. But according to many foreign diplomats and politicians, participation in this "Kremlin project" was seen as an alternative to European integration [24, p.149]. Under these new foreign policy conditions, Ukraine has indeed become significantly closer to Russia. It would be fair to say that relations between the states practically reached their peak during this time.

In general, it can be noted that such an orientation in foreign policy diametrically reflected the mood of Ukrainians. Data from opinion polls in 2003 on the foreign policy orientation of the public show that the number of those who prefer to expand ties within the CIS. Public sentiment in Ukraine was about the same in 1994. Supporters of priority ties with the West decreased from 12.8% in 1998 up to 10.7% at the beginning of 2003 [25, p.226].

There was also a positive result of such cooperation between the countries. Finally, some progress has been made on the demarcation of borders. In January 28, 2003, in Kyiv, Presidents Kuchma and Vladimir Putin signed the Treaty on land border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Parties officially confirmed that they have no territorial claims against each other [20, p.40]. However, in fact, for Russia, this agreement meant almost nothing. The first claims against Ukrainian territories, namely the island of Kosa Tuzla, were made in late 2003. The reason for this was an uncertainty in the demarcation of the Sea of Azov. In the following years, Russia continued to encroach on Ukrainian lands, which a little more than ten years later passed into the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014.

In general, it also can be said that such a cautious foreign policy of Ukraine, which did not provide for particularly rapid movements towards Europe or the CIS and Russia, did not bring any positive effect. On the contrary, significant concessions in economic, political and cultural terms on the part of Ukraine greatly changed the nature of Ukrainian-Russian relations, and put Ukraine in a position of dependence, but an equal partnership was not envisaged.

In general, if we consider the beginning of the 2000s in Ukraine, we can say that this was not the best and most successful stage in terms of foreign policy activity: the deterioration of relations with the West, partial rapprochement with Russia. It is also worth mentioning the territorial and ideological conflicts with neighboring countries: with Romania (over Snake Island and the Danube-Black Sea Canal), the aforementioned Russia (through the waters of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait), Hungary (due to the installation of a memorial to the Hungarian tribes on Veretsky passes and the Hungarian national minority of Transcarpathia), Poland (according to the assessment Volyn tragedy of 1943 and awarding the title of Hero of Ukraine to R. Shukhevych and S. Bandera), etc. [14, p.63].

Ukraine has been increasingly accused of hypocrisy, arguing that the government is taking the side that is more advantageous in a given situation and does not have a clear and well-developed foreign policy strategy. However, I am convinced that the problem was not in Ukraine itself, but in the states that were interested in it. Lacking own sufficient experience in international relations, Ukraine only wanted to enlist support from various quarters. But, it turned out that the weakness was the inability to respond quickly and competently to changes in world political life. Ukraine's attempts to defend its own mapped territorial and historical or cultural borders, enshrined in human memory and consciousness, were often perceived negatively and even hostilely by other countries. However, I believe that these decisions emphasized the seriousness and determination of the Ukrainian nation to join the European community on an equal footing as a full and integral member.

For the first time under Kuchma's presidency, economic stability was achieved in independent Ukraine. Large enterprises began to operate, the permanent concept of "deficit" was minimized, and the population began to receive salaries. A lot of effort has been put into resolving internal problems, which was not the case with the first president. So we can confidently say that this period, with all its advantages and disadvantages, was in principle the first conscious in terms of self-identification of Ukrainians: people realized that country thought of them, people got a constitution and clear borders. And it is fair to say that Kuchma was not a very good expert in geopolitics and political foresight, but ordinary Ukrainians remember his presidency with gratitude.

Well, Ukraine's independence after almost 70 years of membership in the USSR, became an important and largely decisive event for all Ukrainians and the world community. And even though many countries and their representatives did not believe in the possibility of Ukraine becoming an independent and sovereign state (for example, Margaret Thatcher - Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, during her visit to Kyiv was skeptical and even ironic about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and UK), Ukrainians were able to defend their own right to be proud on an equal footing with the world's leading nations.

During the first decade, Ukrainian diplomats, without sufficient experience and despite various obstacles, were able to show the international political community that Ukraine is not just a country between East and West, not just one of the points in ancient and modern trade routes. It is a powerful strategic partner, it is a proud and determined people, and it is a unique culture, history and values that cannot be taken away, desecrated or destroyed. And despite the difficulties and attempts of other states to manipulate the Ukrainian government for their own interests, Ukraine has persevered and continued its development, taking into account the mistakes of the first years.

## CHAPTER 3

### 3. FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE FROM 2004 TO 2014

#### 3.1 Foreign Policy of Ukraine after “Orange Revolution”

2004 was truly a defining year for the Ukrainian people in many ways. In the Ukrainian historical and cultural consciousness this year was remembered, first of all, as the year of the "Orange Revolution". In order to determine the full importance of this act of expression of the will of the people for the further evolution of Ukraine's foreign policy, we must identify the reasons that led to it:

- One of the main causes of the "Orange Revolution" was the multi-vector foreign policy of President Kuchma, which in recent years of his rule has become increasingly pro-Russian. Inconsistency in the definition of the foreign policy vector and "overflow" to different sides, as a result was perceived citizens as a partial and gradual return to the regime that existed in the Soviet Union. This was unacceptable for the people, because even before independence, Ukrainians decided in which direction they wanted to develop. In fact, this was shown by the results of the 1991 referendum.
- Support for the presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich in the presidential election by the current ruling elite, including Kuchma. Why was this the cause of the revolution? Yanukovich had a pro-Russian orientation, which would later become apparent in his policies. In addition, he was a representative of the oligarchy and did not aim to democratize Ukrainian public life.
- Illegitimacy of the 2004 presidential election. As a result of falsification of results Yanukovich won.

All this led to peaceful rallies in Kyiv, which later became known as the "Orange Revolution". This event in Ukrainian history was widely advertised in the

world media. As a result of these rallies, the second round of elections was held again, in which Victor Yushchenko won.

Undoubtedly, Victor Yushchenko won the grueling race on a patriotic wave impulse of society not in individual areas, but in the whole state. Well-known Ukrainian scientist Anatoliy Halchynskyi considers the November 2004 events that preceded the end election campaign, as a "manifestation of the classic in its content social revolution, which is undeniable is a logical continuation of the profound social transformations that began in 1991. In the end, the scientist concluded, the goals of 1991 and the goals of 2004 are similar. They have the same genetics and are not only related to the establishment of Ukraine as independent sovereign state, but also with a radical restructuring of the whole complex of social relations, integration of our country into modern civilized development " [1, p.5].

"Maidan - 2004" articulated the European vector to the whole world, and started the second wave "Integration pressure on the European Union from the ruling elite of Ukraine" [2, p.386]. The events of November and December 2004 changed perceptions of Europeans regarding Ukraine. Europe realized that Ukraine is not just a country located in the East, but in the "East of Europe", and recognized our country as an integral part a single European civilization and political space [3, p.40].

The naive desire for rapid, decisive and radical change has become the greatest deception of protesters, which deeply traumatized the vulnerable Ukrainian soul. This leads to crisis of national identity, which is the main source and main driving force for the latest Ukrainian "Revolution of Dignity" [4].

A characteristic feature of Ukraine's activity in the international arena in the specified period is its direct dependence on the domestic political situation. This trend was characteristic and for the following periods, but in the period 2005–2010 it was clearly manifested [5, p.202].

However, integration is a complex process that involves a huge number of reforms and changes within the state. And the problem of Ukraine's integration into

the European Union was not only, for example, the insufficient level of economic development, but most importantly - the level of perception of the values of legal and civil society. The Orange Revolution gave a significant impetus to bridging this gap, and at the same time, highlighted its special sharpness. It is also needed to remember that such a great obstacle to free integration as the incompleteness of the process of creating a mature Ukrainian political nation. Statehood without national identity does not make sense, and there is no future [1, p.270-271].

The political establishment of post-revolutionary Ukraine was not ready to work in democratic environment. The new elite lacked the spiritual and volitional component for conducting policy on the basis of compromise, tolerance and rational sense. Selfish interests proved to be stronger than democratic values, which not only caused strife and personnel mix in the power team, but also exacerbated the socio-political situation in state and worsened its status in the eyes of international partners [6, p.19].

Revolutionary events in the country chronologically coincided with the enlargement of the EU and its membership, in particular, the countries bordering Ukraine (Poland, Hungary and Slovakia). The emergence of a common border between Ukraine and the EU has prompted politicians to look new formulas for closer interaction. The result of intensified dialogue at the highest level was signing the EU - Ukraine Action Plan for 3 years on 21 February 2005 as a part of European Neighborhood Policy. However, the signed document did not fill Ukraine – EU relations with a new meaning, because it was considered by Brussels as alternatives to integration and association. Trying to prove the seriousness of intentions for Europe, the Ukrainian leadership has proposed an annual “Roadmap program” of implementation of integration measures [3, p.40].

The general upsurge in Europe after the Ukrainian revolution passed quickly. It was replaced by frustration with the actions of the new Ukrainian government. A year later, experts stated: “pro-European the inclined head of state did not formulate



holistic and long-term strategy Ukraine's integration into the European Union” [7, p.5].

In addition, at this time in Europe there was a certain rethinking of the policy of accession to the EU due to the failure to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in referendums in France and the Netherlands. The European Parliament stated that the EU had "reached the limits of its absorption capacity", and in November 2005 the European Commission proposed focusing in the short and medium term on the gradual accession of the Western Balkans, refraining from providing membership to Eastern European countries [7, p.5].

Nevertheless, in some ways, Europe has continued to stimulate and insist on important changes within Ukraine, which could in the medium term ensure the implementation of the strategic course of integration into the European Union, and the realization of the conceptual priority of Ukraine's foreign policy. In particular, in December 2005, EU member states decided to grant Ukraine the status of a market economy country within the framework of anti-dumping legislation (regulation of the value of goods in foreign and domestic markets). Ukraine's expected participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and further work on the free trade area with the EU was considered an important step toward solving the practical problems of European integration. [8, p.614].

Another important step towards finding a consensus on this issue was to change the geopolitical thinking of both Europeans and especially neighboring countries that have recently joined the EU and Ukrainians. The rhetoric of European states about the belonging of the Ukrainian people to Europe is important, but until the Europeans themselves include Ukraine in the system of the strategic vision of the common future, nothing will change. [9]

And here is the correlation between the West's unwillingness to accept post-Soviet space as a sphere of international law and diplomacy and aggressive policy of the Russian Federation towards the post-Soviet republics in order preventing them

from distancing themselves from Moscow's geopolitical plans, aimed at the reintegration of the USSR. In this context, the Eastern Partnership has become the EU's attempt to strengthen its influence on European Post-Soviet space, but the lack of a political component and prospects for membership for young democracies made it difficult to distance themselves from Russia [5, p.5].

It should also be noted that new Ukrainian government failed to develop a clear strategy for European integration, and even more so to convey its basic ideas to the population of Ukraine, which for the most part remained quite inert. A characteristic trend of political activity of Ukrainian citizens was that of protest potentially was enough only to change the government, as it happened in 2004, but not to change the rules games and reboots of the power system itself. Dominance of paternalistic sentiment and Soviet identity led to the unpreparedness of the forced geopolitical reorientation [5, p.204].

President Viktor Yushchenko tried to compensate such failures in the European space by deepening relations with the United States. At that time, Ukraine was most interested in joining NATO. However, the presence of an aggressive and negative attitude towards such a union, the eastern neighbor of Ukraine again hindered this process.

However, the economic and political conditions in the world have developed in such a way that Ukraine has again not been a regular strategic partner, receding into the background. The global economic crisis, the military campaign launched by Russia in Georgia, in which, by the way, Ukraine supported Georgia by demonstrating independence from Moscow in assessing international processes, and the escalation of the situation in the Middle East have made any development of this partnership impossible.

American diplomacy focused on the implementation of the concept of "reset" in relations with Russia, Washington has returned to a pro-Russian formula in international politics foreign policy. According to V. Khandogiy, an integral part of

politics the "reset" between the White House and the Kremlin was the US refusal to support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia in exchange for Russian aid to Afghanistan and Iran [10, p.712].

It is important to consider in more detail Russia's role in hindering Ukraine's integration into the Euro-Atlantic political space. After the Orange Revolution, Russia felt a certain threat to its own security. The authorities were not so much afraid of possible military encroachments by NATO as they were afraid of losing their positions in the post-Soviet environment. Russia was afraid of losing one of its most important territories of influence.

Under such conditions, Ukrainian-Russian relations found themselves at the lowest point of development since the collapse of the USSR. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. Lavrov predicted that Ukraine's accession to NATO would provoke a deep crisis of Russian-Ukrainian relations [11, p.33].

It is in these years, according to O. Dergachev, Russia "has entered a period of certainty" - fully established paradigm of its development, which combined great power, nationalism, a special way of civilization. A special model has been found in the Kremlin "Sovereign democracy", based on the special status of bureaucracy, the degraded role of law, which clearly distances the country from the European community" [11, p.6]. That is why the changes that Ukraine has been striving for and pursuing for years have been incomprehensible to the Kremlin and unacceptable.

However, the dissatisfaction of the Russian leadership was caused not only by Ukraine's integration efforts, but also by attempts to move away from copying Russian models of socio-political and foreign policy development, as well as reviewing a number of controversial historical issues in the context of Russian-Ukrainian relations. In particular, the recognition of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 as genocide of the Ukrainian people, the "Shot Renaissance", as well as a significant revision of the assessment of World War II and so on [3, p.42].

Experts noted that from the beginning the Russian leadership was building relations with Ukraine are more on political and ideological grounds than on generally accepted principles of international relations [12, p.110].

Russia responded to such differences of a civilizational nature asymmetrically strikes on Ukraine. Using Ukraine's economic dependence, Russia unleashed gas (2005, 2009) and trade (restrictions on imports into Russia Ukrainian pipes, metal, synthetic fibers, sugar, etc.) war. Russia's policy in the information field of Ukraine intensified, provoking growing separatism among Russians and the Russian-speaking population, fueling "Anti-NATO hysteria", exacerbating the language situation [3, p.42].

In addition to the aggravation of Russian-Ukrainian relations, the gas war in January 2009 deepened the mutual crisis of confidence between Ukraine and the EU. European countries were again left without gas, and this became the basis for accusations of Ukraine as an unreliable partner. Head of The European Commission demanded that Moscow and Kyiv settle the problems of gas supplies to Europe and separate them from the conflicts in the Ukrainian-Russian negotiation process [13, p.33].

Russia's political elite has been unable to accept new realities in international relations. By disrespecting the judiciary and its sovereignty, Russia has sparked a rise in anti-Russian sentiment in the post-Soviet space to control the geographical area adjacent to its borders and neighboring countries contained in it remained the most effective element of foreign policy. But now they got a new ideological justification of protection the Russian-speaking population [14, p.637].

President Yushchenko has not been able to fully protect his own foreign policy from Russian influence. This is due to the fact that Ukraine, even with the change of power, did not have a clear strategy in relations with the world community, but continued to "adjust" in response to external challenges. Under such circumstances it is quite easy for Russians to be one step ahead, artificially creating "incentives"

which the Ukrainian government responds quite predictably, almost instinctive "reactions" [15, p.550].

Intensification of Russia's activities to restore its influence on post-Soviet space forced European countries to worry about keeping the eastern neighbors in the orbit of their interests. To this end, the European Commission has developed a project called the Eastern Partnership. Its task was to promote the strengthening of statehood and territorial integrity of the countries invited to participate (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), on the basis of European solidarity [16, p.30].

To achieve this, it was necessary to create conditions for political association and economic integration, ensure strong and long-term partnerships between member states, increase social and national security, resolve energy issues, support reforms in various fields, jointly address global issues (environment pollution, terrorism, famine, etc.). Thus, these countries should have been involved in the common ideas and values of the liberal West.

In fact, the "Eastern Partnership" was created in response to the growing demands for European integration of states within the framework of the "European Neighborhood Policy" for states that had virtually no chance of becoming a full member of the EU [17, p.896]. For Ukraine, the path to Europe was "cut off", in particular, due to the escalation of the domestic political crisis, growing differences in policy between parliament and the president, the lack of a common vision of Ukraine's future. In addition, leading European countries were reluctant to sacrifice their own economic relations with Russia to ensure Ukraine's security and support its EU integration process.

Awareness of the need to develop mutually beneficial stable relations on both the western and eastern borders, based on the geopolitical situation of Ukraine, the existing political realities and the existing concept of "equality". Thus, Ukraine had to occupy central position in the EU-Ukraine-Russia political triangle within the

framework of the Greater Europe project, eliminating the need to choose a single vector of partnership [18].

V. Manjola, analyzing the international relations of that time noted that a marked weakening of American hegemony leads to transformation trilateral balancing of the EU - Russia - the United States in a kind of bipolar structure of a new, mostly cooperative type of EU - Russia. Under these conditions, the researcher believed, “finding a rational relationship between concepts "multi-vector", "non-aligned", "European choice", "European" and "Euro-Atlantic" integration, the "Eurasian vector", etc., which can lead to the need to form a new paradigm of foreign policy of Ukraine, before the emergence of such a geopolitical project, in the implementation of which is ours the state could play a constructive and integrative role that would be adequate its potential and geopolitical position” [19, p.9].

In fact, this concept could be a logical development of the previous one multi-vector policy. “EU-NATO-Russia conference: place and prospects” (2009), with the participation of leading diplomats and experts, opinions were expressed that multi-vector principle should remain as basic. It was noted that the geopolitical realities of Ukraine are excluded the possibility of focusing on only one foreign policy direction. With the concept of "multi-vector" was to be understood in the conventional sense as the development and maintenance of state relations with many international actors. The definition of these vectors does not mean that they are equivalent in their own way importance and potential for the realization of national interests of Ukraine. Ukraine's policy of equal proximity opens up opportunities for minimization confrontational components of the geopolitical environment. At the heart of the policy of equality is the principle of equilibrium - the rejection of unilateral orientation to one of the great powers, leading to the satellite of the country; it is a rejection of neutrality between superpowers that threatens the division of the country into spheres of influence, it is a balance between many centers of influence in the international arena [20, p.23].

This concept, which never became the state's foreign policy course, aimed to overcome the inflections in Ukrainian foreign policy in the period Yushchenko's presidency. Analyzing Ukraine's foreign policy from an angle in view of the challenges of civilization, it is pointed a key role of Ukraine. However, achieving this state was possible in the context of post-bipolar world order, and provided for the achievement of a truly great international consensus. However, the problem is not only that the logic of world processes is gone the other way is to increase confrontation, and imperialism finally won in Russia. The main reason is the inefficiency of Ukrainians reforms that should strengthen Ukraine's claims to such a mediating role. Unfortunately, Ukraine has not proved its need for the world. So, it became logical "fatigue" from it in the West and the denial of its statehood in Russia. [3, p.43].

Well, after Yushchenko's revolutionary victory, new perspectives opened up for him for the political elite and, most importantly, for the development of radically new foreign relations. And an important task for them was to change not just the image, but the essence of the system of public administration that has operated in the country since independence [21, p.36]. The main threats to the successful implementation of Ukraine's foreign policy are internal. First of all, it is a political crisis, inability of the government to ensure its own legitimacy, numerous mistakes of government officials, corruption, insufficient level of democracy, lack of interest from government to needs of Ukrainians, passivity of citizens, media dependence on the government [22, p.646].

The people of Ukraine expected completely new decisive actions from the newly elected president. This demand for change was pronounced during the Revolution. However, such revolution was not enough for the new government. The inconsistency of the various branches of government has led to a decline in Ukraine's image as a country with unstable political and economic development. And the conflict between the President and the Prime Minister was successfully used by Ukraine's opponents.

Part of Ukrainian political circles in response to the categorical position of Europe in the Ukrainian-Russian gas wars changed the orientation of their own political views, abandoning national values in favor of economic stability and pragmatism. Increased rates of integration decreased significantly during 2005-2009. The result has been a weakening of pro-Western sentiment and driving forces within Ukraine.

Thus, as Viktor Kaspruk said, Viktor Yushchenko became president of unfulfilled hopes and the greatest disappointment of the Ukrainian people [23]. Years of Victor's Andriyovych Yushchenko has been idle for Ukrainians for five years, we have not moved neither forward nor for his constant clarification of relations within the state [24, p.170].

### **3.2 Foreign Policy of Ukraine towards the Revolution of Dignity**

The presidency of Yanukovich Viktor Fedorovich at one time falls from February 25, 2010, to February 22, 2014. This period is called "time split and international isolation" among many Ukrainian and foreign researchers. "Fugitive President" - that's how it entered the history of independent Ukraine, such promising and promising staff as Viktor Yanukovich, who for as a result of the election, people handed over the presidential mace. Its rapid and a fairly successful political career did not allow the least of Ukrainians an idea of what his presidency will lead to.

The new president Viktor Yanukovich stated that he was "descending from heaven to earth" in anticipation of the European direction. Not giving up from European integration, Viktor Yanukovich announced his intention to sign an agreement with the EU on associate membership and free trade area, readiness to accept EU assistance in carrying out reforms in Ukraine, etc. However, this movement was determined by three principles - pragmatism, economization and non-alignment [25].

In addition, the international situation began to play against Ukraine. Expansion of the EU changed the regional balance of power in 2004-2007. Approaching the EU



border to Ukraine, made it a common space of external security between Russia and the EU. And this, according to foreign experts, has turned Ukraine into a field of geopolitical competition [26, p.4].

Russia has taken full advantage of the changes in the Ukrainian government. It was obvious that Viktor Yanukovich's real priority in Ukraine's foreign policy was relations with the Russian Federation, although documenting Ukraine's main task was European integration. To the traditional asymmetry in relationships added a clear consolidation of the northern neighbor in Ukrainian politics, economy, culture and the military. On April 21, 2010 in Kharkiv, Presidents of Ukraine and Russia signed «Agreement between Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine» which later became known as the "Kharkiv Pact". According to this agreement, the period of stay fleet lasted until 2042. Payment for the stay of the fleet consisted of annual payments of \$100 million and additional funds to be received due to a reduction of \$100 gas prices set by the current contract [27, p.95]. The President assured that in the short term he managed to “radically improve the general atmosphere of Ukrainian-Russian relations and return them to the level of a true strategic partnerships” [28, p.9].

However, despite these seemingly lucrative and compelling arguments, most Ukrainians saw the agreements as a betrayal of national interests and a potential threat to Ukraine's sovereignty and integrity.

The new Law "On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy" (July 1, 2010), fully reflected the problems and crisis of Ukraine's foreign policy strategy under President Yanukovich. Consider the most fundamental contradictions:

1. "... Ukraine's adherence to a policy of non-alignment, which means Ukraine's non-participation in military-political alliances, priority participation in the improvement and development of the European collective security system, continued constructive partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other military-political blocs of mutual interest ... " [29,p.69];

.2. "... ensuring Ukraine's integration into the European political, economic and legal space with the aim of gaining membership in the European Union ..." [29,p.69].

A return to neutrality and non-alignment was to mean the only effective guarantee of Ukraine's security. However, B. Parahonsky, pointing to reducing the role of neutrality and non-aligned status in the world, argued that consolidating non-alignment would mean for Ukraine the complete exclusion from any participation in the security system on the European continent [20, p.23].

International politics does not treat non-alignment as a permanent state. It may be revised in the event of a threat to national security, but its approval is simply inadmissible, given the decision to extend the stay on territory of Ukraine of military bases of the Russian Federation [30, p.18]. This decision is short-sighted and reckless, given the constant territorial and national encroachments by the Russian Federation.

In his inaugural speech on February 25, 2010, Yanukovych said that he had a clear idea that the foreign policy strategy would best suit Ukraine's national interests. Being a bridge between East and West, Ukraine will choose a foreign policy that will allow our country to get the most out of equal and mutually beneficial relations with the Russian Federation, the European Union, the United States and other countries that influence the world situation "[32]. That is, it meant an updated version of the multi-vector strategic course for Ukraine, but in fact with a shift in political emphasis on relations with Russia.

On March 5, 2010, President Viktor Yanukovych paid a visit to Moscow. Even before the visit Russian President Dmitry Medvedev noted that "the election confirmed the aspirations of the citizens of Ukraine to put an end to historically doomed attempts to sow enmity between our states, a sincere desire to strengthen good neighborly relations " [33]. Opposition experts predicted that "the return of the country to the bosom of Russian design, which has always been hegemonic and transnational, rather than integrative, may mean peculiar foreign policy coup.

Ukrainian statehood will be re-founded on Russian ambush” [34]. Ukraine has paid too much for reduced gas prices: its own principles, independence and further political development for a long time. The Kremlin expected from the leadership of Ukraine radical geopolitical reorientation.

On April 2, 2010, President Viktor Yanukovich liquidated the commission for the preparation of Ukraine's accession to NATO. At the same time, the Kyiv Court of Appeals banned the referendum from the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO [13, p.34]. When it comes to non-aligned status as fundamental principle of Ukrainian politics, constitutional commitment - it would be tragic mistake for Ukraine and a completely unacceptable step [35]. There was also a clear signal from Brussels. Deputy Director-General of the Directorate-General “European Neighborhood Policy” of the European Commission H. Mingarelli explained the impossibility to Ukraine simultaneous accession to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the creation of the zone free trade with the European Union [36].

At that time, the United States viewed Ukraine as a perfectly legitimate territory under Russian influence. Therefore, as part of the "reset of Russian-American relations", Washington has significantly influenced the development of technology and modernization in Ukraine [13, p.35].

A visit to Germany after Ukrainian-American negotiations maybe is even more important than to Brussels, because everything is decided in Berlin, Brussels remains a bureaucratic capital. After all, Germany is one of Ukraine's most difficult partners. Berlin was always very pragmatic about the idea of rapid enlargement of the European Union and called to wait with the free trade zone with Kyiv. Moscow has always promoted its own ideas to Europe through Berlin. Angela Merkel's government came to power amid criticism strong rapprochement with Russia, and then did not change policy in this area [37, p.102].

A new focus for Ukraine's foreign policy was the resumption of dialogue with the countries of North Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. September 2-5, 2010

President Viktor Yanukovich paid a visit to China and Hong Kong. Ukraine was going to use the potential relations with China to modernize its economy. China has offered its services in gas and oil production on the Black Sea shelf. But US and Russia was extremely dissatisfied with the Chinese promise to invest in amounting to four billion dollars [38].

Ukraine has not had such strong support from the European Union as before. The United States did not view Ukraine as an independent strategic partner. But the active interest of Russia and participation in the internal affairs of Ukraine, played a key role in the further development of the state and society as a whole. Viktor Yanukovich in 2013 at the November EU summit in Vilnius refused to sign an agreement with the EU on association. Russia's political pressure, and Yanukovich's personal dependence on the Kremlin, will later take precedence over a significant part of Ukrainians. Caused by a sharp change in political course, internal processes in Ukraine again exposed significant contradictions between Ukrainians and significantly influenced the configuration of political elites [13, p.45].

Well, the period of Yanukovich's presidency in the context of foreign policy can be characterized by three main theses:

1. Degradation of foreign policy relations, decline of Ukraine's authority in the international political arena as a reliable and conscious partner and participant in the European processes;
2. The highest level of Ukrainian-Russian relations, "encouragement" of Russia's aggressive ambitions;
3. As the results of all destructive policies - the rise of the Ukrainian spirit, the formation of national consciousness and unification to achieve a common state goal.

Guided by his own interests and preferences, Yanukovich led Ukraine to make concessions not only on cultural or social issues, but also on strategic ones such as security of sovereignty, European integration and economic independence. In fact,

the president has turned away from his people, guided solely by his own and foreign arguments. All this eventually led to rallies in Kyiv, the escape of Yanukovich and his allies.

Fleeing to Russia with his immediate entourage, he took away the spirit of uncertainty and slavery from Ukraine forever. The "Revolution of Dignity" has shown that Ukraine is truly Europe and the people are ready to go to this goal to the end. It is also quite ironic that the first possible coming to power of Yanukovich in 2004 was accompanied by a revolution, and his presidency, in turn, led to a new revolution and a coup in civic consciousness. But both the first and the second act of expressing the will of Ukrainians showed that there can be enemies within the state, and such people have no place in the country.

## CHAPTER 4

### 4. FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE FROM 2014 TO 2022

#### 4.1 The Foreign Policy of Ukraine under Poroshenko

2014 was an extremely important year for Ukraine's foreign policy complex and at the same time crucial. Thanks to the Revolution of Dignity, the criminal regime of Viktor Yanukovich was removed from power. But immediately after the victory of the Revolution, Russian aggression began, Crimea and part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine were occupied. Extraordinary elections of the head of state and parliament took place. Finally, the Association Agreement with the EU was signed and ratified. The infamous provision on so-called "non-aligned status" was removed from the Law on the Principles of Ukraine's Domestic and Foreign Policy, which formally paved the way for the resumption of the Euro-Atlantic integration process [1, p. 37]

The escape of Viktor Yanukovich and his immediate surroundings in Russia, which took place in conditions of sharp confrontation with society, accompanied by the surrender of national interests. Leadership of Russia has taken an openly hostile stance on Ukraine's internal processes, and using available resources, began to actively support separatist trends in Ukraine. Russia's goal has become obvious - the dismemberment of Ukraine. The Kremlin claimed that Ukrainian statehood was nothing more than a fiction and had no reason to exist [2, p.45].

In 2014, Russia's actions against Ukraine turned out to be frankly expansionist: occupation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Annexation of Crimea, in addition to all the legal consequences, had one specific feature – it finally destroyed the specter of "friendship" in relations between Ukraine and Russia. Crimea as a "Khrushchev's gift" was a guarantee of stability interstate relations, however, Kremlin's political elite did not recognize his Ukrainian affiliation at all. However unilateral violation of this shaky balance, completely crossed out the paradigm of "friendship" in bilateral relations.

From now on, according to Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin, Ukraine and Russia are united only by geography: “Any relations are built on trust... And here from this all-encompassing trust between Ukraine and Russia has no trace left. Prospects for restoring this trust in the near future sometimes I don't see. Talk even about the formal normalization of Ukrainian-Russian relations, as long as there is a hybrid war in the Donbass, as long as there is a temporary occupation of Crimea, it is not necessary. We are, naturally, as purely geographical neighbors, we will solve some practical problems of coexistence. But all this will not happen to be included in the palette of normal interstate relations” [3].

Under these conditions, the foreign policy of the state has become atypical for previous stages of clarity. December 23, 2014, at the initiative of the President Poroshenko, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted amendments to the laws which consisted in abandoning the policy of non-alignment. Thus, in the Law of Ukraine “On Fundamentals of National Security” indicated a clear goal: “integration of Ukraine in European political, economic, legal space for the purpose of acquisition membership in the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic security space”, and the issue of cooperation with NATO - “meeting the criteria required for acquisition membership in this organization” [4]. The Law of Ukraine was similarly amended “On the principles of domestic and foreign policy”, which defined the purpose of Ukraine NATO membership.

The implementation of the new course was the signing on June 27, 2014 of the Agreement on The EU-Ukraine Association and its simultaneous ratification on 16 September The Verkhovna Rada and the European Parliament. Since November 2014 some parts of the Agreement entered into force, and from January 1, 2016 – earned a deep and comprehensive free trade area. The association agreement fixed important provisions for the recognition of Ukraine by Europe as a European country, which “Shares a common history and common values with the member states of the European Union”, its desire to strengthen the European identity, the presence of a strong public support in Ukraine of European choice [5].

The events of 2014 showed that the success of our country on the path to the EU will depend no longer from the ability of Ukrainian rulers and diplomats to convince Europeans of the seriousness of what was taken obligations, and in ability carry out the cardinal reforms to implement the so-called the EU “*acquis communautaire*”, from the real steps that Brussels is still waiting from Kyiv. At the same time, the expert community confident that alternative courses for admission to the European Union is not present [6, p.20].

About three quarters of experts are quite optimistic about the assessed Ukraine's chances on successful implementation of the provisions of the Association Agreement with EU in 2015, they believed that Kyiv would succeed to make up for lost time in 2014 year [6, p.20].

This optimism was based on the election results before The Verkhovna Rada, in which in December formed a pro-European majority, reappointed Prime Minister A. Yatsenyuk and his mutual understanding of European integration with the President [7, p.40-41].

In the Sustainable Development Strategy signed in 2015 "Ukraine 2020" [8] stated that the goal of the strategy is to introduce European living standards in Ukraine and Ukraine's leading position in the world.

It should be borne in mind that entering regional integration associations and international organizations for Ukraine is possible only on a parity basis, ensuring the priority of national and national security interests, based on the responsibility of the authorities to Ukrainian citizens and the business community to ensure their interests both in the domestic and European space [9].

Nevertheless, progress in the European direction is not without difficulties, which is manifested in the lack of political stability and conflict in the east Ukraine, which hinders the reform of the country. Institutional play a role difficulties in the EU, which is overburdened by the Greek crisis, the problem of migrants and the rise of Euroscepticism, and so on [2, p.46].



Europe is really not indifferent to issues European integration of our country, but in general the reaction to the Ukrainian events was inadequate to their sharpness and pan-European scale. As J. Soros rightly believes, "Europe needs to wake up and realize that it is being attacked by Russia. Assistance to Ukraine should also be considered as defense spending for EU countries". He also noted: "Europe does not seem to know that it is indirect by being attacked by Russia, and continues "business as usual" [10].

Relations with the United States have reached a new level: the state leaderships supported revolutionary changes in Ukraine. December 18, 2014 President of the United States Obama signed the Law on Support of Freedom of Ukraine, which defined Ukraine is an ally of the United States outside NATO. The US and the EU have not only provided broad international support for Ukraine, but also imposed sanctions on Russia in 2014. Military cooperation with the United States has reached a new level, which, however, is taking place on American conditions. This was clearly reflected in the refusal to provide Ukraine offensive strategic weapons [2, p.46].

Despite the strengthening of cooperation with NATO and the definition of new emphases in Ukraine's foreign policy, in May 2015, both sides identified only short-term plans. During the NATO-Ukraine: A Partnership for a United and Free Europe debate, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Shea said that helping Ukraine was not only a moral obligation but also a direct interest of the Alliance in protecting its members. There is also an understanding between the parties that Ukraine is not yet ready to join the alliance, as it has to carry out a number of reforms and resolve problematic issues in the east of the country. however, "NATO's doors remain open for Ukraine" [11].

At the end of June 2015, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, objectively assessing the current situation, gave a restrained assessment of the prospects for membership. He said that in order to join the Alliance, the country must meet certain standards. Work on internal reforms in the economic, social and administrative

spheres will continue for at least another 6-7 years. He also noted that if the country meets the necessary criteria, the need to join NATO will be determined by popular referendum. So far, neither Ukraine nor NATO is objectively ready for this [12].

Ukrainian diplomats at the beginning and during the escalation of the armed conflict in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea (2014-2015 - active phase), managed to give wide international publicity to events in Ukraine, which led to a new fresh rethinking of the place of Ukraine in the world community. Countering Russian aggression, protecting and restoring Ukraine's integrity have become the main priorities of foreign policy, and all international legal instruments, diplomatic and economic levers, and various international platforms have been actively involved in this. At the same time, US and EU reactions to Russia in Ukraine have often not responded to specific challenges. Diplomatic "concern" over events in eastern Ukraine did not help calm the aggressor, but on the contrary contributed to the aggravation of the military and political situation. The Normandy format of negotiations on the situation in Donbas has only "frozen" the conflict, thus achieving only intermediate, indirect results [2, p.47].

For the first time since declaring independence, Ukraine has demonstrated its own importance in global international projects and processes. According to O. Vlasyuk, Ukraine has become a point branching of historical paths, the focal point where new ones are concentrated opportunities and threats. Currently, a "Ukrainian precedent" and a template are being developed conflict resolution, which will be of universal importance. Method and consequences the resolution of the conflict situation in eastern Ukraine will, in fact, determine prospects of world order [13, p.8].

One of the most important achievements of Poroshenko's term is the receipt of the Tomos for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The question of religion as element of international relations emerged for Ukraine since the beginning of the 2000s. And in it is extremely important to use this question politicization of the religious factor for formation of the foreign policy vector state, which in turn allows in full to influence geopolitical relations with foreign countries [14, p.68].

It should be noted that despite the fact that the Ukrainian government is formally should not interfere in the affairs of the church, its actions talk about something else. Therefore, the procedure for obtaining Tomos played a significant role in autocephaly role in achieving partnership issues relations with the European Union, though at the same time, relations with Russia Federation deteriorated [14, p.68]. This event is also significant in view of the issue of self-identification of Ukrainians as an independent nation.

But an even more important task for promoting the ethnic and national self-identification of Ukrainians remained the language issue. Poroshenko's significant achievement was the signing and adoption of the Law "On the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language" of April 25, 2019. He determined the order and norms of use of the Ukrainian language in the field of state relations, jurisprudence, media activities and more [15, p.40-41].

Given Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the "Minsk Agreements" (September 5, 2014) positioning the war in Donbas as an internal conflict due to separatist sentiments among the population, etc., this law defined the Ukrainian nation as a single and indivisible unit that respects national minorities, but puts the interests of statehood and sovereignty first.

It is important to note that the newly adopted law did not contradict European "Charter for Regional or Minority Languages" ratified by Ukraine, because the Law on Language did not prohibit the use of other languages for domestic use, but only determined the need and procedure for its use in public spheres: economy, education, trade, politics, media and more [15, p.44]. That is, it did not in any way affect the individual rights and freedoms of the citizens of Ukraine. In a broader sense, this should have shown, first of all, the Ukrainian people's intentions to democratize and self-determine the nation as a cultural and ideological part of Western civilization and complete departure from the Eurasian direction of development, which in principle could not exist in war.

During Poroshenko's time, the language and religion issue was seen for the first time as a threat to the identity and security of Ukrainians, including those in the East who have long felt the effects of Russian propaganda by pro-Russian Ukrainian opposition politicians.

During all the years of independence, the inhabitants of Donbas really had a pronounced regional identity, were predominantly Russian-speaking and had the largest in comparison with other regions of the country the share of those who considered themselves "Soviet" (11.7% in 2013 and 19.3% in 2014 [16, p.14]). However, the regional identity of Donbas residents is pronounced never posed a threat to the integrity of the state. Also, each or all together, these traits do not residents of Donbas by a discriminated minority who are under threat. However, it is this thesis directly or implicitly present in the discourse of internal conflict and clearly in the statements of management Russia and the Kremlin media. Thus, the mechanistic transfer of ethnopolitical explanations in the case of Ukraine, it lacks significant simplification and loss of meaning [17, p.57].

Thus, the schematic transfer of ethno-political explanations in case of war in Ukraine, her interpretation as a specific internal conflict, on the one hand, is part of Russian propaganda campaign in Ukraine and in the West, and on the other hand - does not fit into the standard explanations of explosion of separatism. The Ukrainian case is an example of pseudo-separatism that can be explained given the role of external factors in incitement, information support and substantiation of Ukraine's membership in the "Russkii Mir" [18, p.87].

The problem of analyzing the war in Donbas is that it has signs of both internal and interstate conflict at the same time. If the citizens of Ukraine take military action on both sides, the conflict has an element of civil war, but also an element of war between Ukraine and Russia. The "pragmatism" of this position is the recognition of both components and search constructive recommendations for its completion [17, p.58].

The main challenge in this matter is that Ukraine alone would not be able to stop this war. The cessation of confrontation on the terms of Russia within the Minsk format implies the capitulation of Ukraine, which is unacceptable given the foreign and domestic political reasons. A lasting settlement of the conflict is impossible until Russia is recognized as a party to the conflict, but itself the conflict from the "internal" will not be perceived as interstate in the new format of negotiations [17, p.58].

As part of the negotiation process Western partners put forward various projects and plans to end the war in Donbas. The most noticeable among them are the plans of P. Morel (French diplomat, leader of the political group in the tripartite contact group) and F. Steinmeier (ex-head of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now President of Germany). The Morel Plan was announced during the meeting of foreign ministers The Quartet of Normandy (September 2015) [19, p.22].

In view of this, the task of continuing and strengthening Ukraine's integration into the European political space was particularly important, even in spite of the war.

Intensification processes of European integration in Ukraine is manifested, in particular, in the fact that on January 1, 2016 officially began there is a deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU, and on June 11, 2017 the introduction of visa-free regime [20, p.9].

In general, visa liberalization will create opportunities for both sides – Ukraine and EU countries, namely to promote mobility and contacts in all areas: tourism, family ties, business, scientific cooperation, intercultural dialogue [21, p.92].

Of course, these changes have both positive and negative consequences for Ukraine, in particular for the Ukrainian economy: an increase in the number of migrant workers, the outflow of specialists and potential workers. But on the other hand, the visa-free regime opens wide opportunities for development and increase of foreign investments, exchange of experience, introduction of foreign technologies in various spheres of Ukrainian production and industry, modernization of management

and administration, improving service quality, establishing international cooperation and stimulating the development of international activities for national firms and other.

Thus, summing up Ukraine's foreign policy activities during Petro Poroshenko's term, we can say that Ukraine's European integration course has been finally established not only at the level of public consciousness, but also at the political level. The change of power that took place as a result of the "Revolution of Dignity" has led Ukrainian politicians to realize the need for internal changes and reforms necessary for Ukraine's rapid and effective accession to the Euro-Atlantic political, economic and military space. Active dialogues on NATO membership have become not only formal steps, but are now seen as a direct and pragmatic necessity, given the illegitimate annexation of Crimea and Russia's armed invasion and its assistance and support to the self-proclaimed republics of DPR and LPR.

The involvement of the world community in Ukraine's problems is a direct evidence that from now on Ukraine is not only an ephemeral object in Eastern Europe without goals and ambitions, but is a full-fledged player in the world political arena. In addition, the "language law" and the Tomos are a qualitative change in the national consciousness of Ukrainians as a separate and independent nation striving to live in a democratic legal environment.

The five years of Petro Poroshenko's presidency were marked by turbulence in international processes related to the restructuring of international relations. The West has tried to curb this process by using international institutions, appealing to international law and other structures that formed the framework of the unipolar world and maintained the existing world order [22, p.463].

This gave Ukraine hope for international support against Russia military aggression. However, the belief in the omnipotence of diplomacy and reliance solely on international instruments could not produce a productive result and solve issues of war with Russia on the terms of Ukraine. The maximum that managed the

international community is to impose personal sanctions against Russian officials and restrictive sectoral sanctions against Russia, which affect 6% of its economy. Not surprisingly, they have failed to change Russia's aggressive foreign policy. Russia's economy has adapted to such a sanctions regime, diversified its trade and compensated for its deficit at the expense of China and other foreign trade partners [22, p.463].

So we can conclude that neither sanctions nor political and diplomatic means are capable of either to stop the Russian war, and even more so to ensure Ukraine's victory. Diplomatic pressure on post-Maidan authorities under Peter Poroshenko hoped as "heaven's manna", turned out to be too weak, to overcome or at least restrain Russia's revenge.

#### **4.2 Ukraine's Foreign Policy under Zelensky**

The beginning of presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky coincided with extremely difficult foreign policy circumstances and trends: Russia continued its aggressive military policy towards Ukrainian territories, and the international system lost its homogeneity. That is, it means that the old international institutions have exhausted themselves and lost their existence meaning. Relying on for Ukraine's national security, as well as for ending the war with Russia, has proved highly ineffective [22, p.462-363].

The main tasks set by the state and the people for the president as a whole have not changed: leading and, ultimately, integrating into the EU and NATO, returning Crimea to sovereign Ukraine, and ending the war in Donbas. Positions of both Ukraine and the European Union sides in the issue of European integration remained unchanged, but, in addition, with the destruction of the old system of international order.

Therefore, in fact, the issue that required the most decisive steps to address it was the war in the Donbas. However, both the previous and the newly elected authorities were not ready for categorical radical actions in resolving this conflict, which

affected, first of all, the population. All these years, it was not national strategic interests that prevailed among the political elite, but rather thinking from the standpoint of business and economic advantages. This nature of the country's political leadership is evidenced by several characteristics:

- non-recognition of the state of war with Russia and refusal of active resistance Russian aggression;
- non-provocation against the Russian side;
- refusal to apply the legal framework of wartime and the introduction the effect of the country's defense plans;
- priority of waiting tactics;
- appeal to international law and international organizations for protection against Russian military aggression;
- compromises;
- priority and focus exclusively on political and diplomatic means of resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict - Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine [22, p.470].

Such strategy, which stems from pragmatic and cost-effective views, is evidence of the inability of the current democratic regime to counter the blind aggression and uncompromising actions of Russian Federation.

Analyzing the above points regarding the attitude of the Ukrainian authorities to the Russian aggression in Donbas, it can be concluded that neither Ukraine nor the European Union and its institutions, did not want to be embarrassed or spoil economic relations with Russia. The loss of such a powerful strategic partner as Russia will require finding new solutions, partnership projects and operational substitution.

Some researchers call this situation in Ukraine not even a "hybrid war", which is quite a popular idea among scientists and publicists, but rather a more appropriate "hybrid peace". Its fundamental difference from the generally accepted notion of



"peace" is that a "hybrid peace" between countries, in this case, Russia and Ukraine, is at war, but is not officially recognized by either side, continuing to live and build its external and domestic policy on regulations and laws of "peacetime". Another feature of the "hybrid peace" is that there is no clear fixed beginning and end of the war, the results, obligations of the parties, it is not regulated by any regulations, and therefore war criminals cannot be prosecuted, there can be no question on compensation for damages, etc [22, p.471].

A hybrid peace can be interpreted as a state of imperceptible war, when society does not feel this state psychologically and physically, but continues to exist in a peaceful life, not noticing the losses and severe consequences. Or when one part of society in the country is in a state of war (in a war zone), and the other - in a state of peace, where there is a peaceful life and no threat to human life. Such a peace can be considered incomplete, in which partial mobilization is carried out in peacetime, the purpose of which is not clearly defined, or a military tax is removed and a civil-military administration is introduced when there is no official war and certain elements of martial law are imposed [22, p.472].

"Hybrid peace in Ukrainian" is when military measures are introduced in some areas and peaceful cooperation with Russia is developed in others. Thus, in the field of foreign policy, Ukraine continues to maintain diplomatic and consular relations, to develop a political dialogue with the aggressor. In pursuing its foreign policy, the Foreign Ministry continues to use peacetime instruments, limiting itself to statements, consultations, declarations, notes, working visits and negotiations with the Russian side. Ukraine has not even been able to recall its ambassador from Moscow and sever diplomatic relations with Russia [22, p.472].

Normal and common practice during the beginning of the war between the states is the termination of trade, economic and financial relations, the termination of business in the enemy's territory, as it can be completely confiscated. This is exactly what the Russian Federation has done with Ukrainian state property and enterprises in the annexed Crimea and occupied Donbass, in accordance with the rules of war.

The Ukrainian side could not respond to this even, for example, by filing a lawsuit with full justification to the international court for compensation for damages caused to the Ukrainian state by Russian military aggression [22, p.472].

Therefore, as is clear, such a policy had many miscalculations. Therefore, in fact, this conflict was slowed down and frozen. Hopes for peace did not have any valid justifications and guarantees, given the nature and position of the Russian Federation not only in relation to Ukraine, but also in relation to other territories and states that were of strategic interest to the Kremlin.

It should also be noted that Europe, so strongly relied on by the Ukrainian authorities in the context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, was also unprepared to damage relations with Russia, particularly in the economic and energy sectors, in order to restore the integrity of Ukrainian territories and preserve state sovereignty.

A clear example of such a fearful attitude of Europe towards Russia was the return of the Russian delegation to the PACE without any conditions that means the automatic lifting of sanctions imposed by this Council structure Europe against Russia for its occupation of the Crimean peninsula. De facto, this is a recognition of the legitimacy of this occupation. Evidence of this is also behind the scenes agreements of the members of the Council of Europe, in particular France and Germany with The Kremlin to lift sanctions on Russia without Ukraine's participation. For this, Western leaders have asked Putin to release Ukrainian sailors, who are Russian border guards captured in the Kerch Strait on November 25, 2018, although the UN International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea already is ordered their release [23]. Instead, Putin ignored the decision, once again showing contempt for his Western European partners. Actually the Western European community has demonstrated its complete capitulation in front of the Kremlin [22, p.465].

That is, such a reaction from the world community, and in particular from the European community, has shown that they are in fact incapable of doing anything with Russian military aggression and countering the Kremlin's aggressive regime.

This reveals the weakness of a stable liberal society in the face of a real threat and dictatorship that threatens the entire continent and the world.

Personal and national sanctions only caused a reorientation of strategic landmarks and vectors of partnership, the search for new markets and, as it turned out, the emergence of new levers of pressure on the Western European community. Nuclear potential and the leading role in the energy market not only of the continent but also of the world, Russia had unquestionable tools for manipulating EU policies.

It is important to understand the relationship between Europe and Russia in the context of Ukraine as a buffer zone between East and West, and especially now - in the era of globalization.

Undoubtedly, the Russian-Ukrainian war helped take a significant step towards deepening Ukraine's integration into the European Union and the pro-Western political space. However, unfortunately, these processes, as already mentioned, do not do without some hypocrisy on the part of European leaders who are not ready to suffer significant economic and strategic losses, even given that Ukraine's losses are much greater and more significant.

Volodymyr Zelenskyi addressed the conference of Ukrainian ambassadors "Diplomacy 30. Strategy of a strong state" and accentuated the need to rethink the philosophy of Ukraine's foreign policy, said that it should be fast, creative, ambitious and effective, in accordance with the pace and nature of society and globalization in the world [24]. All these features can help Ukraine achieve short- and long-term goals and objectives, one of which is to "reset" relations with Western countries, strengthen their real practical impact on protecting the security of Ukrainian statehood and restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity.

An important role in achieving this task is played by the so-called "urban diplomacy", which became especially important during Mr. Zelensky's term.

In a number of recent documents on urban policy in Europe, we see an extremely low level of attention to peace and the role of cities in this in a number of recent documents on urban policy.

In Europe, we see an extremely low level of attention to peace and the role of cities in this process. Living in a relatively quiet security environment for almost 20 years, government officials focused on a number of other issues, such as environment, sustainability, culture, migration or health care. However, when Russia once again encroached on the security and stability of Europe, the EU's city authorities and networks of cities with a new share of enthusiasm mentioned the primary value base diplomacy of the city, its role, tasks and opportunities in peacebuilding and in general activities during the war in Europe. The international activity of individuals has increased enormously Ukrainian cities and their mayors as public figures and diplomats. [25, p.21-22].

In general, such activity has been made possible by domestic reforms. In particular, the decentralization reform carried out in 2014 played a leading role. Its main goal was to form effective local self-government and territorial organization of government to create and maintain a full living environment for citizens, provide high quality and affordable public services, establish institutions of direct democracy, harmonize the interests of the state and local communities [26]. This underscores once again that without an effective domestic policy and quality reforms within the state, it is impossible to pursue an effective foreign policy.

Cities began to be seen not only as links in the world economy, but also as important donors peace and understanding between cultures on the planet. The center of the movement of cities for peace in shape twinning agreements - became Western countries. EU cities have been active in supporting the Ukrainian people during the war in Ukraine. The main forms of involvement were: demonstrations calling for an end to the war and condemnation of Russian aggression; rallies addressed to the NATO leadership with a request to close the skies over Ukraine; providing humanitarian assistance, raising funds for the needs of the military and civilian

population affected by hostilities; reception of refugees, assistance to them in crossing borders, material, humanitarian, psychological support, etc. Such behaviors are especially noticeable in the cities of neighboring countries [25, p.22].

In addition, in many countries around the world the practice of "showing" the national colors of the Ukrainian flag: they illuminate parliament buildings or famous places, and breeders create unique plants (for example, in the Netherlands bred yellow-blue tulip). In many European cities, streets are being renamed in honor of Ukrainian defenders and hero cities. Also interesting is the initiative to create memorable artifacts, the proceeds from the sale of which went to help and support the Armed Forces: coins, stamps and more. In this case, it is not even a question of the "urban diplomacy", but rather of cultural diplomacy for the general victory of Ukraine and democratic values over the Russian dictatorship and occupation.

The role of "urban diplomacy for peace" became particularly prominent after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which the Kremlin dubbed the innocent "special operation," which, again, is not regulated by any "laws of war".

Assistance to Ukraine and regional centers is currently provided by 23 countries and 101 cities, among others the most active are Poland and Germany. EU cities have even begun to attract their own brothers for this. It is important to note that most help is received cities in western Ukraine, due to logistics and security. It is also remarkable the fact that personal contacts and activity of the mayor play an important role in this, not only signed twinning agreements. A number of cities declare their readiness to provide asylum to refugees, both on their own and in private through the movement of Solidarity Cities [25, p.23].

The activities of Ukrainian cities can be divided into: a call for help for Ukraine, both to higher state structures and to sister cities, intensification of cooperation with representatives of international organizations, public diplomacy. Thus to representatives of 22 cities joined the President's initiative to close the skies

over Ukraine of regional significance. Many of them mentioned other influential worlds when addressing NATO states [25, p.23].

Cities are cooperating more actively with international organizations. It started in Vinnytsia work of the Office of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Zhytomyr - Doctors Without Borders, Norwegian Refugee Council in Ternopil. Zhytomyr and Lviv became centers of public diplomacy, and this is where they settled down International Press Center, and the Lviv Media Center began to perform its functions Ukrainian. Mayors of the cities of Nikolaev, Odesa, Zhytomyr and Lviv actively communicate with representatives of the world's most famous media, such as CNN, The Washington Post, The Economist, Le Mond, Deutsche Welle, The Guardian, Sky News [25, p.23].

All this testifies to the importance of Ukraine as a subject of international relations and its clear position in the system of democratic political forces. Such close relations not only of the highest representatives of the state, but also of heads of regional and local administrations provide the most effective interaction, according to actual needs and tasks. Often such interaction is based on individual misdeeds or partnerships of mayors or on certain ethnic characteristics. These processes testify not only to the West's formal involvement in solving Ukraine's problems, but also to its actual participation.

However, relations with Europe are not always so good. Lack of cohesion and unity within the European Union leads to delays in the process of agreeing on sanctions packages against Russia, the supply of weapons and other things that are crucial for Ukraine's victory as soon as possible.

The Ukrainian leader has repeatedly called on European leaders to take decisive action, emphasizing that Ukraine's security actually means the security of the whole of Europe and the civilized world [27].

Nevertheless, the European Union and the United States have provided and continue to provide material and military assistance, providing the Armed Forces of

Ukraine with a variety of military equipment to effectively fight Russia. The greatest achievement in the field of Western support was the signing of the law on Lend-lease for Ukraine on May 9, 2022 by the President of the United States Biden. The law will allow the United States to promptly provide Ukraine with weapons to protect itself from Russian aggression, and Kyiv will receive financial assistance from it - in a much larger amount than before. [28]. This was an extremely important step, the results of which will be felt later. In fact, the entire civilized West has thus expressed its confidence in Ukraine's victory in this protracted war. As part of the world's leading states supplying weapons to Ukraine, they are also conducting training on the use of the latest means of combating the occupiers for the Ukrainian military. Thus increasing the professionalism of the Ukrainian army and its efficiency.

An important component of Ukraine's foreign policy during the war is the negotiation of Ukrainian and Russian negotiating groups. Permanent members of the Ukrainian delegation are: People's Deputy David Arahamiya – Chairman of the Delegation, deputies Dmytro Lubinets and Rustem Umerov, Adviser to the President's Office Mykhailo Podoliak, Deputy Head of the President's Office Kyrylo Tymoshenko, Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov, Deputy Foreign Minister Mykola Tochytsky [29].

The main issues of all rounds of negotiations are the creation of humanitarian corridors for the withdrawal of civilians to safe, controlled territories of Ukraine and the supply of humanitarian aid to the occupied settlements, ceasefire and involvement of the parties in diplomatic conflict resolution, and withdrawal of Russian occupying forces [29]. Negotiations often involve third parties as guarantors of the transparency of the negotiation process. In particular, such representatives of Belarus and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan played a role in the talks on ending the war.

It is important to note that at this stage Ukraine is no longer ready to give up its own interests by encouraging Russian encroachments on Ukrainian territory and statehood. The national delegation demonstrates an extremely high level of preparation for difficult negotiations and readiness to end the peace, guided by the

norms of international law and the laws of war. Representatives of Ukraine are principled in matters relating to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the preservation of statehood and human lives and do not agree to the terms of Russia.

In addition to direct opposition to the aggressor country, Ukraine is uncompromising in defending its national interests in the European arena. Part of the Western world – from members of key EU governments to former US diplomats and influential US journalists – are in fact proposing to "persuade" Ukraine to abandon resistance and seek speedy "peaceful settlements" with Russia, even at the cost of losing territories. The President of Ukraine resolutely refused, saying that such a decision was unacceptable, drawing a historical analogy with attempts to "pacify" Adolf Hitler on the eve of World War II. He reiterated that such "powerless pacifism" could threaten the world and called on world leaders to continue their common struggle. [30].

Despite the war, Ukraine is making significant strides toward membership in the European Union. The application for accession to the EU was submitted by the Ukrainian side on February 28, 2022. Europe responded immediately by supporting Ukraine's adoption under the simplified accelerated procedure [31]. Thus, during Zelensky's tenure on the issue of European integration, more effective results were achieved than during the entire period of Ukraine's independence.

In addition, due to internal reforms in the field of digital transformation, economy, banking system and successful foreign policy activity, a positive and promising image of the Ukrainian state was created in the international political space. This allowed leading world and, in particular, European politicians to assert Ukraine's true belonging to Europe and to promote its fastest integration [32].

Summing up the current foreign policy activity of Vladimir Zelensky, we can identify several main results:

- final departure from the policy of multi-vector as a way to ensure the national interests of Ukraine;



- creating a positive image of Ukraine and politicians on the world stage as progressive, competent and experienced participants of international relations;
- awareness of the need for quality domestic reforms for effective foreign policy;
- involvement of the world community in the fight against Russian aggression and assistance to the population affected by the war;
- final formation and approval of the national self-identification of Ukrainians as a member of democratic civilization;
- sharing and popularization of Ukrainian culture, language and traditions around the world;
- raising a need and importance of diplomacy as a state institution.

So, presidency of Volodymyr Zelensky is a time of real unity of all Ukrainians against the enemy, time of rising of Ukraine culture and time when all people in Ukraine are building their own future and making a new history.

## CHAPTER 5

### 5. CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this research work was to define the Ukrainian foreign policy orientation in the era of globalization, and in particular to study how Ukraine's foreign policy is formed during the interaction of internal and external events.

Independence in 1991 and separation from the all-consuming system of the Soviet Union meant for Ukraine the beginning of its own independent path, which was not always simple and without obstacles. At the international level, Ukraine had its first steps to show what values and ideas are close to it, what goals it seeks to achieve, and in what world it exists. Rather quickly, the fact of independence was recognized by the world's leading countries, which was a very important indicator for a young, yet an unexperienced state.

The first President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk was a supporter of a multi-vector foreign policy as a possibility to meet various needs and interests of the country. This strategy had an ambitious justification and rationale. At the same time, the main task of Ukraine's foreign policy was to join the European Union and NATO. However, it should be noted that in practical implementation these two strategies cannot exist at the same time, as the combination of the pro-Western and pro-Western directions is a losing one: In fact, there are no significant results in either direction and potential development is reversed in the period of stagnation.

In fact, as a result of the foreign policy of the first President, no practical moves toward European integration have been made, but strategic partnership relations with many countries have been established, and Ukraine's reputation as a promising and ambitious young state has been established in the world. However, due to the lack of agreement on foreign and domestic policy, as well as the lack of experience of Ukrainian politicians and diplomats, Ukraine could not finally consolidate itself in the Western political space.

The policy of the next president Leonid Kravchuk is more consistent. Great attention was paid to internal problems and tasks. At the same time, foreign policy goals remained unchanged. In general, Ukraine has shown its ambition in the international dimension, but it was clearly unprepared for certain decisive actions. Moreover, a large number of international high-profile cases, such as the “cassette scandal” and the murder of journalist Georgy Gongadze and others, have greatly undermined Ukraine’s reputation in the eyes of the world community. In addition, political processes in the world took place in such a way that the focus from Ukraine was shifted to solving acute issues of terrorism, stabilizing world peace, and others.

Instead of improving its own internal political system, stabilizing the economy, and improving social life, Ukraine went further from its main goal and was engaged in developing friendly relations with the Russian Federation, which was not aimed at strengthening equal partnership relations, but rather wanted to put Ukraine in a position of dependence.

However, such actions to some extent contributed to strengthening the national self-awareness of the Ukrainian people and understanding of the importance of following the pro-Western vector of development.

It is this awareness and reflected in the bright will of the people, which has received the name "Orange Revolution". This event caused an unprecedented international response. It became an important sign of the true belonging of Ukrainian society to the democratic European community.

However, unfortunately, the authorities that came as a result of the revolution did not realize the expectations of either European politicians or the people, and in fact, did not lead to any qualitative changes in the context of international relations. Although President Viktor Yushchenko had a pro-European position, he was unable to fully realize it because of internal contradictions in the then-top management circle.

The foreign policy of the next president, Viktor Yanukovich, has finally approved in the Ukrainian national and political consciousness the impossibility of the existence of the idea of "partnership" and friendship with Russia. The period from 2009 to 2013 can be called a period of dissolution of Ukrainian-Russian relations and the suppression of the idea of European integration at the highest political level. The actual authorities of the oligarchy and disrespect for national interests led to the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbas.

Yanukovich's presidency ended with a shameful escape to Russia and led to Revolution of Dignity" that entered the history of Ukraine and the world as a manifestation of the courage and determination of the Ukrainian people in the face of injustice and threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The next president was Petro Poroshenko, whose task was to fight Russian aggression and continue the European integration movement. In general, we can say that his cadence has indeed led to a significant strengthening of the interaction between Ukraine and the European Union. Cultural and religious diplomacy gained great importance. The efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy have made it possible to establish a visa-free regime between Ukraine and the EU countries.

However, unfortunately, no progress on the issue of ending the war in the East of Ukraine has taken place, so this conflict has resulted in a long confrontation, occupation of Ukrainian territories, and the creation of the so-called "People's Republic". In addition, the Crimean peninsula remains under the occupation of Russia.

The presidency of the last and current leader of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky is in extremely difficult foreign and domestic political conditions: Russian aggression, the crisis of the European Union and its institutions, COVID-19 and, subsequently, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And despite all these problems, the most significant achievements in Ukraine's foreign policy are now taking place.

The world's leading powers are involved in the fight against Russia, helping financially, politically, and with arms. Ukraine is at an active stage in the European integration process. The level of national self-identification of the population has reached an extremely high level. Ukrainian society is adapting to new internal and external political conditions, recognizing the need to end the war by liberating all occupied territories.

All defeats and victories in foreign policy strengthened the Ukrainian people and contributed to the formation of a conscious nation. After analyzing the foreign policy of Ukraine for more than 30 years, finding all the causal links, it becomes clear why the state is now at this stage of its development, is in such conditions and is experiencing the current events, and also allows predicting its short and long-term prospects, using the experience gained not to make the same mistakes in the future.

Ukraine from the uncertain country "between East and West", the territory of influence of different ideologies, has become an example for many countries in many areas. Ukrainians are launching new trends in the issue of public life. Politicians and diplomats change the rules in accordance with modern requirements. And now people all over the world know that the patriotic appeal "Glory to Ukraine!" needs one answer - "Glory to the heroes!" Ukraine as a state has a strong potential, so the main task for future politicians and diplomats is not to lose, but to increase Ukraine's reputation on the world stage and promote its entry into leading positions in all areas.

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## APPENDIX

Ukraine is one of the most vibrant countries in terms of its foreign policy orientations among the former Soviet republics. Its geographical location in relation to external powers, historical background, and the structure of the society led Ukraine to follow various foreign policy courses since its independence. The thesis titled *Foreign Policy of Ukraine in the Age of Globalization* written by undergraduate student Hiro Kateryna provides a whole picture of Ukraine's foreign policy directions since the early 1990s. By examining Ukraine's foreign policy under each of the presidents since the independence, Kateryna attempts to answer the following question of what are the characteristics of Ukraine's foreign policy orientations in the era of globalization. In particular, she asks how Ukraine's foreign policy is shaped in the course of the interaction of domestic and global developments.

After analyzing the foreign policy directions of Ukraine since the 1990s, Kateryna reveals that Kyiv initially aimed to develop a multi-vector foreign policy but it failed with the Orange Revolution. Following the Revolution, she observes a West-oriented foreign policy course in Ukraine. However, it is interrupted by the adoption of a pro-Russian foreign policy from 2010 until the end of 2013 under the pretext of a non-alliance / pragmatic foreign policy tenet. Nevertheless, the developments following the Revolution of Dignity led Kyiv to alter its foreign policy course once again to the West. In the end, Kateryna argues that as long as the Russian invasion continues, Kyiv will sustain and strengthen its West-oriented foreign policy. For her, reparation of Ukraine's relations with Russia seems unrealistic neither in the short nor the medium term.

In this respect, the *Foreign Policy of Ukraine in the Age of Globalization* would be a highly good starting point for those who wish to examine Ukraine's foreign policy in relation to domestic and global affairs.

Consequently, as an undergraduate thesis, this work is well written and organized. I believe it is a satisfying study that may enable an international relations student to obtain a bachelor's diploma.

*Thesis Advisor:*

Associate Professor in the Department of  
International Relations and Audit at Dnipro  
University of Technology (Dnipro/Ukraine)  
Email: Muradov.I.Ya@nmu.one

Ibrahim Muradov

