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**ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AS A
TOOL TO DETER MILITARY AGGRESSION**

(Ekonominės sankcijos Rusijos Federacijai kaip priemonė atgrasyti nuo karinės
agresijos)

Final bachelor thesis

Political science study program, state code S6121 JX037

Social Sciences Study Field

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Kaunas, 2023

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UN – United Nations

USA – United States of America

UAV - Unmanned aerial vehicle

CAATSA - Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act

EU – European Union

ILO - International Labour Organization

WTO – World Trade Organization

UAE - United Arab Emirates

PM – Premier Minister

RF – Russian Federation

OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

UK – United Kingdom

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ABSTRACT

In recent years, the Russian Federation's military activities and geopolitical ambitions have raised concerns among the international community. To address these concerns and discourage further military aggression, several countries and international organizations have resorted to economic sanctions as a deterrent strategy. This bachelor thesis aims to examine the effectiveness of economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation as a means of deterring military aggression.

The study begins by providing a comprehensive overview of economic sanctions, their historical context, and theoretical foundations. It explores the different types of economic sanctions, including trade restrictions, financial measures, and diplomatic actions, highlighting their potential advantages and limitations as tools of coercion. Using a case study approach, the thesis analyzes prominent instances of economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation in response to military aggression or perceived violations of international norms. These case studies include sanctions related to conflicts in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and alleged cyber-attacks, among others. The analysis examines the goals, implementation strategies, and outcomes of these sanctions, considering factors such as their economic impact, political dynamics, and the intended behavioral changes in the Russian government.

Furthermore, the study assesses the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent tool in the context of the Russian Federation's military aggression. It explores the correlation between the imposition of sanctions and changes in the Russian government's behavior, military activities, and foreign policy objectives. Additionally, the thesis investigates unintended consequences, such as shifts in alliances, economic vulnerabilities, and the impact on civilian populations. The findings of the case study analysis provide valuable insights into the efficacy and limitations of economic sanctions as a deterrent strategy against the Russian Federation's military aggression. The research contributes to the existing literature by enhancing our understanding of the complex dynamics between economic sanctions, political decision-making, and military behavior.

This bachelor thesis concludes with policy recommendations for policymakers, international organizations, and stakeholders involved in addressing Russian military aggression. These recommendations aim to inform the design and implementation of future economic sanctions, taking into account their potential effectiveness, unintended consequences, and the broader geopolitical context.

SANTRAUKA

Pastaraisiais metais Rusijos Federacijos karinė veikla ir geopolitiniai ambicijos sukėlė nerimą tarptautinei bendruomenei. Norint spręsti šias problemas ir atgrasyti tolesnę karinę agresiją, keli pasaulio šalys ir tarptautinės organizacijos pasitelkė ekonomines sankcijas kaip atgrasymo strategiją. Šio bakalauro darbo tikslas yra ištirti ekonominių sankcijų, taikomų Rusijos Federacijai, veiksmingumą kaip karinės agresijos atgrasymo priemonę. Darbas pradedamas pateikiant išsamų ekonominių sankcijų apžvalgą, jų istorinį kontekstą ir teorinius pagrindus. Nagrinėjamos skirtingos ekonominių sankcijų rūšys, įskaitant prekybos apribojimus, finansines priemones ir diplomatinės veiksmus, pabrėžiant jų potencialias privalumus ir apribojimus kaip įtikinimo priemones.

Naudodamiesi atvejo studijų metodu, analizuojame žymius ekonominių sankcijų taikymo Rusijos Federacijai atvejus kaip atsaką į karinę agresiją ar suvoktus tarptautinius normų pažeidimus. Šios atvejo studijos apima sankcijas, susijusias su konfliktu Ukrainoje, Krymo aneksija ir įtariamais kibernetiniais išpuoliais, tarp kitų. Analizė nagrinėja šių sankcijų tikslus, įgyvendinimo strategijas ir rezultatus, atsižvelgiant į ekonominę jų poveikį, politinius dinamikos veiksnius ir numatytus elgesio pokyčius Rusijos vyriausybėje.

Be to, darbe įvertinamas ekonominių sankcijų veiksmingumas kaip atgrasymo priemonė Rusijos Federacijos karinei agresijai kontekste. Nagrinėjama sąsaja tarp sankcijų taikymo ir Rusijos vyriausybės elgesio, karinių veiksmų ir užsienio politikos tikslų pokyčių. Taip pat atliekamas tyrimas dėl nenorimo poveikio, pvz., aljansų pasikeitimo, ekonominių pažeidžiamumų ir poveikio civiliniam gyventojui.

Atvejo studijų analizės rezultatai suteikia vertingų žinių apie ekonominių sankcijų veiksmingumą ir apribojimus kaip priemonę atgrasyti Rusijos Federacijos karinę agresiją. Šis tyrimas prisideda prie esamos literatūros, padedant geriau suprasti sudėtingas sąsajas tarp ekonominių sankcijų, politinių sprendimų priėmimo ir karinio elgesio.

Baigiamojoje darbo dalyje pateikiamos politikos rekomendacijos politikams, tarptautinėms organizacijoms ir suinteresuotoms šalims, kurios siekia spręsti Rusijos karinę agresiją. Šios rekomendacijos siekia informuoti ateities ekonominių sankcijų projektavimą ir įgyvendinimą, atsižvelgiant į jų potencialų veiksmingumą, nenorimą poveikį ir platesnį geopolitinį kontekstą.

INTRODUCTION

Relevance of the topic. To this day, during the full-scale war in Ukraine, the words about the “warming” of relations between the Russian Federation and certain Western leaders, the return of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and even calls for the resumption of Russia’s participation in the G7 no longer have any force. The whole world has seen what the Russian authorities are, what orders they give to execute on the front and what conditions they lay out for the settlement of the conflict (Appendix No. 1). Now sanctions remain one of the main means of pressure on the aggressor in order to force Russian Federation to return to the civilized norms of international relations and to respect the rules of the international community. What is the strategy of the Ukrainian government and the governments of the United States, the EU and other countries to maintain the regime of sanctions against Russia? How long will the current multilateral coalition of countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia continue to support the sanctions, and what will the present multi-party coalitions of countries which have impose sanctions against Russia do? Will Russia continue to support the sanctions and what will be the conditions for their modification - weakening for the modification of them - weakness or strengthening? These and other questions require clear answers in order to peace in the region and restore respect for international law. Economic, diplomatic and other sanctions have become common instruments of international policy. States applying sanctions use them as a lever to influence the geopolitical decisions of the governments of the countries against which they are directed.

In 2014, in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the United States, the EU and Canada imposed sanctions on Russia. Russia has become the largest and most influential country that has fallen under such harsh sanctions. Despite Russia’s leading position in the international arena, the United States and the EU have said they will not lift the sanctions until Russia withdraws its troops from the territory of sovereign Ukraine and returns its borders to 1991. Many talk about the impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy, but it is difficult to determine their effectiveness both from an economic and political point of view. Nevertheless, effectiveness is a key element, since sanctions are essentially a means to a goal. The aim, in turn, is to stop the Russian aggression and restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine. But unfortunately, sanctions alone are not enough to change Russian foreign policy.

Despite the fact that the sanctions did not change the behavior of Russia, they were effective. Although the world has seen the negative impact of sanctions on the Russian economy compared to 2014, the economic damage caused was not enough to change the direction of

Russia's policy towards Ukraine. It can be assumed that the sanctions against Russia have not managed to fully unlock their potential due to insufficient influence on the Russian economy and political structure.

The basis for the study was the UN Charter, the decisions of the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General, the sanctions committees, the practice of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations and the EU Court.

The research target is a comprehensive analysis of the political and legal nature of targeted sanctions of the UN Security Council to determine the current state of the concept, the main trends of development, the place and role of addressed coercive measures in ensuring international peace and security, the establishment of restrictions on their application, the identification of the main shortcomings of sanctions regimes and possible ways of their elimination and improvement of effectiveness.

The purpose of the research is to formulate and solve such scientific tasks:

- to characterize the development of the institute of international legal sanctions from the moment of the creation of the United Nations to the present time; to define the main characteristics of international law sanctions and to distinguish them from the related concepts of "compulsory measures" and "countermeasures";

- to establish preconditions and find out the reasons for the concept of targeted sanctions; to reveal the legal nature of the specific sanctions and to define the conditions for the classification of sanctions as targeted measures of influence;

- to carry out a systematic analysis of the types and forms of targeted sanctions of the UN Security Council in order to clarify the main shortcomings of the sanctions regimes and possible ways of their elimination; to analyze the practice of the United Nations Security Council on the application of specific sanctions in the fight against specific violations of international peace and security; to formulate and disclose the main criteria and conditions for the effectiveness of the targeted Sanctions and to propose ways for their improvement; to determine the state of the legislation of Ukraine on the implementation of sanctions decisions.

Object of research. Political and international legal relations arising in connection with the development, adoption and implementation of targeted sanctions by the UN Security Council against violators of the norms of international order, peace and law.

Subject of research. International sanctions, their nature and principles, regulation and procedure for the application of targeted collective coercive measures adopted on behalf of all

member states of the United Nations on the basis of Article 41 of Chapter VII (Appendix No. 2) of the UN Charter, the process of their preparation, implementation and implementation by member countries, the effectiveness of such sanctions and their influence as a deterrent of Russian aggression.

Research Methods. In order to obtain the most reliable scientific results of the study, a complex of philosophical, world-looking, scientific and special-scientific methods were used, which ensured the unity of the socio-philosophic and international-legal analysis of the features of the application of targeted international legal sanctions by the UN Security Council. Also the methodological basis is made up of such general scientific methods as analysis and synthesis, generalization, modeling, etc. The application of methods of analysis and synthesis has made it possible to analyze the concept of sanctions in modern political science, to explore their main types, to highlight their features and characteristic elements. The comparative method was used to study the doctrinal views on the conditions and legal grounds for the application of targeted coercive measures and comprehensive sanctions.

The historical-logical method was used in the study of the process of formation and development of the concept of targeted sanctions, and the systemic method - in the research of the place of the institute of sanctions in the modern system of international law. The use of the formal-legal method has made it possible to analyze in detail the normative and legal content of UN Security Council resolutions, in accordance with which coercive measures are introduced with respect to states-delinquents. The statistical method was used, in particular, to generalize indicators of the frequency of introduction of certain targeted coercive measures and their effectiveness.

Scientific novelty. In the framework of Ukrainian political science, a comprehensive study of the political and legal problems of the application of targeted sanctions by the UN Security Council was conducted, which is characterized by scientific novelty and the author's contribution to the definition of the theoretical and practical aspects of the introduction of coercive measures. The novelty of the study consists in the fact that, for the first time, the main political and legal reasons for the emergence of the concept of “smart sanctions” in the international law practice of the UN Security Council are identified, which are: the deterioration of the economy of third countries as a result of the cessation of economic cooperation with the sanctioned state; an arms embargo; sanctions related to the interruption of transportation (interruptions of air traffic and a ban on entry to other countries); diplomatic sanctions and sanctions aimed at restricting or terminating scientific cooperation.

1. INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS

1.1 Theoretical foundations of the institution of sanctions in international politics

International politics and international law are an organic part of contemporary political international legal practice and one of the most common coercive instruments for the protection of international law. Norms and principles relating to international law sanctions are a separate institution of international law, which is currently constantly developing. Over the past two decades, this legal institution has undergone significant changes and the experience of sanctions shows that non-military coercive measures play a key role in ensuring the implementation of international law. The mechanism of coercion is an integral element of any political and legal system, including international politics and law. States, as the main subjects of international law, are not subject to each other, and therefore there is no central mechanism of coercion.

The coordination nature of interstate relations has led to the peculiarities of the coercion mechanism, according to which "the protection of the rights and interests of subjects can be forcibly ensured, if necessary, by means of coercion by the subject itself" [17, p. 5]. At the same time, coercion is an integral element of a decentralized mechanism of international law, which ultimately guarantees the functioning of the international law and reflects its specificity. In the works devoted to the complex and multifaceted problems of sanctions in political science, the theoretical scientific development of the main aspects of application issues remains unfinished. At the same time, the practice of imposing sanctions is multifaceted and controversial. In the doctrine of international law and modern international legal practice, there is no single approach to the meaning of the concept of "international legal sanctions", and the precise and concrete definition of the category of "sanctions" remains one of the most problematic issues.

An important reason for difficulties in the interpretation of this concept is that few international documents contain the definition of the term "sanction". Other important elements of the theory regarding the application of non-military means of coercion remain insufficiently developed. In particular, the following questions remain unclear: the content of the sanctions; the relationship between the concept of sanctions and other relevant legal concepts, the use of such categories as international legal liability, coercive measures, response measures; the absence of consensus on the relation between the sanction and jurisdiction on imposing sanctions, the grounds for imposing and terminating sanctions – this is an inexhaustible list of issues that have not yet been properly resolved. At the same time, solving the theoretical problems of determining the

nature and specificity of sanctions has important practical importance for ensuring international law and international order.

Since the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and the formation of the modern system of coercive measures, the issue of sanctions in international law has been constantly at the center of attention of political scientists and international scholars. In the 1960s, the United Nations Sanctions Institute underwent significant changes. These changes were important in the context of a noticeable progressive movement in the theory of international responsibility and the research of the sanctions institute by international scholars. In the ever-expanding practice of international relations, new challenges arise related to the functioning of the sanctions institute in international law, which require comprehensive and fundamental research. In particular, this is a question of the nature, grounds, purposes and subjects of international sanctions.

The term "sanction" comes from the Latin word *sānctio* - the most severe decision [27, p. 684]. International lawyers have long been interested in the theoretical development of the problem of coercion in international relations and international legal sanctions [24, p. 10]. In the second half of the 20th century, Soviet and Western doctrines of international law began to actively discuss the question of state responsibility. In the context of responsibility research, a special place has always been given to sanctions.

The views of western scientists on the nature of sanctions are not unanimous. For example, D. Anzilotti believes that the only possible sanction against the violating state is compensation for damages or satisfaction of claims, which both are punishment for unlawful acts.

L. Pico Forlati notes that the term "sanctions" used in international law is suitable for defining all types of sanctions. The term "sanction" used in international law is suitable for defining all the consequences of an unlawful act that arise for the responsible entity.

P. Guggenheim also considers compensation as a sanction applied against the guilty subject, as well as self-defense measures (repression, war, etc.), and collective coercive measures by international organizations.

L. Oppenheim understands sanctions as compulsory dispute settlement measures, i.e. measures that in varying degrees contain elements of coercion and are applied by one state to coerce another state with the aim of forcing another state to adopt a certain settlement of a dispute as settlement as such that the first state wishes. He calls these measures rhetoric, repression (including embargo), peaceful blockade and intervention.

Thus, the analysis of the doctrine of international law from 1960s to 1990s makes it possible to conclude that, despite the different views of Western scientists on the legal nature of coercive measures, sanctions were primarily understood as collective, individual sanctions and coercive measures that were applied to the violating state in response to the commission of an international crime. It is in these works that theoretical material has accumulated, which has become the basis of modern research and a significant achievement in solving the problem of establishing legal principles, signs and basic principles of state responsibility, on the one hand, and international-legal sanctions on the other.

The work of the Commission of International Law initiated the process of codifying the norms of customary law regarding international legal liability, and became a boost for the further progressive development of this field. The scrupulous discussion by the members of the Commission of the text of the Articles on the responsibility of States, the sharp formulation of the content of its provisions, the controversy regarding the definition of principles and principles of responsibility for States have enabled to define the essence of such terms as "international legal responsibility" and "sanctions" more thoroughly and accurately, to separate one concept from the other.

According to the general plan adopted by the Commission at the beginning of its work, three main sections of the future project were defined. In its first part, it was planned to consider the origin of international responsibility, to determine the grounds and conditions under which it is possible to establish the presence of an internationally unlawful act. The second part should consider the content, forms and scope of international liability, i.e. the possible consequences, the occurrence of which is most likely under different circumstances in accordance with the norms of international law in the event of the state committing an internationally unlawful act (the consequences associated with compensation for damage, and the consequences related to punishment for internationally-unlawful acts, the relationship between these two types of effects, the specific forms in which reparations and sanctions can be simultaneously embodied). In the third part, it was envisaged to determine the procedure for the implementation of responsibility and settlement of disputes [30, p. 56].

Thus, the materials of the Commission's work show that at the beginning of its activity sanctions were considered as one of the forms of international legal responsibility of states. However, during the Commission's work, the term "sanctions" has been replaced by the term "countermeasures", and the issue of regulation of such measures has been referred to in the third part of the Project, which is devoted to the implementation of the international responsibility of States. The adoption of such a decision is due to the fact that the Commission has concluded that

it is necessary to use the term "sanctions" only for coercive measures which are applied by decisions of international organizations in connection with the violation of an international obligation which has serious consequences for the international community and which an international organization, in particular the United Nations, is entitled to adopt on the basis of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security [31, p. 121]. During further discussion of the Project, a common agreement was expressed that the term "sanctions" should be limited to measures taken by one or another international body or organization. The most obvious example in this regard, in the opinion of some members of the Commission, is the coercive measures of the UN Security Council [47, p. 50].

With the adoption of the Statutes on State Responsibility, the terms "international responsibility", "countermeasures" and "sanctions" acquired more distinct features, received clearer characteristics and explanations of the meaning of these terms. There are less and less opinions that do not divide these seemingly similar concepts by their legal nature, content and meaning. In the Articles on State Responsibility, the term "sanctions" is not applied, and the forms of state responsibility defined in this document do not provide for such a form of responsibility as sanctions, which gives grounds to claim the isolated place of the institution of sanctions in the system of international law [3, p. 171]. Without exaggeration, the activities of the Commission should be considered as an invaluable achievement, which was organized in the form of work of committees, conducting annual sessions, reports of 19 special speakers and representatives of states, discussing reports, organizing discussions on current activities of Commission, adopting resolutions. All this gave the opportunity to agree on a number of principles regarding international responsibility as one of the most important branches of modern international law and to formulate its principles and norms. Such work with small pauses lasted more than 40 years. The obvious merit of the Articles on State Responsibility is that the results of the discussion clearly established that sanctions are coercive measures that can only be applied by international organizations.

The recognition by the United Nations General Assembly of the Articles on the responsibility of States means official recognition. However, the fact that they are adopted in the form of an appendix to the resolution does not make the rules approved by the norms of international law, apart from those that previously existed as international customs or contained in international treaties. The articles on the responsibility of states, adopted by the Commission on International Law of the United Nations, constitute a codification of existing customary norms with important elements of progressive development. More and more decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies contain references to the Article on the responsibility of States for internationally unlawful acts.

The UN Secretariat has prepared a review of the decisions of international bodies. In the case of the European Court of Human Rights «I. Ilashka and others against Moldova and Russia», adopted in 2004, contains a reference to Article 7, approved by the Commission of International Law in 2001 to justify the conclusion on the responsibility of the state for the actions of its representatives committed "ultra vires" or violating instructions [30, p. 7].

In the 1999 judgment in the case *M/V SAIGA*, the International Court of Justice for the Law of the Sea referred to the p. 1 Project st. 42 (Compensation), adopted by the Commission of International Law, recognizing the right of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to compensation [38].

The WTO's report in the case *Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres*, examined in 2007, referred to Article 4 of the Responsibility of States in confirmation of the conclusions of the absence of grounds to consider the decision of the local court of Brazil to release the country from the obligation to comply with the requirements of art. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994).

Cases on certain international legal issues referred to, in their final documents, the Article on the responsibility of states as codified principles developed in modern international law, regarding the liability of states for internationally unlawful acts. Separately, the review includes decisions of the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, European Court, the Appeal Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), international arbitrations, the Administrative Tribunal of the world bank, the administrative tribunal of the international labour organization (ILO), the European Commission on human rights, etc. The review covers the analysis of documents in more than 200 cases in which decisions were made between 1973 and 2013.

So, the application of the provisions of the Articles on the accountability of States indicates their worldwide recognition as customary norms of international law. The scientific basis laid down by the Commission on the nature of coercive measures of international organizations has opened up new perspectives for the fundamental study of nature of sanctions regimes with respect to the violating states; it has indicated the need to solve by scientists previously unknown tasks regarding the laws of functioning and development of the sanctions; other tasks aimed at more detailed settlement of public relations in the sphere of application of coercive measures. The term "sanctions", even a reference to it in any form, is never used in the Articles on State Responsibility, which indicates that international sanctions are not a component of the institution of state responsibility. In this context, it would be quite justified to assert that a clear and reasoned definition of general principles, basic elements, properties, content of state responsibility and the

term “countermeasures” as a means of implementing responsibility would end the dogmatic and practical contradictions of scientists regarding the place of the institute of sanctions in the system of international law.

However, still in the scientific literature, you can often encounter points of view that interpret internationally legal sanctions too widely, replacing them with forms of international legal responsibility or identifying them with them. Ukrainian investigators of international sanctions. O. Pakhil [49] define international law sanctions as “the normative formulation of measures that have the character of legal coercion and are applied by subjects of international law to the violating state in case of non-compliance with the prescriptions of international legal norms and contain their legal assessment”. At the same time, they emphasize that “the doctrinal direction, which attributes to sanctions all the negative consequences of violating the provisions of the legal norm of international law, is the most convincing”. Professor of International Law Dutch-Debbas considers sanctions as a special part of the law of international liability, covering all legal consequences of violation of international law, and not only compensation by the state for damages due to the payment of reparations.

These considerations, which make international coercive measures an element of international coercion as elements of the institution of responsibility of states, contradict the modern understanding of the institute of international-legal sanctions, since the incorrect identification or abuse of the current understanding of sanctions institute in political science and international law stimulates the loss of its inherent legal and political distinction and characteristics.

Together with others, in the international legal scientific literature, international law sanctions are considered as the only coercive instrument of the UN Security Council for the fight against the most dangerous international crimes. In contrast to them, coercive measures of other subjects of international law are offered as so-called "collective countermeasures" or "countermeasures applied in international law". Barroso, the president of the European Commission, commenting on the possibility of a decision to introduce international sanctions against Ukraine in the context of mass human rights violations during peaceful rallies in Kiev on the Independence Square in late 2013 and early 2014, noted that sanctions can only be introduced by the UN Security Council, and there is no mechanism in the international legal basis for launching sanctions. The very narrow interpretation of sanctions by the subjects applying them may be related to the position of the main UN bodies, which in their official documents use the term "sanctions" only with respect to coercive measures. This artificial fragmentation of the

concept is unjustified and can lead to the appearance of different concepts that describe the same objects and phenomena, but will have a different (sometimes very different) meaning.

The term "international legal sanctions" appears to be applied to coercive measures by all international intergovernmental organizations. This position is dictated by the desire to a unified understanding of legal concepts in the sphere of application of international legal sanctions. Definition of legal concepts or identification of legal phenomena is usually understood as a qualitative definition and comparison of signs and distinctive features, legal characteristics, regulatory functions, consequences and other characteristics. For example, international intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, have international legal entity and operate on a contractual basis. The scope of the coercive measures they apply is the same and is aimed at international order and protection. For these reasons, it is appropriate to recognize that the restriction of the concept of "sanctions" only by coercive measures of the UN Security Council is unjustified, since in such a case, due to its legal nature, a different meaning is artificially given to the same concept, depending on the methods and purposes of application of the institute of international law. Thus, the imperative of coercive measures by the UN Security Council and other international organizations should be called the term "sanctions of international law".

In addition to the above views on the legal nature, purpose and types of international coercive measures, it should be noted that there are other views about the place of sanctions in international law. The system of international law expresses views that do not largely coincide not only with the agreed opinions of experts who participate in the work of the Commission of International Law, but also with international practice. In the work of some international lawyers, as in the Commission's work, there is a tendency toward the traditional doctrine of international law on sanctions.

About sanctions in international law. For example, a researcher from the Australian National University, D. M. Farrell notes that "in the international sphere, sanctions are treated as a wide range of measures taken for different purposes against different entities." The author also notes that the term "sanction" is widely used to define an action aimed at coercion or punishment for a certain behavior or penalty for unlawful conduct that the sanctioning authority considers unacceptable to itself. The motivation for imposing sanctions can be a reaction to a violation of the law. The motive may also be measures taken to its own foreign policy objectives or to the foreign policy goals of the state; or to obtain an advantage over the subject to which sanctions are applied [28, p. 8].

A. Kern, a professor of law at the University of Zurich, believes that "sanctions can be applied by both states and international organizations and are aimed at any of the following purposes: to change the political course of a state or its policies; to punish or retaliate for acts committed; or as a message to the state or third parties. Furthermore, economic sanctions may be used to promote the achievement of military objectives on the one hand, and to maintain peace on the other. This may be related to using sanctions as a tool for dialogue. The tactical purpose of sanctions may be to deter or coerce the violating state. Detention or coercion of other states or persons who are not infringers, but whose behavior is trading or carrying out transactions with the object of sanctions" [31, p. 10].

These positions widely interpret the nature and legal nature of sanctions. Some authors try to use sanctions as a cover-up to hide openly illegal actions that have nothing to do with the norms contained in international legal documents, thus trying to give them a legitimate appearance. They create a sense of legality. The main objections relate to the proposed formulations of goals, for the achievement of which sanctions may be applied, as well as the reasons that motivated such decisions.

Despite the above opinions of experts-internationalists, there is increasingly a relatively correct opinion that sanctions are coercive actions of international organizations. If previously only some supporters of the doctrine of international law called sanctions coercive measures of international organizations, today such views are increasingly appearing in the scientific literature. For these reasons, recognizing that the restriction of the concept of "sanctions" only by coercive measures of the UN Security Council is unjustified, since in such a case, by virtue of its legal nature, different content is artificially attributed to the same concept, based on the methods and purposes of application of the institute of international law. Thus, the imperative of coercive measures by the UN Security Council and other international organizations should be referred to as "sanctions under international law".

In addition to the above-mentioned views on the legal nature, purpose and types of international coercive measures, it should be noted that there are other views about the place of sanctions in international law. The international legal system expresses views that do not largely coincide not only with the agreed opinions of experts involved in the work of the Commission of international law, but also with international practice. This is not only a question of the Commission of international law, but also of international practice. In the work of some international lawyers who participate in the Commission's work, there is a tendency against the traditional doctrine of international law on sanctions.

Researcher from Afghanistan G. Khakimdavar, analyzing the means and varieties of coercive measures, notes that “traditional sanctions, which usually have negative consequences for the state to which they are applied, can be replaced by sanctions that provide an incentive that will encourage the State to stop unlawful behavior. Such an incentive is a positive sanction, an alternative to traditional sanctions that threaten the deprivation of certain economic freedoms” [29, p. 147].

P. Volencyn, investigating the problems of peace and international conflicts, notes that “sanctions due to low effectiveness, negative consequences for states have limited possibilities and are not an alternative way to end violations of international legal norms.” However, the range of possible measures, in his opinion, “may not only have negative and destructive consequences, but also aim to provide the states from which the cessation of violations of international law norms is sought, certain material and political incentives, hoping to end the negative policy by its leadership” [36, p. 231].

The analysis of the doctrine of international law and the practice of interstate relations gives grounds to summarize that the emergence of the theory of “positive” sanctions is related to the needs of the modern world community in security, international stability and peace. Increasing competition between states, intensification of the struggle for natural resources and markets, territorial assaults, social, interreligious and interethnic internal conflicts and other disagreements will continue to provoke new confrontations, the settlement of which will be submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council. In view of this, supporters of the concept of positive sanctions insist on the need to change the forms of coexistence of states and the introduction of new ways of resolving conflicts, re-thinking the nature and content of international legal sanctions.

The methodological error is the very attempt to compare the concept of so-called incentive sanctions with the practice of applying international law sanctions, which are implemented on the basis of part VII of the Charter of the United Nations or according to the statutes of other international organizations [27, p. 161]. Analysis of the effectiveness of domestic legal systems shows that positive sanctions in them are considered primarily as legal incentives, under which the form and measure of legal approval of deserved legal behavior is understood, as a result of which the subject is rewarded. The presence of incentive sanctions in the domestic law of states is justified by the task of law, which consists of both restraining offenses, punishing persons who have committed them, and in stimulating lawful behavior, encouraging persons acting in the interests of society. International legal sanctions have a number of specific characteristics that are determined by the peculiarities of international law, so it is quite unjustified and even false to try to present the theory of positive sanctions as a more effective and successful variety of

international legal coercive measures. Modern science of international law considers sanctions as a reaction to offences in the form of coercive measures applied to the offender of legal norms. This is widely accepted in the doctrine. Positive sanctions, as an alternative to coercive measures, are, in essence, instruments of encouragement, i.e. a system of motivation opposite to coercion and punishment.

The analysis of the categories “primitive” and “encouragement” allows to identify a number of fundamental differences between them:

First, if encouragement is intended to stimulate a positive way of action of the subject, compulsion is actions aimed at inclining him to adhere to generally accepted norms of behavior.

Second, the measures of encouragement, in the view of society, are connected with elements of the commonly useful, as opposed to the measure of coercion, which is always perceived as an element of the negative, harmful and sublime.

Third, encouragement is always a measure of approval, and coercion is a measure of condemnation.

Fourth, if a potential is laid in coercion that drives a person to the norm, then through encouragement incentives are implemented aimed at improving the behavior of a person beyond the general norm.

In these two diametrically opposing concepts, the relationship with positive moral values and general human priorities is manifested in different ways: if, through the encouragement of the subject, certain material or moral value is provided, then through coercion and punishment he is deprived of some good. In addition, coercion is usually manifested through demand, order, threat, physical or powerful moral punishment, blackmail or other violent and unfavourable ways for the subject that are not inherent in acts of encouragement. Thus, when dividing sanctions into negative and positive, one of the most important features of sanctions is ignored – the compulsory nature of such measures, as a result of which the boundaries between sanctions and incentive measures are blurred, which prevents the correct establishment of the nature of these institutions and the determination of the role of each of them in the system of international legal regulation. Such views are also not consistent with the multifunctional orientation of international coercive measures.

As is known, along with the main function of international legal sanctions - the restorative, which consists in ensuring the restoration of the violated right, no less important place occupy preventive (precautionary) and educational functions. The preventive function of the sanctions

consists in inflicting on the violator of the norms of international law a feeling of the inevitability of the application of sanctions in case of refusal to cease the offence and voluntarily perform the duties that are imposed on him. At the same time, the warning effect is exercised not only on the offender, but also on other subjects of international law. It is not possible in this regard not to note that the preventive value of sanctions is determined by the inevitability of their application in the event that the offender does not wish to act in accordance with the norms of international law. An exceptionally important place is occupied by the educational function of international sanctions, designed to form in the state of delinquency and other potential offenders the understanding of the need for strict observance of the norms of international law. Effective struggle with violations of international law norms, timely and irreversible application of sanctions creates in the subjects of international relations the conviction in the inviolability of the existing legal order, strengthens the faith in the justice and power of the modern organization of the world community, the confidence that legitimate rights and interests will be safeguarded. This, in turn, contributes to the enhancement and strengthening of legality and international stability. Set at the same level as coercive incentive actions as a response to violations of international law, the authors destroying the preventive and educational functions of sanctions.

So, after analyzing the categories of "coercion" and "encouragement", the origin and functions of sanctions in international law, it can be concluded that the concept of "positive" sanctions does not correspond to the fundamental principles and the legal nature of the sanctions as coercive measures. Encouraging a state-delinquent to end an unlawful policy in exchange for certain preferences, privileges, economic assistance, states or international organizations knowingly or involuntarily suggest that in the future, in the event of a repeated violation of international norms, one can also count on receiving certain concessions or benefits. Such practices will adversely affect other potential offenders. The concept of "positive" sanctions, although it has the right to exist, has nothing to do with the institute of international law sanctions and is a special type of non-sanction measures designed to prevent the emergence of interstate conflicts or prevent further escalation of those that have already erupted. Given this, taking into account the fundamental difference between positive and negative sanctions by nature of origin and functions performed, it seems unacceptable and unfounded to apply the term "sanctions" to measures to encourage subjects of international law involved in committing offences.

In my opinion, the significance of the legal definition is very important and carries a serious meaning load, contributes to a deeper penetration in the essence of public relations and international processes, in connection with which it cannot be counted as the composition of secondary means of expression of the content and nature of the elements of law.

The draft law of Ukraine on the procedure for implementation of decisions of international organizations on the introduction of sanctions (Appendix No. 3).

1.2 Main characteristics of international sanctions

The modern world is based on the system of international law, which is designed to regulate relations between states, their interests and the means by which they can use states to protect their national interests. The use of military force to defend national interests has also proved very dangerous and expensive for states. The devastating consequences of World War II for humanity made it necessary to create a global system of "rules of the game" for states, which is the system of international law. The task of this system is to create rules that allow states to regulate their relations with other states in order to prevent the use of violent means to political goals.

The effective functioning of a global system of rules is impossible without the means ensuring their implementation. Officially, countries parties to international treaties must voluntarily comply with their provisions. In fact, numerous cases of violations of international law have led to the need to develop a system of instruments to ensure compliance with international law, to return the offender to the sphere of international right or simply to punish him for violations. The most common and realistic means of coercion of the subject, which forces the subject not to violate the norms of international law, are sanctions, also known as "counter-sanctions".

The Oxford Dictionary defines sanctions as "an official order that restricts trade, relations, etc. with a country in order to force it to do something." The Ukrainian Diplomatic Encyclopedia defines international sanctions as measures of legal coercion, which are applied by subjects of international law with the aim of preventing international violation, restoring violated rights and forcing the infringer to fulfill their obligations in the sphere of international right.

Thus, by definition, sanctions are instruments of coercion that use different means of influence on the object of sanctions. Sanctions can be of different types, usually distinguish three main types of sanctions:

- **Diplomatic sanctions** are the reduction or termination of the diplomatic presence or the rupture of diplomatic relations.
- **Political sanctions** are the restriction of diplomatic contacts, the suspension or suspension of the implementation of joint international treaties, the exclusion from international organizations of a country that has grossly violated international law or even the complete termination of the diplomatic relations between countries.

- **Economic sanctions** are a partial or complete restriction of economic activity, a total or partial limitation of trade relations with a country.

The application of economic sanctions as the most common mechanism of punishment for violations of international law threatens a greater number of countries. Also, the introduction of economic sanctions is felt on themselves and the countries that apply them. Moreover, the policy of economic sanctions may also affect third countries that are not participants in violations of international sanctions but are negatively affected by economic sanction policies because they have close economic ties with countries both on a global scale and in a specific region. When applying economic sanctions, it is necessary to weigh all possible risks. The best solution with economic constraints is the one that causes the most tangible harm to the violating country, as well as those who apply these sanctions, and those they affect.

The problem with the application of economic sanctions is the difficulty of measuring their effectiveness. The complexity of transnational economic processes creates a large number of factors that can have both a positive and a negative effect for a country under economic sanctions. This situation allows us to manipulate the topic of the effectiveness of economic sanctions, which often occurs in the political plane. In particular, Russia is trying to convince the world that the sanctions that have been imposed on it are even beneficial to it due to the so-called “import substitution” policy. Also among Russians is widespread the thesis that countries that apply sanctions against it suffer from them more than the Russian Federation itself. But the simple argument that testifies to the effectiveness of the regime against the Russian Federation is the efforts made by Russia to their removal.

The application of economic restrictions is often accompanied by political sanctions by the countries that initiated them. The effectiveness of the application of political sanctions is difficult to compare with economical, but their combination creates a more comprehensive policy to the object of application of sanctions, which creates the effect of comprehensive restriction of the violator country of international law. Sanctions can be imposed by states (individual) and international organizations. However, it has become common practice for states to observe only the sanctions regime imposed by international organizations, such as the United Nations. In contrast, representatives of the leadership of the sanctioned state mostly avoid the negative consequences of sanctions, which complicates the achievement of the objectives set. For example, the application of a comprehensive regime of sanctions can lead to serious consequences in the humanitarian sphere of the state, but can not the objectives of the sanction policy. On the other hand, targeted sanctions can mitigate negative consequences for the population and make a clear boundary between population and decision makers. In addition, targeted sanctions can be of

varying scale, from a narrow circle of individuals to specific groups of people and spread to specific sectors of interaction.

Sectoral sanctions targeting key sectors of the economy are approaching, with the subsequent effect of comprehensive sanctions as they affect the entire society, or even a group of societies. In the modern world, sanctions have earned the reputation of a complex of measures "between war and word". It is worth noting that the application of sanctions has become more common in the modern world than in the last century. For example, of the 26 sanctions imposed on the United States, 12 have been initiated over the past 10 years; the United Nations has imposed sanctions more than 20 times since the end of the Cold War, while before only twice has been imposed against South Rhodesia (the territory of Zimbabwe) and South Africa. This increase in the number of sanctions indicates the weakening of international legal norms and international regimes, as sanctions often become a kind of one-time replacement for universal "rules of the game". With the help of sanctions offenders, who for various reasons are not profitable to comply with the agreed standards of the world order, are punished. The application of sanctions is associated with significantly less risks than compared to alternative forms of pressure, especially violent. However, this tool has its price, and the fact that states and international organizations are more likely to use these tools demonstrates the unreliability of the institutions of government or the rule of law. In other words, the more frequently sanctions are used the more this is a sign of a crisis in the international security system. Sanctions are considered as preventive and restrictive measures that allow to respond to political challenges and events that contradict the goals and values of the country that applies them. For example, the European Union defines the following main objectives when applying sanctions: the protection of the values, fundamental integrity, and security of the EU; the maintenance of peace; and the strengthening and support of democracy.

The basic purpose of sanctions is to change the behavior of the state to which the sanctions are applied. Sanctions may be aimed at encouraging a country to abandon a nuclear program, use military force against a neighboring state or genocide against its own population. They can also be a trading tool. The mechanism behind the use of sanctions to change the behavior of other states takes into account their influence on decision-making and is based on rationality. It is assumed that the threat of sanctions or their actual application will lead to an increase in the price to the sky. With all this simplicity and seemingly convincingness of this logic, it rarely works in practice for a number of reasons. Sanctions can also be used as punishment for actions that have already been committed. Often such sanctions are applied in response to judicial decisions that have no retroactive effect. In such cases, sanctions serve as a warning to others about the cost of violating

the international regime. If it is impossible to force a state to change its behavior, the other purpose of sanctions is to prevent it from committing further destructive actions or unwanted actions.

Finally, sanctions can be a tool for destabilizing a country in order to change the regime in power. The aim of Ukraine is to return the occupied territories and minimize the possibility of further aggression by Russia. Achieving these goals by means of sanctions alone is almost impossible. That's why sanctions should be used in Ukraine's arsenal and take into account different nuances; complemented by other tools; and be part of a broader strategy for managing conflict. First, the combination of several tasks at the same time and, secondly, the divergence that exists in the goals of Ukraine and other countries that have imposed sanctions against Russia for the decisions taken by the Kremlin on Ukraine - each of these goals is achieved by different ways of applying sanctions, different rhetoric, different character and scale of sanctions. Unfortunately, some of these goals cannot be achieved through sanctions. It is also important to understand as fully as possible what our partners are trying to achieve through sanctions. The belief that sanctions have been introduced and are existing exclusively in favor of Ukraine is unlikely to be a good basis for a long-term outlook. The basis of the sanctions is the national interests of the countries that introduce them, and the scope of these interests can be extremely broad. In addition, they may be influenced by other interests of different countries, which may vary substantially: from the desire to punish Russia for undermining the world order to the wish to weaken it so that it becomes a victim. However, it should be remembered that sanctions are not the exact tool of pressure that can be abused. It always has its price. Excessive use of sanctions regimes or lack of retaliation can create certain risks, such as disproportion between sanctions and the economic damage they cause, which can lead to increased tensions between the U.S. and the EU.

CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) is a federal law that imposes additional sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Russia. The bill was approved by 115 members of the U.S. Congress, 98 votes against 2 in the US Senate, and signed on August 2, 2017 by US President Donald Trump. It was introduced unilaterally by the United States and allowed to introduce secondary sanctions against Russia. As European companies have become more actively cooperating with Russia than American companies, this makes them vulnerable to U.S. sanctions. This, in turn, could lead to a disruption of diplomatic tensions and undermine Western «unity» against Russia.

Sanctions against Russian oligarchs and Kremlin companies, in turn, increase their support for Putin, as their survival and prosperity directly depend on him. Another risk is that abuse of sanctions weakens their effectiveness. Russia and its partners are actively looking for alternatives to overcome the problematic circumstances associated with sanctions. Russia and China are

already working together to minimize their dependence on sanctions. Continuing the previous risk, it should be noted that sanctions are becoming an integral part of the daily foreign policy of the U.S. and the EU. This is dangerous because the idea of the inevitability of sanctions reflects Russia's desire to seek a way out of the situation that led to sanctions. In this case, the West will lose its advantage over Russia. By implementing CAATSA, the United States has significantly delegated powers to suspend and impose sanctions from the president to Congress, making a swift suspension of the sanction's regime even less likely.

To talk about an effective regime of sanctions, it is necessary not only to analyze the current situation and the shortcomings of the current policy towards Russia, but also to determine what measures the Russian Federation is taking:

- big and small actions;
- lifting or easing sanctions.

The work analyzed the sanctions that were applied to Russia (Appendix No. 4).

Conclusion to Chapter 1

International detente policy, which was the result of the end of the Cold War, gave the opportunity to concentrate the joint efforts of states on international peace-building, to coordinate the positions of progressive states, coordinate fruitful joint activities in the United Nations and other international organizations, and coordinate joint activity on activities on the application of international-legal sanctions to violating states.

The Institute of International Legal Sanctions, commonly referred to as the structural element of the institute of international responsibility, has evolved over the last half-century, has developed into a separate institution of enforcement and ensuring compliance with the norms of international law.

The fruitful work of the Commission on International Law and the articles adopted in the report on the responsibility of States for acts contrary to international law contributed to the gradual development of the concept of international punitive coercion as an effective instrument of collective influence. Analysis of articles on state responsibility, working documents of the Commission on International Law and judicial decisions related to these articles has allowed to identify a number of key provisions and features of international sanctions, among which, in particular, the fact that sanctions are not a form of international responsibility and international intergovernmental organizations are subjects of application of sanctions.

Despite some positive steps taken in this direction, a single concept of sanctions in international law has not yet been produced. The diversity of definitions complicates their theoretical research and does not contribute to the production of a unified approach to their application in practice.

The study of the legal nature of sanctions, their basic characteristics and application gives grounds to propose the following scientific definition: international law sanctions are exclusively unilateral, collective, lawful coercive measures applied by international intergovernmental organizations to violating international law states, in order to force the offender to stop the violation and to refrain from violation of international law and to fulfill the obligations arising from the legal relationship of the obligation, if the violator voluntarily refuses to perform them to compensate for damages and only after all the means of peaceful settlement of the dispute have been exhausted.

2. THE SPECIFICITY OF TARGETED SANCTIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SUPPRESSING MILITARY AGGRESSION

2.1 Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy in the light of the war of Russia against Ukraine

The Russian war against Ukraine has caused a serious humanitarian crisis. The massive military invasion of Russia and the intense fighting that has been ongoing in Ukraine since February 24, 2022 have resulted in numerous deaths, wounds, mass displacement of civilians, including children, damage to social, transport, logistic and technical infrastructure throughout the region, as well as destruction and damage to the country's economic, social and humanitarian system. Dozens of millions of people were affected inside the country, both in the occupied territories and in the unoccupied, but barbaric bombardment-affected territories. The most urgent problems that need to be solved are the provision of a viable supply of everything necessary for the Ukrainian army, assistance to the injured civilians and the restoration of infrastructure, as well as ensuring the full functioning of vital state functions of the state, but in the conditions of war the introduction of elements of post-war reconstruction is practically impossible without proper economic ground. Therefore, today the national economy is one of the priority areas that sets the course.

Success in the economic and social spheres largely depends on the ability of managers at different levels to articulate and formulate appropriate strategic plans, as well as to ensure their effective implementation, including timely implementation of defined priorities. Ukraine has overcome the initial economic shocks of the war, and now it is time to define priorities more clearly. The country has the prerequisites for the inevitable post-war economic and social recovery, the immediate restoration of destroyed cities and the modernization of infrastructure. This is largely due to international assistance provided and guaranteed by our foreign partners. Without adequate actions of the authorities, including the use of appropriate economic policy instruments, as well as without active participation and control of the population, the state will not be able to quickly recover from hostilities and realize the significant potential of post-war revival.

The government has introduced a number of important innovations in the field of emergency regulation, namely regulatory innovations aimed at reducing the tax burden on business and stimulating the economy. Measures on economic liberalization show that the government is aware that there is a direct connection with the degree of economic freedom and the pace of economic development. The changes that have begun must not only be continued, but also intensified in the postwar period. All economic policy innovations that proved their effectiveness during the war must be applied in the preparation and implementation of the post-war economic development strategy of Ukraine.

Since old times, the tool of economic sanctions has been known as a trade ban or embargo. However, since the beginning of the 20th century, economic sanctions have played a key role in crisis situations. Therefore, the main purpose of sanctions can be explained by preventing and resolving conflicts. As stated by D. Dressner, one of the driving forces of the imposition of sanctions is the expectation of future conflicts between the sending state and the target state. Such restrictive measures are widely discussed in the context of social sciences, especially economics, political science, international relations, world science, security science, etc. Sanctions can be understood as "non-violent measures that can be used to influence the behavior of the state and, more and more often, individuals, as well as to punish for violations" [Chachko & Benthon Heath, 2022]. B. Horvath noted in 2015 that in the narrative of international law and international economic law, economic sanctions are legal instruments that are uniquely used to foreign policy and security policy goals.

In the sphere of international politics, sanctions can be used as an instrument of economic, not military pressure. The most common examples of sanctions are "financial sanctions, asset freezing, travel ban, restrictions on luxury goods and arms embargo" [Drezner, 2011]. According to the report of the United Nations Security Council in 2013 (session of the UN Security Council

Committee 2127 on August 5, 2013 on the control and observance of the sanctions regime against the Central African Republic, which was introduced by the U.N. Security Council due to political instability and armed confrontation in this country over recent years), "the application of sanctions can be divided into five categories: conflict settlement, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fight against terrorism, democratization and protection of the civilian population (including human rights)". On the other hand, their impact on the imposition of sanctions for the maintenance of peace or in response to any violations is not equal. According to the researchers, "between 1990 and 2015, the United States applied approximately five times more sanctions than the UN, and twice as many as the EU." Since economic sanctions are one of the main instruments for resolving or reducing conflicts, it is necessary to analyze the effectiveness of the sanctions policy in the light of Russia's war against Ukraine.

On the one hand, economic sanctions can be considered as part of a peace-keeping strategy. On the other hand, the policy of sanctions is described as a set of tools to prevent the escalation of the conflict, but in some discussions the question of improving the sanctions procedures is raised to the objectives of such economic deterrence, oriented to the settlement of conflict. They argue that the study of peacebuilding and its practical application in the global political system and international security system minimizes the risk of violation of sovereignty and co-definition of sanctions policies.

Researching the sanctions policy in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war, scientists focus on the following issues:

- the functioning of the sanctions regime and the problem of establishing the criteria for the legality of economic sanctions;
- the preventive nature of sanctions.

Sanctions must be effective in preventing conflict, military arms or war. On the one hand, the sanctions policy has sparked discussions about the effectiveness of economic sanctions, as "authoritarian regimes can (often deliberately) transfer the burden of sanctions to the population as a whole, and these regimes are sometimes aggravated by the effect of "coordinating around the flag" sanctions." Sanctions can destabilize democratic leaders, but may virtually not affect authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, countries subject to sanctions tend to form coalitions to circumvent sanctions. Therefore, imposing sanctions on the target state is accompanied by the introduction of sanctions against it.

The last statement may mean that economic benefits may prevail over values. Although the degree of willingness to join the sanctions policy against Russia varies from state to state. This

variability raised the question of balance between solidarity with Ukraine and the pursuit of economic goals for individual countries. This balance reflects the competing interests of world powers between the aspiration for internal stability and the desire to respond to unjustified aggression against another country. For example, in the XX century there was an idea, proposed by S. Polachek [50] according to the article «Conflict and Trade», “states that are heavily dependent on trade are more likely to avoid trade disputes with their trading partners than states that are less interdependent.” While states claim to have achieved specific economic goals, Russia’s unfair attack on Ukraine has shifted the balance between economic benefits and democratic values and principles in favor of values.

For example, P. M. Silva II and Z. Selden from the University of Florida conducted research on economic interdependence and economic sanctions, studying the attitude of EU member countries to the introduction of sanctions against Russia and their dependence from the Russian economy. Z. Selden (2020) shows “a remarkable positive correlation between economic interdependence and support for sanctions among EU member countries.” This means that “states with a higher level of interdependence are more opposed to sanctions against Russia than states with a lower level of interaction” [Silva & Selden, 2020]. “On the contrary, countries that are least economically interdependent are most opposed to sanctions, while some of the most interdependency states are most supportive of sanctions.”

Before the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, among many EU member countries who advocated the introduction of sanctions against Russia, there was a “soft” side that tried to prevent such a decision. P. M. Silva II and Z. Selden found that “most EU member states that are vulnerable to Russia’s aggressive actions, such as the Baltic countries, are mostly in favor of sanctions, despite the fact that they will lose more than most EU member countries, in terms of trade.”

In light of the war of Russia against Ukraine, the positions on the introduction of sanctions against Russia among EU member countries were divided into several groups. The first group, which included Poland, the Baltic states, Great Britain, and northern European countries, condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine and supported a strict regime of sanctions against Russia. At the other end of the spectrum, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Portugal and Spain, as well as Hungary and Austria have tended to cooperate with Russia due to the economic ties they have developed, cultural and religious ties and/or the absence of recent conflicts. Among them, key members, France, and Germany, took a moderate stance. This polarization has been used by Russia "to divide internal opinion in EU member states in the hope of preventing the resumption of sanctions", by spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation, interfering in the

political life of individual countries, supporting pro-Kremlin politicians, and introducing countersanctions, such as food embargoes. The actual frontal war of Russia against Ukraine has led to a rethinking of the issue of national security, national interests, and the definition of the unity of the Western world. The basic principle of pragmatic approach to international relations implies that collective actions of states against a threat are more effective than actions of one state. Russia's unprovoked military attack on Ukraine has provoked unprecedented actions by the Western world, especially the EU, which, as noted above, has different political preferences and views on sanctions against the aggressor state.

The sanctions imposed against the Russian Federation after the annexation of Crimea can be divided into several categories. The first category of sanctions concerns "blocking" sanctions, i.e., the freezing of assets. "Such sanctions have been imposed one by one against Russian President Putin and other members of the Russian business and political elite" [Chachko and Benton Heath, 2022]. The second category of sanctions is focused on the financial system and "includes blocking sanctions against major Russian banks and financial institutions that restrict transactions with others" [Chachko and Benton Heath, 2022]. Measures taken by the EU and US institutions to exclude certain Russian financial institutions from the SWIFT system and to ban all transactions with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. Third category, as indicated Chackko and D. Benton Heath (2022), is energy as "the US has banned the import of Russian oil, liquefied natural gas and coal, as well as all new American investments in the Russian energy sector."

With the Sixth package of sanctions, the European Council imposed sanctions "against the purchase, import or supply by Russia of crude oil and certain petroleum products to the EU". "The United States and other countries have introduced export controls aimed at limiting Russia's access to necessary goods. Moreover, in response to the illegal Russian "referendum" in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, the U.S. administration announced new economic restrictions aimed at "a low number of non-Russian underlying companies established earlier this year to help major Russian military suppliers avoid sanctions already imposed."

The next category concerns transport: the closure of Russian airspace for Russian aircraft, the prohibition on the carriage of passengers and cargo from the air space of the Russian "Aeroflot". These measures have been announced by the United States, the EU, the UK, Iceland, Switzerland, Canada and other countries. The last category is activities that are accompanied by the escape of private operators. Finally, there are travel restrictions for Russian tourists. After discussions in the EU on banning the entry of Russian tourists into the EU, some EU members have concluded that such restrictions will be introduced. In September 2022, a joint statement was announced by the Baltic countries and Poland on measures to restrict the entry of Russian tourists

to their countries. In addition to the above-mentioned decision, at the end of September, the Finnish government announced restrictions on the entry of Russian tourists to its territory, to prevent cooperation between third parties and Russian companies and banks. It introduces a mechanism that allows third parties acting in other countries to be punished for cooperation and contribution to the Russian economy. This type of sanction policy is called “secondary sanctions.” As was said in the American discourse, “Make Russia radioactive for non-American, non-European companies.”

Unprecedented sanctions imposed by leading countries demonstrate the unity of the world around the idea of territorial integrity and international law. The unity in condemning Russia’s aggressive policy towards another country, even by countries that traditionally adhere to the principle of neutrality in foreign policy, signals a change in the perception of the world order, where the aggressor country must be decisively condemned and isolated. For example, the government of Singapore, adhering to the principle of neutrality, imposed sanctions against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, signaling that “we cannot tolerate that the Russian government is violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another Sovereign State. For such a small country as Singapore, this is not a theoretical principle, but a dangerous precedent.”

The reaction of neutral powers can be an expression of a revision of the world order, in which imperialist invasions must be defeated by the decisive response of the international community. The war unleashed by Russia has opened a new era of war, which includes not only conventional, cybernetic or diplomatic warfare, but also economic, meaning, as the President of the European Commission, U. von der Leyen, said, “the toughest sanctions the world has ever seen.”

However, the effectiveness of sanctions remains difficult to assess in the short term due to a lack of data from Russia, which continues to spread misinformation about its “growing power” after the sanctions were introduced. On September 7, 2022, the Russian president spoke at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, stating that rather than having the effect that the West wants, sanctions are deteriorating the quality of life of Europeans, and poorer countries are losing access to food. Such statements indicate not only Russia’s disregard for international law and its desire to continue the war against a sovereign state, but also its attempt to emphasize the impunity of its actions. Therefore, victory in the war with the enemy, who is confident in his impunity, can be achieved both by military and economic means, and by the unity of partners and allies of Ukraine. The effectiveness of sanctions as an alternative to military and conflict requires further research, starting with the fact that “a precise empirical assessment of the effectivity of the sanctions is difficult for two reasons: timelines and access to data. When it comes to assessing the

impact of economic sanctions, six months are usually not enough. In fact, economists believe that real debates about sanctions against Russia will continue after 2023.

This analysis shows that while the war in Ukraine continues, the issue of sanctions policy against Russia remains relevant. Russia remains one of the biggest potential threats in the world as a terrorist state, using nuclear blackmail, committing genocide against the Ukrainian people, ignoring international law and borders of other states, and threatening to set the world on fire in a new global war. The sanctions imposed on Russia are unprecedented, but it can be predicted that due to further criminal actions of Russia on the territory of Ukraine they will be intensified, as well as the support of Ukraine by its allies and partners. As noted above, sanctions have less impact on authoritarian states, while the entire burden of sanctions falls on the shoulders of the citizens of the state against which they are directed. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the sectors that will have the most impact on the Russian economy.

To this goal, research on “smart sanctions” as well as the effectiveness of the sanctions already introduced is a perspective thing. At the same time, economic sanctions against aggressive Russia must be accompanied by increasing the military potential of the armed forces of Ukraine to ensure the victory of Ukraine over the aggressor state, which can be achieved in the context of Ukraine’s military victory and the subsequent demilitarization of Russia.

2.2 International multilateral sanctions regime against the Russian Federation to deter military aggression

Since the start of the unprovoked full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Ukraine and its international partners have imposed a series of sanctions against Russia. Today, the Russian Federation is the most sanctioning country in the world and at the moment it is the sanctions that are one of the most effective instrument of influence on the aggressor country by the civilized world community. An important element of the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the sanctions direction is interaction with the capitals of the EU Member States, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and a number of other partner countries. In matters of formation and implementation of state policy in the sanctions sphere, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, as an auxiliary instrument, takes into account the Plan of action of the international expert group Ermak-Macfol on strengthening sanctions against the Russian Federation, prepared by a group of international and Ukrainian experts.

As for now, the work of the site "War and Sanctions" (<https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua>) has been started, which publishes sanctions lists of persons involved in solving, supporting and facilitating the military aggression of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus against Ukraine. The portal contains detailed profiles of individuals and their relationships, as well as visualizations of sanctions already applied in different jurisdictions. The information on the Portal is constantly updated and is also available in English. This portal also provides the opportunity to quantify progress in the application of sanctions by EU countries, the UK, the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. On the anniversary of the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine by the partner states, powerful sanctions packages were adopted.

1. EU

April 2023. The Council of the EU has already introduced ten packages of economic and individual sanctions in connection with the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine. On February 25, 2023, the 10th package of EU sanctions, which included such provisions, was adopted by written procedure:

- The lists of individual sanctions include 121 objects, including 87 individuals and 34 organizations, including Russian military leaders, deputies of the State Duma, government officials, the leadership of political parties of Russia, the Russian Ombudsman Moskalkova, persons involved in the export of Ukrainian children (V. Yakimova), officials appointed by Russia in the occupied territories in Ukraine, as well as the company of the Military-industrial complex of Russian Federation.

- As part of the fight against Russian propaganda, licenses for broadcasting Russian media in the EU (Patriot Media Group, including 11 associated companies, Russia Today, RT Arabic, Sputnik Arabic) were suspended and their content was banned, as well as 20 propagandists were added.

- New financial sanctions: Alfa-Bank, Tinkoff Bank and Rosbank (personal sanctions introduced that allow freezing the assets of these banks).

- The list of subjects directly supporting the military-industrial complex of Russia has been expanded. In the sanction lists included 96 new subject (including the proposals of Ukraine).

- Additional trade bans on exports to the EU cover 47 electronic components found by Ukraine in seized Russian weapons systems, dual-use goods, sensitive export products, vehicles, products used in construction, etc. The total amount of bans is approximately 11 billion euros.

- Import restrictions apply to imports of synthetic rubber and bitumen mass.
- Russian citizens are prohibited from participating in the boards of directors of critical infrastructure companies in the EU.
- Prohibition on the provision of gas storage capacities to Russian legal and physical persons.
- Strengthening provisions against circumventing sanctions. Prohibition of transit of dual-use goods, new obligations regarding reporting, review of all assets of the Russian central bank stored in the EU (for financing the reconstruction of Ukraine).
- Obligation for airlines to report irregular flights to the competent authorities of the EU Member States.
- In addition, the EU's Global Human Rights Regime list includes eight persons and seven organizations involved in the Wagner Group's activities in Ukraine, Libya, Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. In the regime of restrictive measures in connection with the situation in Mali also included a representative of the Wagner Group.

At the same time, the 10th package is adopted on six terms:

- 1) work on sanctions lists against persons responsible for the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia;
- 2) intensification of work on Belarusian sanctions;
- 3) further intensive work on sanctions on the nuclear industry;
- 4) the sanction of diamonds;
- 5) a special mechanism to control the level of diversification of imports of synthetic rubber to the EU (quarterly review). The European Commission will present a document on this mechanism in the coming days; - Sanctions against SUN Ship Management (D) Ltd., which is in the jurisdiction of the UAE (first experience of applying such sanctions);
- 6) the start of the work of the EU and the EEAS on the application of sanctions to 150 Russian propagandists. Listed by Poland.

2. USA

On February 24, 2023 the U.S. State Department announced the introduction of new sanctions against Russia for its war against Ukraine (<https://is.gd/y985ij>), in particular under the full blocking sanctions of the United States:

- More than 60 individuals and legal entities involved in the management of Russia's operations and policy of aggression against Ukraine and the illegal management of the occupied Ukrainian territories in the interests of the Russian Federation (ministers, governors and Russian officials, as well as 6 people and 3 organizations who, acting on occupied territories, were involved in stealing Ukrainian grain);
- 3 companies involved in expanding the production and export of energy in Russia (structures involved in the design and construction of the Nordic Bay terminal in the framework of the Vostok oil projects);
- 4 persons and 22 organizations from the Russian technology sector (producers of software used by Russia for intelligence collection);
- 3 enterprises that develop and exploit Russian nuclear weapons, as well as 3 companies that work in the civil nuclear sector and are affiliated with Rosatom;
- a number of persons involved in the illegal control of Russia over the Ukrainian ZNPP (Zaporozhya nuclear power plant).

The visa restrictions were imposed on 1,200 Russian military personnel, including officers, for actions that threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. The U.S. Department of Commerce has published four decisions imposing additional export restrictions for Russia, Belarus and Iran, as well as for third-country companies.

On February 24, 2023 the U.S. Treasury imposed one of the most powerful sanctions packages against Russia for its war against Ukraine (<https://is.gd/T8uCKo>), which includes a resolution on sanctioning the metallurgical and mining sectors of the Russian Federation economy and imposing sanctions against 22 individuals and 83 legal entities.

The U.S. Treasury Department has announced the adoption, in accordance with the Executive Decree of the President of the United States No. 14024, of a decision concerning the sanctioning of the metallurgical and mining sectors of the Russian economy. This decision allows sanctions to be imposed on any physical or legal person who intends to work or has already acted in this sector of the Russian economy, and also strengthens the ability of competent U.S. authorities to impose additional economic restrictions against Russia. This step supplements existing provisions on sanctions against those who work or have worked in the fields of quantum

computing, accounting, trust management, provision of consular services, aerospace industry, marine industry, electronics, financial services, technology, as well as the defense sector of the Russian Federation economy.

The Ministry of Finance, the Department of Commerce and the State Department of the United States also issued a warning about the impact of sanctions and export control on the military-industrial complex. According to the information of the Ministry of Finance, since February 2022, the U.S. Treasury has imposed more than 2,500 sanctions restrictions against Russia and its supporters, and has also ensured close coordination on the anti-Russian sanctions track with more than 30 partner states.

February 24, 2023 President of the United States J. Biden has imposed (<https://bit.ly/3EvLSsf>) an additional increase in import duties on various goods from Russia in the amount of approximately \$2.8 billion. In particular, tariffs on imports of most types of metal and products from it were increased from 35% to 70%. Customs duties on other Russian goods, including chemicals and minerals, increased to 35%.

In addition, the decision of the President of the United States (<https://bit.ly/3Znf2IH>), starting March 10, 2023, imposes a 200-percent ad-value duty on aluminum from Russia and its products. Starting April 10, 2023, a 200-percent ad-value tariff will be imposed on aluminum products if any amount of aluminum in their composition is of Russian origin.

3. Canada

On February 24, 2023 Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in his address “Supporting Ukraine as long as necessary” announced new sanctions against 129 Russian individuals and 63 legal entities of the Russian Federation in response to the ongoing unprovoked aggression of Russia in Ukraine. Restrictions are imposed on the top leadership of Russian ministries and agencies, including military, members of the Government and the Presidential Administration, Russian deputies of the State Duma, oligarchs and their relatives, including the son of Dmitry Medvedev, the daughter of R. Kadirov, the family of A. Mordasov.

The Canadian sanctions list includes: the political party “Yedinaya Rossiya”; a number of key defence enterprises at scientific research institutions; federal departments – FSB, FSO, the main management of special programs of the President of the Russian Federation, the head of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces, the State Duma, the Soviet of Federations, the Federal service of financial monitoring; Russian companies – JSC “Exploiting organization of Zaporozhye NPP” (Rosatom), the managing company of JSC «Rosneftgaz» (40.4% Rosneft, 10.97% Gazprom,

27.63% Inter RAO). Also prohibited the export to the Russian Federation of a number of chemical elements and compounds (commodity code 3818.00), which are used in the production of electronics, and a complete ban on the import of weapons from Russia.

It was announced that the Canadian petition will counteract the unfair practices to which Russia and Belarus resort in order to artificially underestimate the value of their exports to Canada, since it is subject to an additional 35% tariff from 2022. D. Trudeau noted that the Canadian Border Agency has the appropriate tools to protect Canadian producers from unfair competition due to state distortion of prices for Russian and Belarusian imports.

4. Australia

On the anniversary of the full-scale aggression of the RF against Ukraine, a joint statement was issued by the Prime Minister of Australia E. Albénizzi, Deputy Prime Minister R. Marlz and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia P. Wong on providing military aid to Ukraine and introducing a new package of sanctions against the aggressor state - The new aid package to Ukraine includes the provision of military intelligence drones (for a total of \$23.6 million USA). Sanctions will be imposed on 90 Russian individuals and 40 legal entities. Thus, as of today, Australia has imposed sanctions against more than 1,000 individuals and legal entities of the Russian Federation, and the total amount of military aid is \$ 353.6 million.

5. New Zealand

Minister of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand N. Mahuta on February 24, 2023, announced a new round of sanctions against 87 people, including persons of strategic importance for the Russian Federation and close to President Vladimir Putin, members of the Central Electoral Commission who participated in the organization of illegal referendums in the occupied Russian territories of Ukraine, as well as military personnel who were active in the war. Sanctions are automatically extended to family members and associates of those persons.

6. Japan

On 24.02.2023 during the online meeting of the leaders of the "Group of Seven" countries, which took place with the participation of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky, PM of Japan F. Kishida announced that his country joins the sanctions pressure against the Russian Federation and introduces a new package of sanctions. In particular, it freezes the assets of Russian individuals identified in the list of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, imposes a ban on the export of a certain group of goods that can contribute to the strengthening of the industrial base of Russia, in particular goods related to the production of drones, and also frees the funds of Russian financial

institutions. In addition, the new sanctions package includes a ban on export to the 21st enterprise and the organization of the aggressor country of goods that may contribute to the strengthening of the industrial base of the Russian Federation, in particular regarding the production of UAVs.

7. Great Britain

24 February, 2023 the UK government has announced the approval of a new package of internationally coordinated sanctions and trade measures, which include a ban on exports of all goods that Russia used on the battlefield in Ukraine. In particular, this list includes hundreds of goods – aircraft parts, radio equipment and electronic components that can be used by Russian aircraft, including in the production of UAVs. The sanctions were also introduced against the top managers of Rosatom, as well as the heads of two of Russia's largest defense companies, four banks and other representatives of the Russian elite. According to information from London, Rosatom has deep ties with the Russian military-industrial complex, including related to Alexander Novak, who is also a member of the supervisory council and deputy head of the Russian government. It is that the state-owned company supplied the Russian armed forces with technologies and materials necessary to replenish Russia's needs on the front, including for defense companies that are under sanctions.

The new sanctions package also included four banks (MTS Bank, Bank St. Petersburg, Uralsib, Bank Zenit). This will further isolate Russia from the international financial system and help prevent Russia from imposing sanctions. This package was also aimed at individuals and legal entities involved in ensuring the functioning of Putin's military-industrial complex, in particular:

- 34 managers of different companies, which are associated with the two largest Russian defense companies "Rostech" and "Almaz-Antey" (a state-run Russian company specializing in the production of land-to-air missiles and firearms for aircraft);
- 8 Russian organizations engaged in the production or repair of military equipment for the armed forces of Russia, including aviation and navy (All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics, AT Izumrud, OJSC Elecon Plant, VNYITF, REMBAZA, OY Lom, OO Zvezda, LLC Sokol Plant);
- 5 Iranian senior executives at Qods Aviation Industry, a company that produces drones used against Ukraine.

In addition, Britain has announced new major trade restrictions that will further undermine Russia's military machine and reduce Putin's finances. In addition to the ban on exports of products that Russia used on the battlefield, the UK government also imposed a ban on imports of 140 goods, including iron and steel products that were processed in the third countries. London

also announced the expansion of the existing restrictive measures against the occupied Crimea and the territories uncontrolled by the Ukrainian government in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in order to extend their action to the Russian-occupied areas of the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. This would restrict access to UK trade and financial services.

Sanctions from our partners provide a real lever of influence and increase the isolation of the aggressor in the international arena. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is working systematically with foreign partners in order to strengthen sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

2.3 Russia's reaction to economic sanctions

In the wake of the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as the illegal armed invasion of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014, the Russian Federation would have had to withdraw its troops from Crimea, as stated in the 42nd report of the Ukrainian and EU foreign ministries, but to date they are still there. On the occasion of the 42nd anniversary of the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the resolution "Definition of Aggression", the Russian Federation initiated an unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. Thus, it not only violated the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the country, but also threatened international peace and security as a whole [24, p. 5].

Politicians, diplomats, experts, and scientists are trying to understand why this happened, how a war between "brotherly peoples" could erupt, and what prompted the official Kremlin to become a pretender for the world order of the century? How could Russia, which was the guarantor of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, do so? The safe system of international relations, the system of confrontation and mutual influence, was formed by the leaders of the Great Three countries after the defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. It was based on the division of the central regions of the planet into spheres of influence and of the planets into sphere of influences and introduced a bipolar existence.

The collapse of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union radically changed the geopolitical map of the continent, creating a fundamentally new balance of forces on the planet and proved that history is not once and for all and the conditions of existence of the world system are constantly changing. The realities of the Cold War have been replaced by a messy balance of the post-bipolar planet with fundamentally new challenges, tangible threats and a clearly conflict environment [32 p. 286]. At the same time, there is an euphoria caused by these changes, as noted by O. Sushko, "provoked a traumatic defeat

syndrome on the other side of the geopolitical swallow - in Russia." And the effects were noticed only recently, when the "brother" suddenly came to the "guest" [25].

According to L. Chekalenko the neglect of the previous security system has led to uncontrolled chaos, the destruction of economic potential, human losses, civilizational catastrophe and has dragged Ukraine into a hybrid war. Russian influence came to the forefront, which led to a new round of redistribution of the world. The Russian Federation has benefited from the weakening factor of European security, the deep dependence of European integration on Russian raw resources, the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the continent and the lack of communication, as well as Washington's unrealized geostrategic interests in the Middle East and Africa.

The existence of Ukraine, according to the aggressor, in its borders was "a terrible blow" to Russia's geopolitical security, equivalent to "the occupation of its territory", and therefore "further existence a united Ukraine is unacceptable". According to the Russian Federation, the territory of the latter should be divided into several belts corresponding to geopolitical and ethno-cultural realities. "The Ukrainian problem is the most important and serious problem facing Moscow." [10, p. 32]. It is common knowledge, that Putin believes that Ukraine's independence is something abnormal, temporary, unusual and extraordinary.

At the time, unfortunately, it is unknown what exactly the owner of the White House replied to the Russian leader. Probably he kept diplomatic silence, not wishing to spoil the relationship. And now it is clear that the plays of many world leaders with Putin have fueled his imperial ambitions even more. To a certain extent, this is the line of "eviting sharp angles" in relations with Moscow, which continued at the beginning of the presidency of B. Obama called for a "restart" of relations with Russia in 2009.

According to G. Perepelica, trend of the global system of international relations to multipolarity has created favorable conditions for returning to the Kremlin leaders the status of a global power, without which they cannot imagine the future of their country. The first steps on this path should be the reintegration and full annexation of the post-Soviet space by Russia. "Without Ukraine, it would not make sense to start such a strategic project," - he said [51]. When Ukraine abandoned its reintegration plans and expressed its intention to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, the military scenario became the only way to this strategic goal. The annexation of Crimea unleashed Russia's hands for military occupation of Eastern Ukraine.

Starting this hybrid offensive, the Putin regime pursued a dual global goal: geostrategic – to destroy the existing world order of Western domination on the planet and to return Russia to the

status of a “great state”; geohistorical – to return the world to the realities of the middle of the last century (“spheres of influence”, “struggle systems”, “balance of forces and interests” etc.). That is, the reproduction of the "Cold War" lost by the Soviet Union.

It is also necessary to recognize that a single-polar world has not been formed, but an effective multipolar system has been created. International politics is characterized by a global power vacuum. The United States no longer has enough influence, and sometimes it lacks the will and willingness to solve urgent problems. This makes it difficult to control the world system, and states with geopolitical ambitions are provoking conflicts to reshape the global order of the international hierarchy.

In general, the state of global security system, A. Hrychenko concludes: “The Western Pole, which was not so long ago strong, today is blurred, unconsolidated and ineffective in making global decisions. Decades of peace and prosperity after World War II weakened the West’s vigilance, Western alliances and armed forces became bureaucratized, and the incentive to adequate defense funding decreased, creating the illusion that military aggression could be repelled through negotiations. After all, such a policy is one of the best solutions that negotiations can offer, because it is now clear that the current system of international security is clearly unable to control the situation on the planet and guarantee security.” The Kremlin leaders, however, took full advantage of this duration of time to create a military nuclear power with unpredictable foreign policy. Typically, nuclear weapons are now considered not only as a means of nuclear attack, but also as a way to avoid possible defeat in conventional warfare, and even as a guarantee of sovereignty [34, p. 56].

It is worth stressing that in the course of the exacerbation of the hybrid war the ideological version was increasingly distinguished, the key point of which was the ideology of the "Russian world". According to some authors, on the territory of the former USSR, the ideology of the “Russian world” in reality looks like a special operation to cover up the Kremlin version of the Nazi concept of Lebensraum (living space), that is, the domination of the political system of the Russian Federation, linked to its oligarchic-corruption capital and anti-liberal concept. Its practical embodiment is clearly demonstrated in the example of the annexation of Crimea. The narrating rhetoric of “the rebirth of Russia as a great power”, which “returns its lands”, rather than losing them as it did with M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin, who defends the russians in Ukraine from the “bandero-fascists” and the “Kyiv junta”; Russia, who opposes the crazy pressure and criticism of the hostile West, and other irrational ideologues in its essence – all this has caused a wave of pseudo-patriotic experiences and Crimean euphoria, has provided massive support for the Kremlin leadership by the population of the Russian Federation[28, p. 7].

In March 2014, Europeans woke up in a world of Vladimir Putin, where borders can be changed in an apparent order, international institutions are powerless, economic interdependence becomes a source of danger, and predictability is more a duty than an advantage. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has forced the EU to acknowledge that instead of gradually, literally molecularly spreading across the continent and ultimately across the planet, its idea of European order has collapsed. The postmodernist European order was unexpectedly in the paddock. Just as the collapse of Yugoslavia ended the European order of the Cold War, the Crimean crisis marked the end of the post-Bipolar European order.

On March 18, 2014, in an address to both chambers of the Federal Assembly of the country, the President of the Russian Federation formulated the main theses of "Putin's doctrine" on the occasion of the annexation of Crimea: the balance of power on the planet has changed; the weight of the West in global politics is decreasing; international law is not a dogma but a set of options from which the Kremlin will choose what is advantageous to it; countries are divided into strong and weak; the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the latter are subject to agreements among the strong; it is time for radical changes, Russia is a separate state - a civilization with its unique values that will seek to shape its own rules of the game in international politics.

Later, on December 18 of the same year, V. Putin adopted a new Military Doctrine, which identified the main external threats to the country, including the establishment of regimes in neighboring states whose policies pose a threat to Russia's interests. Thus, official Moscow seeks to "legitimize" possible future territorial expansions at the expense of its neighbors. For example, among the key tasks of the Russian Armed Forces during peacetime is the "protection of citizens outside the Russian Federation from armed aggression against them." Even Russian-speaking citizens residing in distant foreign countries have the right to military protection from the Russian Armed Forces. Consequently, at the official normative and legislative level, the Russian leadership essentially legitimizes the deepening and continuation of military actions in Donbas [15, p. 15]. The armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, as a logical culmination of the revanchist geostrategy meticulously developed by the Kremlin's ruling elite, has exposed the crisis in the contemporary international security system.

Unable to compete globally through economic and political-diplomatic means, H. Perepelitsa noted, that official Moscow, by creating the "Russian world" doctrine, has engaged in the destruction of the world order. As evidence of this, in his opinion, there is the discrediting of practically all international security institutions, the disregard for agreements that formed the foundations of the post-bipolar world: the rejection of the principles of the Final Act signed in Helsinki in 1975 by 35 states, the revision of borders on the continent, the abandonment of the

Belavezha Accords by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus in 1991, which can be interpreted as a refusal to recognize the state sovereignty of post-Soviet countries; the non-acceptance of NATO and EU expansion to the East, the incitement of radical pro-Russian parties in Central and Western Europe, the neutralization of the Visegrád Group by incorporating pro-Russian-oriented countries into it, the gross violation of over 300 international treaties and conventions, the UN Charter, and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and so on. Thus, the current authorities in Russia are seeking to create a situation of global chaos in which they can establish a new order on their own terms and conditions. Consequently, the scenarios for establishing a new world order depend on the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict [13, p. 7]. "This means," he emphasized, "that being caught between the East and the West, Ukraine is at risk of losing its state sovereignty and territorial integrity." The battle for Ukraine will determine the final result of this geopolitical struggle, as the country's integration into either the European or Russian sphere will determine the further expansion of dominance for one of these entities, either to the West or to the East. By annexing Ukraine, Russia can expand its strategic position and exert its geopolitical influence on Central Europe, imposing its normative power on Western Europe. So, contemporary Russia has an historic opportunity to seize its place in Europe, shift the balance of power in its relations with the West, and restructure the entire geopolitical space of Europe in its favor. It aims to reassess the outcomes of the Cold War, reaffirming itself as the dominant force in the geopolitical space of Europe and Eurasia [21, p. 371]. By pointing out that Russian aggression against Ukraine represents the climax and embodiment of the degradation of the global security system, modern authors also emphasize the complexity and multi-level nature of the conflict in and around Ukraine.

In particular, V. Pilipchuk [52] argues that it is necessary to consider not just one, but three different conflicts: a geopolitical conflict (between Russia and the West), a bilateral conflict (between Ukraine and Russia), and an internal Ukrainian conflict, all of which erupted simultaneously in the same territory. According to him, this war is unlike others because it involves a country that had received direct security guarantees from all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, yet still faced external aggression and territorial violations. Additionally, this war unfolds within the framework of European security, which was considered the most stable regional security architecture. Despite the clear inability of the OSCE and other international organizations to halt the conflict, restore peace, and hold the aggressor accountable, key figures on the international stage show no willingness to reconsider the principles of the existing European security architecture, making it more effective and reliable. Moreover, an asymmetric and hybrid conflict is clearly evident in this context.

Russia, as an aggressor and terrorist, publicly denied its involvement in the conflict in 2014, while its actions included both traditional military methods such as territorial annexation and unconventional methods in the political, economic, and informational spheres, as well as terrorism. This comprehensive approach allows us to see it as a classic case of hybrid aggression [31]. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the responsibility for the destruction of the old world order lies not only with Russia but also with Western countries that "missed" the aggression against Ukraine (and in 2008 - against Georgia). According to some reports, the majority of Western media outlets unexpectedly "turned a blind eye" to identifying the aggressor and naming the occupying forces after these events, inventing new terms instead, the only purpose of which was to avoid calling it the Russian aggression of 2014, which it truly was [7].

Strategic and mental unpreparedness of the West towards crisis situations in the security environment can also be explained by underestimating the syndrome of revanchism in Russia and the role of Ukraine in Russian expansionist policies, as well as doubts about how far official Moscow is willing to go in defending what it calls "key interests" of Russia and disbelief that Kremlin leaders would dare to directly use force against neighboring countries. Even the extensive "Serdyukov reforms" carried out in the Russian Armed Forces and the presence of strategic nuclear capabilities were not perceived as factors that could turn Russia into a threat to European collective security. As a result, the US and the EU, demonstrating their complete inability to stop the escalation of the international political conflict in March 2014, mainly took tactical measures throughout the year. These measures primarily involved implementing gradual economic sanctions against Russia to restrain its leadership from escalating the conflict and to persuade them to abide by international law norms. In other words, in a strategic context, the leaders of the US and European countries did not see the Russian aggression against Ukraine as a critical threat to the stability of NATO and the Western alliance system, nor did they exclude the possibility of returning to the previous status quo. As for the refusal of Washington and London to fulfill the guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity according to the Budapest Memorandum, it was initially not considered a political defeat since Ukraine is not a NATO member or a significant US ally outside the scope of the North Atlantic Alliance, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, or Israel, but rather a non-block state [29, p. 18].

So, at the beginning of 2016, the then President of the United States, B. Obama, openly stated that "Ukraine is not a member of NATO, so it will be vulnerable to Russian aggression regardless of what we do." However, in February 2015, Western politicians, reflecting on the events of the first months of the previous year, were forced to acknowledge the following: "During the protests that erupted in early 2014, which ultimately led to the overthrow of the pro-Moscow

government of Viktor Yanukovich, Ukraine became the first country in Europe where protesters were killed while holding EU flags." The West, as many in Kyiv believe, betrayed Ukraine [27, p. 165].

During the period up to 2022 (2014-2022), the concept of addressing the security issues of the Ukrainian state gained increasing popularity within Western and Ukrainian elite circles. Its essence was as follows: official Kyiv de facto recognizes the annexation of Crimea and allows for elections in Donbas before regaining control over the border, which is practically impossible. The border control, which effectively means the reintegration of the occupied territory into Russia, promised the Kremlin "neutrality" or "non-bloc status," a refusal to pursue plans for NATO membership or enter into any binding agreements (as neutrality implies relinquishing a significant part of sovereignty - the right to independently determine allies in the sphere of security and defense). Although, as known, since the spring of 2014, Ukraine has legislatively affirmed its "non-bloc" status and has not officially stated its intentions to become a NATO member in the future. Ukraine was not a member of NATO and had the strongest international legal ties with Russia since the signing of the "Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation" in 1997, which was extended in 2012. However, this did not prevent its northern neighbor from annexing Crimea and initiating an armed invasion in Donbas [12, p. 25]. The prospect of signing a multilateral international treaty that would guarantee Ukraine's security was also questionable, as evidenced by the fate of the aforementioned Budapest Memorandum, which was violated.

Based on the above, I share the following opinion of I. Klympush-Tsintsadze: "The only realistic solution for Ukraine is to accelerate its European and Atlantic integration, with a particular emphasis on NATO membership." The only way to achieve this is through realistic and tangible integration of Ukraine into the European Union with a strong focus on NATO integration. In other words, it involves maximizing alignment with the North Atlantic bloc, adopting its rules, and making NATO membership a medium-term strategic goal [12].

The economic sanctions imposed by the EU and the US following the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine have been effective, but they have also had a negative impact on the economies of Western countries. That is why voices in Europe are calling for their cessation. This is due to the significant economic dependence of some countries on the continent on Russia, as well as the presence of many European companies in its market, which brings substantial revenue to budgets and social programs. This, in turn, enables Kremlin propaganda to influence numerous politicians, public figures, and foreign media outlets to spread the "correct" version of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the aggressor needs to be stopped. Ukraine is not the ultimate goal for Vladimir Putin, just as Czechoslovakia was not the ultimate goal for Hitler.

Imperialists do not have a final goal, especially now that they have a nuclear "button" [14, p. 30]. For Russia, conquering Ukraine is a step towards restructuring the world order in its own interests, a necessary precondition for new aggression against Europe, and an example to intimidate the United States.

Russia is primarily fighting for its own future, but if it achieves victory in this campaign and gains control over Ukraine's resources, Putin will become much more confident and aggressive. Everyone will truly witness a different Russia. The West will only have the opportunity to stop it not at the Siversky Donets or Dnieper, but at the Buh or Vistula, if not at the Oder. And the price for this will be paid not only by Ukrainians but also by Europeans with their lives. That is why it makes much more sense to help Ukraine stop this now. And this should be understood by everyone in Europe and North America [17].

Recent events on the continent confirm that the "hybrid war" as a form of aggressive pursuit of Moscow's geopolitical objectives is not limited to Ukraine and, by modifying its forms, expands to new theaters of conflict. V. Gorbulin, for example, identifies three large-scale "hybrid operations" that share many similarities. To determine Russia's ability to find successful (but strategically incorrect) local solutions, it is necessary to understand that not only Ukraine but also the Baltic countries are within the immediate "hybrid threat" zone [17].

The dangerous feature of the current situation is the blurring of distinctions between external and internal threats. The hybrid war conducted by the Russian Federation in modern interstate conflicts aims to undermine the societies it is directed against and suppress their will to resist. Its central targets are civil society and institutions, and now even the armed forces. Moreover, it exhibits a comprehensive and multidimensional character. Military means can play both a primary and secondary role in this context. Illusions of peace and the active exploitation of societal and state weaknesses and vulnerabilities are important tools in contemporary warfare. Simultaneously, Russian mass media openly discuss scenarios of a potential military clash between Russia and the "aggressive NATO bloc," including the possibility of nuclear weapons being used. In a situation of diminishing leverage through the use of oil and gas, the threat to employ it becomes the most effective tool of official Moscow, through which it blackmails the peoples of the world [1, p. 20].

The issue of hybrid warfare and its consequences was among the key topics discussed at the recent Munich Security Conference, which is considered the most representative and authoritative in the world. Evaluating its outcomes, O. Sushko raised a valid question: "Do we witness a serious understanding by the West of the full spectrum of threats and potential pathways

out of the security crisis, or are we currently experiencing only fear and discomfort, without a clear and realistic action program to expect in the foreseeable future?" [26].

Thus, the Russian military aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated Moscow's disregard for international law, undermined the foundations of the security system, deepened its crisis, and marked the logical culmination of a long-standing "geopolitical revenge" strategy, initiating a new phase of global redistribution.

Conclusions to Chapter 2

The analysis highlights the contradictory nature of the sanctioning procedure and its effectiveness as a means to combat hybrid aggression. From the perspective of long-term macroeconomic impact, the main effects of sanctions are the overall influence on the Russian economy and its qualitative indicators. On the one hand, there is a reassessment of risks for investments and business activities in Russia, and on the other hand, there are the restrictions imposed by sanctions. However, capital outflows were not solely caused by sanctions. In fact, they began a few months before the imposition of sanctions due to a negative economic forecast for Russia as a result of its dependency on oil exports. In a favorable situation where a combination of other factors influencing the behavior of a violator of international "rules of the game" exists, restrictive sanctions can significantly impact the strategic plans of the affected states. An example of this can be seen in the situation related to the construction of the "Nord Stream 2" gas pipeline in Russia. In the long-term perspective, the imposition of sanctions against a particular country is bound to result in technological and economic challenges.

Indeed, it should be noted that the ambiguous formulation of coordinated legislation (under which sanctions are imposed) allows for significant flexibility in the application of specific provisions, depending on the particular sanctions. Therefore, the possibility of manipulating sanction regimes in the context of political agreements between states should not be ruled out.

CONCLUSIONS

An important aspect for Ukraine's victory in the war is the improvement of the policy on the formation and implementation of sanctions. The establishment of an effective sanctions regime requires the coordination of a complex set of issues and factors, which necessitates detailed consideration of various decision-making factors (assessment of goals, vulnerabilities, expected

outcomes), stages of sanction implementation, and monitoring of their application. To ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the sanction's regime, it is critically important to adhere to at least the following conditions:

- Use maximum clarity in the formulation of legal and regulatory acts to avoid alternative interpretations. The absence of clear articulation of the essence of sanction restrictions provides a basis for non-application, avoidance, or abuse of sanctions.

- Sanctions should be aligned with well-defined and achievable political objectives.

- Sanctions should benefit national entities that assist the state in implementing and monitoring the sanction regime. Without the involvement of national entities (individuals and companies), the effectiveness of government authorities will be insufficient.

- Utilize sanctions in conjunction with other instruments, including political, diplomatic, economic, and security measures. Sanctions alone often fail to achieve their intended goals.

- Deepen international cooperation in the application of sanctions against the Russian Federation due to its aggression against Ukraine. Initiating the preparation of a joint memorandum between Ukraine and the EU, affirming the steadfast commitment to enforcing sanctions against Russia until the full restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty and the violated international law.

- Implement organizational and institutional improvements in the process of formulating and implementing sanctions.

- Establish accountability for legal and natural persons who violate, attempt to violate, or conceal violations of sanctions, as well as hold government entities accountable for proposing the application, cancellation, or modification of sanctions in violation of legislation.

- Implement a procedure for granting special permits (licenses) for certain types of activities and operations that are deemed prohibited due to the imposition of sanctions, in cases where they are essential for ensuring Ukraine's national security.

Protecting the national interests of Ukraine requires modernizing approaches to identifying foreign investments in sectors sensitive to national security. However, the introduction of regulatory norms regarding the processes of acquisition, ownership, and control of national assets should not contribute to unfounded protectionism, a decline in investment attractiveness, increased monopolization, and/or the spread of unfair anti-competitive practices.

In this regard, it is advisable to:

- Initiate a review of the issue of defining threats to national security generated by foreign investments in sectors sensitive to national security. Consider the feasibility of establishing an authorized executive body or expanding the powers of existing state agencies responsible for shaping and implementing the state policy on foreign investment, monitoring, and ensuring national security in capital operations.

- Develop methodological recommendations for identifying the list of sectors of economic activity and objects that are sensitive to national security and establish the procedure for informing the responsible state authority about foreign investments in these objects.

- Develop methodological recommendations for determining threshold levels of foreign capital concentration in sectors sensitive to national security in economic activities.

- Develop methodological recommendations for monitoring and implementing the right of ownership for foreign investments whose beneficiaries are included in the list of national sanctions, as well as in sanction lists introduced by the United States, the European Union, and other countries.

- Initiate the preparation of relevant changes to Ukrainian legislation aimed at strengthening control over the impact of foreign investments on Ukraine's national security.

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(UK), Lukoil; Exploration of the Zohr field in the Mediterranean Sea, BP, Eni, Rosneft. Additionally, sanctions do not restrict joint production of complex shale deposits (tight oil), which is currently being pursued by Norwegian Statoil and British BP in cooperation with Rosneft in Russia.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix №1

RTVI interview (29.03.2023)

Russia is open to "proposals for a peaceful settlement," while Ukraine "continues to rely on a military solution to the conflict," said Galuzin (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). According to him, a "comprehensive, fair, and sustainable peace" in Ukraine and Europe is possible under the following conditions:

- cessation of hostilities by Ukrainian armed formations and the supply of weapons by Western countries;
- withdrawal of foreign "mercenaries" from the territory of the state;
- ensuring Ukraine's neutral and non-aligned status;
- abandonment of Ukraine's NATO and EU membership aspirations;
- confirmation of Ukraine's non-nuclear status;
- recognition by Kyiv and the international community of the "new territorial realities."

Appendix №2

Article 41. Chapter 7. Measures in Case of Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.

The United Nations Security Council has the authority to decide which measures, not involving the use of armed force, should be employed to carry out its decisions, and it may call upon Member States to apply these measures. These measures may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations, rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, or other means of communication, as well as the severance of diplomatic relations.

Appendix №3

Проект Закон України Про порядок виконання рішень міжнародних організацій про запровадження санкцій.

Цей законопроект визначає основні засади виконання резолюцій Ради Безпеки ООН та рішень міжнародних організацій про запровадження міжнародно-правових санкцій, які є обов'язковими для України, встановлює повноваження та обов'язки органів державної влади, у зв'язку з необхідністю виконання заборон та обмежень, що містяться в санкційних резолюціях. Розділ 1. Загальні положення Стаття 1. Міжнародно-правові санкції. Міжнародно-правові санкції – це невійськові колективні примусові заходи, що застосовуються міжнародними міжурядовими організаціями до держави, яка порушує норми міжнародного права, з метою змусити її припинити міжнародне правопорушення та відшкодувати заподіяну шкоду. Міжнародно-правові санкції носять тимчасовий характер. Міжнародно-правові санкції не повинні носити більш обмежувальних характер, ніж це визначено резолюціями Ради Безпеки ООН, а також рішеннями міжнародних організацій або їх органів про запровадження санкцій, які є обов'язковими для України. Стаття 2. Сфера застосування Закону. Дія цього Закону поширюється на органи виконавчої влади, інші державні органи та служби, які проводять діяльність пов'язану із забезпеченням виконання обмежень і заборон, встановлених резолюціями Ради Безпеки ООН, рішеннями міжнародних міжурядових організацій, які є обов'язковими для України. Стаття 3. Виконання рішень про запровадження міжнародних санкцій. Діяльність з виконання рішень міжнародних організацій про запровадження міжнародноправових санкцій – це сукупність дій органів і посадових осіб, визначених у цьому Законі, що спрямовані на виконання рішень міжнародних міжурядових організацій про запровадження примусових заходів, які проводяться на підставах, в межах повноважень та у спосіб, визначених цим Законом, іншими нормативно-правовими актами, прийнятими відповідно до цього Закону та інших Законів. Стаття 4. Основні принципи виконання рішень міжнародних організацій про застосування санкцій. Виконання рішень міжнародних організацій про запровадження санкцій ґрунтується на принципах: 1) верховенства права; 2) законності; 3) гласності; 242 4) об'єктивності, 5) комплексного здійснення правових, політичних, соціально-економічних, інформаційних та інших заходів; 6) відкритості та прозорості діяльності органів виконавчої влади, інші державні органи та служби, які проводять діяльність з виконання санкцій; 7) обов'язковості виконання рішень міжнародних організацій про застосування міжнародноправових санкцій. Стаття 5. Правова основа застосування міжнародно-правових санкцій. Правову основу виконання резолюцій Ради Безпеки ООН та рішень міжнародних організацій про запровадження міжнародних санкцій становлять Конституція України, загальновизнані принципи і норми

міжнародного права, міжнародні договори України, згода на обов'язковість яких надана Верховною Радою України, закони України, нормативні акти Президента України, Кабінету Міністрів України, рішення Ради національної безпеки та оборони України, а також прийняті на їх виконання нормативно-правові акти. Порядок запровадження контрзаходів, інших обмежувальних односторонніх заходів Україною до іншої держави регулюються Законом України «Про санкції». Розділ 2. Органи державного регулювання у сфері виконання санкцій міжнародних організацій

Стаття 6. Органи державного регулювання в сфері виконання рішень про застосування міжнародних санкцій

Органами державного регулювання в сфері виконання рішень про застосування санкцій є Верховна Рада України, Президент України, Кабінет Міністрів України, центральні органи виконавчої влади та органи державного управління, правоохоронні органи у межах своєї компетенції у відповідності із законами України.

Стаття 7. Верховна Рада України. Найвищим органом, що здійснює державне регулювання в сфері виконання рішень про застосування міжнародних санкцій, є Верховна Рада України. До повноважень Верховної Ради України належить: - прийняття, зміна та скасування законів, що стосуються міжнародно-правових санкцій; - розгляд, затвердження та зміна структури органів державного регулювання в сфері виконання рішень про застосування міжнародних санкцій; - приведення у відповідність законодавства України з міжнародними договорами України відповідно до законів України про міжнародні договори України та приведення законодавства України у відповідність з правилами, встановленими цими договорами; - здійснення контролю за діяльністю Кабінету Міністрів України відповідно до Конституції та закону; - здійснює інші повноваження, визначені Конституцією та законами України.


Стаття 8. Президент України. Президент України: - представляє державу в міжнародних відносинах, здійснює керівництво зовнішньополітичною діяльністю держави, веде переговори та укладає міжнародні договори України; 243 - призначає та звільняє глав дипломатичних представництв України в інших державах і при міжнародних організаціях; приймає вірчі і відкличні грамоти дипломатичних представників іноземних держав; - спрямовує і координує роботу органів державного регулювання в сфері виконання резолюцій Ради Безпеки ООН та рішень міжнародних організацій про застосування санкцій; - здійснює контроль при виконанні резолюцій Ради Безпеки ООН та рішень міжнародних організацій про застосування санкцій; - здійснює інші повноваження, визначені Конституцією та законами України.

Стаття 9. Кабінет Міністрів України. Кабінет Міністрів України: - забезпечує виконання рішень міжнародних організацій з питань запровадження санкцій, які є обов'язковими для України; - приймає постанови про виконання рішень міжнародних організацій про застосування міжнародних санкцій, які є обов'язковими на всій території України центральними та місцевими органами виконавчої влади, органами місцевого самоврядування, підприємствами, установами, організаціями та

фізичними особами, визначає строки введення санкційних обмежень та заборон, ухвалює рішення про припинення застосування санкцій; - забезпечує реалізацію державної політики в галузі державного експортного контролю, зовнішньоекономічної діяльності, протидії легалізації доходів, одержаних злочинним шляхом, фінансуванню тероризму та фінансуванню розповсюдження зброї масового знищення; - приймає акти нормативного характеру про порядок виконання певних видів міжнародноправових санкцій. - затвердження списків товарів і послуг, експорт яких з території України забороняється або обмежується у межах виконання рішень міжнародних організацій про застосування санкцій. - спрямовує і координує роботу міністерств та інших центральних органів виконавчої влади, які забезпечують проведення державної політики з виконання міжнародно-правових санкцій - здійснює інші повноваження, визначені Конституцією та законами України. Стаття 10. Центральний орган виконавчої влади з формування та забезпечення реалізації державної політики у сфері зовнішньої політики України. Центральний орган виконавчої влади у формуванні та забезпеченні реалізації державної політики у сфері зовнішніх відносин України: - організовує та координує діяльність органів що здійснюють державне регулювання в сфері виконання рішень про застосування міжнародних санкцій; - здійснює загальний нагляд за виконанням рішень про застосування міжнародних санкцій, узагальнює стан їх виконання, вносить пропозиції щодо вдосконалення цієї діяльності; - здійснює методичне керівництво з організації діяльності, спрямованої на виконання санкційних рішень міжнародних організацій; - здійснює контроль за додержанням вимог рішень міжнародних організацій про застосування санкцій; - інформує президента України Кабінет Міністрів України та відповідні міжнародні організації про стан виконання санкційних обмежень та заборон; - забезпечити ведення оперативного обміну інформацією між Комітетом та державними органами; - здійснює інші повноваження, визначені законами України. Стаття 11. Національний банк України Національний банк України: 244 - здійснює державне регулювання та нагляд у сфері банківської діяльності із заморожування банківських активів іноземних держав, суб'єктів господарської діяльності, фізичних осіб за рішеннями міжнародних організацій, заборону здійснення банківських платежів та інших фінансових заборон і обмежень, встановлених резолюціями про запровадження санкцій; - вживає заходів до виконання банками заходів, спрямованих на ідентифікацію клієнтів та поглибленого вивчення і аналізу відповідності фінансових операцій змісту їх діяльності та фінансового стану. - аналізує стан виконання банками запроваджених міжнародними організаціями заборон і обмежень у банківсько-фінансовій сфері - здійснює контроль за виконанням банківськими установами санкційних обмежень - здійснює державне регулювання та нагляд у сфері банківської діяльності щодо запобігання та протидії легалізації (відмиванню) доходів

одержаних злочинним шляхом, фінансуванню тероризму та розповсюдження зброї масового знищення. - здійснює інші повноваження, визначені законами України. Стаття 12. Центральний орган виконавчої влади із забезпечення реалізації державної політики економічного розвитку і торгівлі. Центральний орган виконавчої влади із забезпечення реалізації державної політики економічного розвитку і торгівлі: - забезпечує реалізацію державної політики щодо забезпечення виконання рішень міжнародних організацій про застосування торгового ембарго на експорт товарів, передача яких не підлягає державному експортному контролю; - розробляє проекти номенклатури товарів заборонених до ввезення в Україну з держави, щодо якої застосовано санкції та подає їх на розгляд Кабінету Міністрів України; - розробляє проекти номенклатури товарів заборонених до вивезення з України до держави, щодо якої застосовано санкції та подає їх на розгляд Кабінету міністрів України; - видає нормативні акти з питань виконання примусових заходів щодо експорту (імпорту) з території України товарів, переміщення яких обмежено у відповідності з рішеннями міжнародних організацій про застосування санкцій. - здійснює інші повноваження, визначені законами України. Стаття 13. Центральний орган виконавчої влади з формування та забезпечення державної фінансової політики Центральний орган виконавчої влади з формування та забезпечення реалізації державної фінансової політики: - забезпечує формування та реалізацію державної політики у сфері державного фінансового контролю, запобігання і протидії легалізації доходів, одержаних злочинним шляхом, фінансуванню тероризму, виконанню рішень міжнародних організацій із запровадження фінансових санкцій у вигляді заморожування активів, блокування платежів та інших фінансових заборон і обмежень, встановлених резолюціями про запровадження санкцій; - розробляє проекти законів та інших нормативно-правих актів з питань регулювання державного фінансового контролю та фінансового моніторингу, у сфері виконання обмежень у фінансово-банківській сфері, а також у сфері запобігання і протидії легалізації (відмиванню) доходів, одержаних злочинним шляхом, або фінансуванню тероризму; - здійснює регулювання і нагляд у сфері запобігання та протидії легалізації (відмиванню) доходів, одержаних злочинним шляхом, або фінансуванню тероризму, виконання фінансових санкцій міжнародних організацій в межах повноважень.

Appendix №4



<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/>

Appendix №5

