provisions) in a variety of ecological, energy, and environmental domains which could include taxes for support. In addition, a single land tax which does not fuel real estate speculation and the inordinate development of a rentier society (Henry George) was also viewed as important for a more "just" society.

- Currently, Sikkim, a state in India, primarily Buddhist, is considering a guaranteed annual income, and farmers in a province in south India are weighing a cash grant.
- Andrew Yang, a current USA presidential candidate, has a campaign that centers around what he calls "UBI" (Universal Basic Income for all). In the context of explaining the philosophy on his website, he evokes the name of a certain "Founding Father":

The idea of guaranteeing eve"' citizen an income from the government is an old one, *first recorded during the Renaissance. In America, it was picked up by founding father Thomas Paine, who referred to the payments as a "natural inheritance. "* If you are interested in reading about his ideas on UBI, a full rundown can be found here:

https://www.yang2020.com/what-is-ubi/

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THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE FUTURE

by Raghavan N. Iyer

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The central assumption of this paper is the possible provision of a guaranteed annual income (or its equivalent in goods and services) to every American citizen in the abundant economy of the foreseeable future. The main purpose of the paper will be to indicate some of the drastic implications of this proposal for social theory and contemporary values, and for a more daring vision of the future than is now commonly contemplated.

It is hardly surprising that the proposal to provide a guaranteed annual income (GAI) to all is seen by critics and champions alike as a revolutionary act in itself. If nothing else were done (which is inconceivable) , the enactment of such a proposal would alone be a primary factor in changing the way in which the social structure would give form and direction to the universal human urge for fulfillment. The unprecedented divorce between basic income and work, and between involuntary work and survival, will have repercussions on the level of income distribution, attitudes to work, social differentiation, social stratification, occupational ranking, the definition of success and failure, and the possibilities of fulfillment in an affluent society with an abundant economy, a mass consumer culture, and a federal system of representative democracy. All these repercussions – economic, social, political, and ethical – will be too uncertain and unpredictable, too chaotic and complex, to be adequately handled by any computer or master-planner or committee of social engineers. What is certain is that they will produce a change in the social structure so radical that it cannot come about without a transitional period of social disorganization and increased anomie. In other words, even if the eventual outcome is a Golden Age in which there is a new and stable social structure uniquely conducive to universal and unparalleled human fulfillment, it is diffi-cult to weigh the high cost in human suffering, waste, and frustration against the unearned gains to a future generation of inheritors of an unforeseeable (and therefore unintended) utopia.

The fact that the GAI proposal does not make practical sense on its own merely illustrates an easily forgotten truth. The guarantee of income (or of material goods) cannot guarantee anything else that we may desire, but it draws attention to an array of possibilities that we tend to overlook in conventional appraisals of the available means in relation to elusive ends. The more we reflect calmly on the GAI proposal, the more we discern its dual impact on our minds. It is both a dynamite to mental inertia and a stimulus to our creative imagination. It heightens our awareness of dangerous trends and illusions already visible in this country, and it reminds us of the awesome prospect of the imminence of 1984 in some technocratic blueprints for the day after tomorrow. An automated economy could be an authoritarian nightmare if central control were to fall into the hands of power-hungry experts whose manipulative skills include the art of arousing emotion through the deceptive rhetoric of freedom or welfare (conservative or radical), while catering to the insatiable demands of mass consumption in the name of "happiness." The nightmare is aggravated by

the thought of increasing coercion (or subtle pressure) in the use of pills and drugs to modify the genetic inheritance and emotional responses of human beings.

The nightmare is frightening, but it must be dispelled. A technological utopia is indeed a denial of freedom if every man is made to carry out the function for which he is best qualified by order of an enlightened despot or a committee of benevolent experts. It may also be true, as Samuel Butler warned in Erewhon, that the mass of mankind will acquiesce in any arrangement that gives them better food and clothing at a cheaper rate. It is further obvious that even if the individual's lot matches his biological needs better after the "second industrial revolution" than after the first, this would not make the worker master of his job to any greater extent if there is no real change in the conditions in which jobs are created and distributed. The optimum use of individual capacities need not mitigate natural or social inequalities, it could easily sacrifice freedom to efficiency, and it might well augment "man's grovelling preference for his material over his spiritual interests." Above all, the masses who give power to clever technicians (the New Barbarians, as Shaw called them) are in real danger of finding themselves dominated by them because they need them.

All these dangers are real – they are possible and even probable in a purely technological cornucopia. But the nightmare misleads us precisely in our feeling that we are helpless, that what is possible and probable is inevitable, that the technological utopia is historically determined and rules out any alternative vision of a feasible future. If we are frightened, what are we really afraid of – the machinations of a few men, the superhuman capacities of man-made machines, the mediocrity and conformity and materialism of the masses in an affluent society, or the lack of an adequate social philosophy or political wisdom in a representative democracy? Or, are we afraid only of ourselves? Are we convinced that there is nothing we can do about our fears? Do we despair of our capacity of exercising constructive imagination? Are we doubters of dreams and visions and believers only in nightmares?

Mechanistic concepts are immensely tempting in an industrial society and they could be used to distort human consciousness. If all specifiable tasks for human beings can be reduced to routine movements which a machine can perform, engineers may lead us to the non sequitur that anything a man can do a machine can do. Computer experts may be able to use the techniques of formal logic, but they do not necessarily think more clearly or less illogically than other men. The cleverest men may overlook

an elementary point in modal logic: that there is something they are not clever enough to do. (Either they can tie a knot that they cannot untie, or they cannot. Either way, there is something that they cannot do!) The technologist is neither a god nor a devil, nor even a man who is the sole purveyor of mechanistic concepts. As longas the control of the apparatus in modern industrial society (which limits consciousness) requires free agents, rational discourse cannot be wholly eliminated.

If we can respond to the GAI proposal merely with negative rather than positive emotions, with nightmares to the exclusion of noble visions, we may be reluctant prisoners of a secular fatalism and a technological determinism that have theoretical as well as practical roots. The doctrine of inevitable, unilinear progress has enhanced our collective self-image (maintained by essentially nationalistic ideologies, conservative or radical) but flattened our individual ideals of self-fulfillment and narrowed our practical range of vision of human potentialities. There is always a logical gap between a descriptive account of the impact of technology on the social structure and an evaluative appraisal of either or both in terms of criteria of human fulfillment. This gap may be bridged in social theory and in human life by assuming in advance that we can know and predict contingent connections between changes in the human capacities. This is a plausible assumption and the mainspring of much that is admirable in the quest for collective self-improvement. But this assumption is dangerous when it is elevated into a dogma and may blind us to the lessons of contemporary history. The important thing is to judge every proposal for technical change or social improvement in terms of criteria of human fulfillment.

Any social structure gives form and some continuity to the range of possibilities of human growth and fulfillment. Every social system can be appraised (though appraisals are not final and infallible judgments) in terms of human growth and fulfillment. A social structure can promote or retard or pervert human growth, according to internally shared or externally held criteria. It is also a contingent truth that remarkable individuals arise from time to time who transcend the limitations of their social situation and enrich our concept of human excellence. Democratic theory requires us to view any social structure in terms of the opportunities for growth for the many rather than the attainments of a few. It is majoritarian and also egalitarian (at least in a minimal sense). But there have been high cultures—high in the display of human excellence—which were unashamedly undemocratic. They tended to have stable and hierarchical social structures, in which men could identify with and even

profit from the cultural attainments of the few. Modern democratic societies seek to appropriate the excellence of the hierarchical societies and rich cultures of antiquity. This attempt can never wholly succeed and sometimes vulgarizes borrowed standards and concepts of excellence. A culturally developed society shows contempt for a less mature society even if it is more democratic, egalitarian, and affluent. The latter protects itself by caricaturing the former.

Hierarchical social structures are justifiable only in relation to a consensus of belief regarding the structure of reality and of a constant human nature, and the mirroring of a transcendent structure in the social system. Their internal stability depends upon the effective maintenance of the consensus of beliefs and values and the reasonable relevance of role performance to ideal expectations. As this cannot be indefinitely maintained (though the longevity and attainments of some hierarchical societies is amazing), high cultures decay and their hierarchical social systems are ripe for revolution or radical reform if they are to survive. Egalitarian social structures can be justified not only in terms of equality but also in terms of freedom; they are more difficult to admire in terms of the criteria of human solidarity and of human excellence. They may make considerable advance on the basis of a seeming consensus of belief in current theories ("scientific" in different degrees and senses) regarding the structure of reality and of human nature. But their real strength lies in the extent to which an open view of human nature anddiverse world-views and dialogue between men of varied beliefs are maintained. This requires an appropriate social structure and political system.

If we can decide on a hierarchy of needs and/or of values, an egalitarian social structure can be judged both in terms of common and minimal needs and of the spread of standards and the attainment of human excellence. However, if we agree to be more agnostic about human needs and human possibilities, if we regard human nature as always indeterminate (or our knowledge of its limits as inevitably inconclusive), we have a new criterion for appraising changes in the social structure in relation to the multiple criteria of human fulfillment. The changes in social structure that are envisaged in connection with the GAI proposal must be estimated not only in terms of these multiple criteria but also in relation to the actual pursuit of diverse ideals of human growth and excellence. The important thing about the idea of perfectibility is in the quest for it, its stimulus to indefinite growth.

Society's judgments of success and failure are pretentious if they are more than provisional, and they may even be irrelevant to a man's inward

vision of growth and fulfillment. The ideal of fraternity implies the capacity and need in individuals to identify with the achievements of other men and to show an uncondescending compassion for the weaknesses and failures of others. The meaning of education is the unfolding in individuals of the capacity to choose effectively, to set themselves the highest standards of excellence, to exemplify tolerance and civility in relation to others, to empathize with the achievements and failures of men everywhere, and to see life as a process of continuous self-education.

A social system that is entirely based on the above considerations is truly utopian, but the justification of its ruling principles is no more difficult than of the ethical and social principles underlying the GAI proposal. The paradoxical and unpleasant corollary of all this may be that the very nation which is economically and technically capable of implementing the GAI proposal is culturally and ethically unprepared for a utopia based on similar principles. Can a conformist, success-oriented, competitive, culturally immature society deserve a sudden jump from mature capitalism to a technocratic and democratic utopia? Is this society of largely self-made men merely a distorting mirror of the repressed ambitions and muffled vulgarities of the world's proletariat?

The problem may be put in this way. The wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world is the poorest in what was supremely precious to the highest cultures of classical antiquity and the renaissances of world history—the availability of time for thought and contemplation, for relaxation and creative (time-taking) work, for conversation and study, for love and friendship, for the enjoyment of the arts and the beauties of nature, for solitude and communion, for doubts and dreams, and for much else—for indolence and excellence, for salons and coffee-houses and the market-place, for laughter and tears, for poetry and philosophy, for song and dance and worship, for birds and beasts, for sleep and convalescence, for birth and death, time to live and enough time to dwell on eternity. Can the mere availability of more time teach the most time-saving society in history how to spend time and how to transcend it and how to appreciate timelessness?

If the greatest souls from the largely forgotten cultures of antiquity were suddenly to descend upon the contemporary American scene, they would not, I think, grudge this country its golden opportunities for ushering in a better future for itself and for the world of mankind. They might freely concede that their own societies gave too much to too few and not nearly enough to too many. They might say that this country has already given more to instruct minds and to nourish bodies in larger

numbers than any previous nation in recorded history. For this reason alone, this great republic deserves all its golden opportunities for truly enriching the lives of Americans and educating them in the varied ways of inspiring and serving the rest of mankind. But, in order to plan and prepare for the future, we must not shrink from calling things in the present by their proper names and learning all we can from the past. We must be deaf to the contemporary Voice of America at least for a while if we are to learn from the highest cultures of antiquity and listen to earlier voices in American history. We could especially benefit from Edward Bellamy, perhaps the boldest social prophet of the modern age, a latter-day child of the Enlightenment and student of ancient philosophies, a visionary whose chief work was a best-seller for decades and who is strangely neglected in his own country at the very time when he is most relevant.

In his remarkable essay, written at 24, on "The Religion of Solidarity," in his unpublished manuscripts, and in several of his romantic stories, Edward Bellamy gave intuitive expression to a philosophy and psychology of man that are worthy of study. His understanding of human nature, of the burden of guilt and the connection between the quality of motive and the degree of fulfillment in human action, the tension between self-love and self-hatred, was profounder than that of the philosophes of the Enlightenment. His inversion of Calvinist theology and psychology enabled him to detach the moral appeal of Christianity from the Protestant ethic of capitalism. His view of man found place both for the vita contemplativa and for the vita activa, and he had a larger vision of human fulfillment than Marx and Freud. He understood what was overlooked by these titanic iconoclasts but was known to the noblest and humblest of men—the divine discontent, the urge for self-transcendence in human nature. Bellamy helps us to see the connection between "alienation" and "repression," a "restlessness" that lies behind and beyond the very real truths embodied in the concepts of "alienation" and "repression," that cannot be wholly reduced to either of these concepts.

Looking Backward and Equality portray a daring vision of social transformation. Bellamy's conception of the society of the future was not based upon any single, supreme criterion of human fulfillment in relation to the social structure – social justice, equality, communal welfare, individual freedom, or even human solidarity. He was concerned with all of these and much more, because of his acceptance of the complexity, richness, and creativity of human nature, its capacity for self-expression as well as self-transcendence. He cared more for selfless romantic love and for human relationships and for communion with nature than those modern

thinkers who have socialism or anarchism or communism in their brains, but only anger (however righteous) or resentment or meanness or pride or even self-hatred in their hearts. He combined the compassion of some of the English utopian socialists with the stress on a rational reorganization of society that characterized the French philosophes and also with the immense concern for individual freedom and human diversity of Constant and Mill. He was a prophet without anger, a thinker without disciples, a dreamer who was sane, a poetic philanthropist. He was American to the core—adventurous, somewhat plebeian, charmingly naive at times, an autodidact, forward-looking, a man who deeply cared about the practical realization of universal brotherhood.

The fatal flaw of Bellamy's vision was his blurring of the distinction between reason, in the classical sense, and rationality as a principle of organization; hence, his heavy reliance on the machinery and bureaucracy of centralized authority, his emphasis on efficiency and formal regulation, his belief that ethical criteria provide rules of reasonableness that could be properly applied and justly enforced by institutions. He had a nineteenth century notion of public service and could not foresee the stark political irrationality of the twentieth century.

Despite this central flaw of his detailed picture of social organization (which is the flaw of most social theories since Saint-Simon), Bellamy has a unique relevance to our attempt to envisage the American social structure of the future. There is an unresolved gap between his philosophical insights into human nature, emphasizing willing self-transcendence as the key to self-actualization, and his sociological emphasis on external organization and formal regulation, on inducing cooperation in an industrial army, on the externalization of the hierarchical principle in a social system with economic equality and the ethic of solidarity. But we can still learn from his distinctive concern with the correspondence of the social structure (through the universal provision of opportunities) and the spread of new norms reflecting a concept of human nature that seeks external expression as well as inward fulfillment. He sought to strip the government of its glamour and reduce it to a service organization, to make the basic economic needs independent of competitive striving so that work can become creative rather than burdensome; emulation is directed toward non-material ends, and men find the inward freedom that reinforces social solidarity and also transcends it. His method was sound, moving from criteria of human fulfillment to social principles and norms and then visualizing the social structure and the institutional set-up.

This is not the place for a detailed consideration of Bellamy. Suffice it to say that a revival of interest in his writings is overdue – his philosophical insights and his sociological illusions are alike suggestive.

We are now ready to exercise our own imaginations in regard to the social structure of the future. I make bold to suggest a complete reversal, or radical modification, of several assumptions that we have hitherto taken for granted. This will give us some of the ruling principles—or rather what Coleridge called "saving principles"–in terms of which we could visualize and initiate the institutional changes that are needed. My concern in this paper is with the ruling principles rather than specific institutional changes.

Frustration and fulfillment are relative terms. They are largely connected with the gap between expectations and their realization. An individual could decrease the gap either by lowering the level of his expectations or his standards of achievement, or both. He could endure the gap by evading it – by deluding himself as to the extent of his achievements or by becoming indifferent to past expectations or to present and future achievements. He could be humiliated or spurred on by the fact of the gap, by his estimate of it at any given time, and by the constancy or growth of the gap. All this depends upon his self-image, his own conception of himself in relation to others, his level of self-awareness, his concern with self-actualization, and his capacity for self-expression and self-transcendence, as well as his powers of self-correction, his spatial and temporal perspective.

As society is the mirror in which a man sees himself, and as no man lives in a historical or social or cultural vacuum, the gap itself and the factors affecting it will all be affected by his social situation, his multiple roles, his occupation, his wealth and status, inherited, borrowed, and prevailing concepts of human nature, human excellence, of success and failure. The more he is affected by the factors within his power and determined by himself, the more of an individual a man is. The more varied, flexible, and changing a man's expectations and criteria of achievement, the richer he will be as a person, and the more capable of a variety of meaningful relationships with others. The more he is affected by external factors within his own society, the more he will be conditioned by it and the less capable of transcending it. The wider his vision of human excellence, the greater his access to other cultures in time and in space, the more universal a man he will be, the less conditioned by his own society, and, therefore, the more of an individual he is likely to become. But, in every case, he cannot be indifferent to those around him and to the values

and judgments of his own society without becoming anti-social and even anti-human. Social judgments, when reasonably just, must be somewhat relevant to him if he is not to become a total heretic or hermit and risk the danger of becoming egocentric and losing touch with reality (social and human). The more he can modify social values, the more he can maintain and incarnate them, the more heroic or iconoclastic or conservative or exemplary will be his role as a member of his society.

In a mature society (in which the proportion and importance of "individuals" is high and increasing) , a man will come to be judged more by the standards he sets himself (and others) than those external to him, though there must be some sort of optimal relation between his internal and external standards. Excellence in society is determined by a variety of factors, but it is both shaped by and exemplified in its heroes and saints, its philosophers, artists, and scientists, its craftsmen and innovators, its carriers of creative achievement as well as exemplars in the art of living. A society may be judged not only by its excellence but also by the opportunities it offers to all men to benefit from and emulate its excellence, the conditions of work it provides, the area and freedom of individual choice, the mitigation of social inequalities, the measure of social sympathy, the peaceful resolution of disagreements, the tolerance of diversity, the treatment of nonconformity in rebels, eccentrics, deviants, and delinquents, the impact of society's criteria of success and failure upon the strong and the weak, the restraints on its power-holders and the degree of participation of citizens in all policymaking, its reliance on persuasion rather than coercion, its stimulus to fulfillment, and its mitigation of the burden of frustration.

Given this very broad perspective, what ruling principles should govern the social structure of the future in a republic that has enacted the guaranteed annual income proposal?

First of all, we must re-examine the established tie-up between division of labor, multiple roles, social differentiation, and occupational ranking, distribution of income, property, and power, and social stratification, status-seeking, and social mobility. There are three sets of factors here (which I shall designate alpha, beta, and gamma) that determine the social structure through their interrelationship. The alpha factors are deeply embedded in the very notion of a complex society and are logically inseparable from the concept of an industrial society. The beta factors are institutionalized and self-sustaining (or self-perpetuating) unless modified by deliberate acts of policy and to some extent by private initiative and social interaction. It is possible to give a descriptive account

of the alpha and beta factors. The gamma factors introduce a shift from the empirical to the evaluative, although empirical indices could be found for them. They will always be dependent upon the internalization of social norms and upon individual valuation of these norms, as well as of their external signs and practical consequences. There is no reason, in principle, why the beta factors should be seen as the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the alpha factors, still less as the sufficient conditions for the determination of the gamma factors. The alpha factors underline the fact of diversity in society, that individuals are different and do different things and contribute differently to society. The beta factors indicate the inequality of conditions and opportunities available to different individuals. The gamma factors result in a more or less rigid, stronger or weaker, form of the hierarchical principle rooted in human tendencies toward externalization.

Durkheim, in his classic treatment of division of labor, pointed out that there exists in the mores of every society (conscience des sociétés) an imprecise notion of what the various social functions are worth, of the relative remuneration due each of them, and, consequently, the degree of comfort appropriate to the average worker in each occupation. The various functions are ranked by public opinion into a sort of hierarchy, and a certain coefficient of welfare is assigned to each according to the place it occupies in the hierarchy. There is, as a result, a very real set of rules that establishes the maximum standard of living each class of functionaries may legitimately seek to attain. The scale changes as the total social income grows or diminishes, and in accordance with the changes that occur in the mores of the society.

Under the pressure of social norms, each person in his own orbit takes account in a general way of the extreme point to which his ambitions may go and aspires to nothing beyond it. If he respects the social ruling and submits to group authority, he is well "adjusted" to his station in life and a limit is thus marked out for his desires and wants. He may try to embellish or improve his life, but these attempts may fail without leaving him despondent. The equilibrium of his happiness is stable because it is determinate. However, it would not be sufficient that everyone accept as equitable the hierarchy of functions set up by the mores if he did not also consider equally equitable the manner in which the individuals who are to perform these functions are recruited. If each person began life with the same resources, if the competitive struggle is joined under conditions of equality, no one could consider the results of the struggle unjust. The closer we approach to that ideal equality, the less necessary social control

will be. But this is only a question of degree as natural endowments may (or will) be unequal.

Modern industrial societies have shown that the determination of the gamma factors by the beta factors is not as logical or as satisfactory (in terms of equality, equity, or coercion) as Durkheim suggested. The beta factors, so far from being merely a secondary consequence of social differentiation, have assumed a primary role in determining the gamma factors and have distorted the principle of human solidarity that is compatible with the alpha factors alone. We further tend to associate inequalities of social rank (a gamma factor) with people's occupational position (a beta factor) . It is this correlation which could be affected sufficiently by the GAI proposal (if several other things were done), so that the beta factors ceased to be the crucial link or intermediate agency between the alpha and the gamma fac-

tors. Furthermore, among the beta factors, the importance of occupational ranking as the determinant (through the market value of the required qualifications) of the unequal distribution of income, prestige, and power could also be affected by GAI.

By undermining the importance of the beta factors (through social policies accompanying GAI, especially in relation to conditions of voluntary work, attitudes to work, and the social norms engendered by education), a revolutionary change could result in the social structure of the future. This is especially because social stratification is always a rank order in terms of "prestige" and not of "esteem," a rank order of positions that cannot be thought of independently of their individual incumbents. It is social norms that mediate between individual attitudes (partly governed by sanctions) and the inequality of social positions, i.e., the degree of social stratification. The full implications of the reversal or modification of these current attitudes will only become evident when I have put forward the following ruling principles:

The second reversal, or modification, of something we take for granted (in all societies, past and present) is just as revolutionary as the first, though it is less dependent on the GAI proposal as such.

We have taken for granted that human life must be seen as a succession of stages, corresponding to somewhat arbitrary divisions of physical growth and decay, marked by exclusive concentration on distinct activities — education, productivity, and retirement. Education is seen as the preparation for a vocation, especially in an industrial society with increasing specialization. In an action-oriented and success-obsessed culture, retirement is regarded as a state of uselessness, indolence, senility,

loneliness. The accent on youth makes the plight of the aged a generally intolerable and inhuman condition, made more pathetic by nostalgia and the pretense of rejuvenation. The emphasis on productivity, and its identification with economic activity or some tedious labor, distorts the very meaning of education. No wonder there is no meaningful use of leisure but, on the contrary, a dread of solitude, while the emphasis on gregariousness perverts the concept of play as well as of love and friendship.

In place of the succession principle I recommend the principle of simultaneity of pursuit of education, work, leisure, during the whole of a man's life in the new society. With the introduction of GAI, work would become voluntary, training for and enjoyment of leisure a continuous activity linked with a philosophy of life-long education. There must, of course, be differences of emphasis in the kind of education or work or leisure activity, and there may also be some flexibility in regard to the proportions of these three modes of activity (though ideally they should merge into each other) in successive periods of human life.

Paradoxically, I think that the simultaneity principle will better subserve one of Bellamy's philosophical insights than the succession principle, with which he combined it. The latter generates that false continuity through identification with the personal ego rather than the individualizing self which Bellamy was concerned to attack on epistemological and ethical grounds. Bellamy drew important social corollaries from his view that the individual is a composite of many persons, not one—the abandonment of the retributive theory of punishment (which is a welcome contemporary trend) and the danger of a man binding his future selves by pledges that he is in no position to take (this would be true of some pledges and not of others—a fruitful subject of inquiry) .

Third, theories of society, and the structures implied or recommended by them, have tended to take for granted that there is in every man a fixed quantum of energy, a finite potential, which must be distributed economically in different directions, possibly according to some marginal principle of diminishing returns (in terms of tangible rewards or psychic satisfactions), or according to some specific theory of balance and integration. This principle dies hard. It is logically connected with a closed view of human nature, the notion of man as an unchanging essence governed by known and knowable laws.

This view of the finitude, scarcity, and fixity of human energy and potentiality, of the human being in relation to finite space and finite time,

with an unalterably finite mind, is easily used to support the principle of specialization in economic and educational terms and rigid schemes of social differentiation. It makes more plausible the shift to social stratification and the need for a centralized authority responsible for a rational (i.e., efficient and equitable) allocation of functions. This theory, which is Aristotelian in origin and was reinforced by the sharp Judaeo-Christian contrast between man and God and used by Hobbes to justify the subordination of the individual to the State, was explicitly stated by the physiologist Bichat and powerfully influenced the social thought of Saint-Simon, and has been revived in the niggardly views of man of some contemporary psychologists.

My open view of human nature requires me to reject this view of man as philosophically vulnerable; I think that its rejection in a society of abundance can also be justified on psychological, sociological, political, and even pragmatic grounds. It could become increasingly important in an automated society, which requires a continual redefinement of the concept of being human as opposed to a computer or machine.

Bichat's physiological doctrine of inequality penetrated the social thought of the nineteenth century and became part of a general conception of man and society. He produced a trinary division into brain man, sensory man, and motor man, and his vitalist theory allowed for only a quantum of energy in each individual. In each type one dominant faculty was capable of great development, while the other two were destined to remain feeble, and no man, with the rarest of exceptions, could develop all three faculties to an equivalent degree. Physiologically, men were born limited and restricted and vital energy invariably tended to channel itself into one receptacle rather than the two others.

This parsimonious, deterministic, and assured view of man has some plausibility; it is vaguely confirmed by common experience in that we do assume that human choice is needed between competing activities, that our time and energy is limited. But time means different things to different people and at different times; we have no reason to set advance limits to human creativity or to confine the term "energy" to a purely physical interpretation. William James in The Energies of Men emphasized that we all tend to use less than our potential energies, a point that is perhaps more meaningful to the American, with an energy that seems unbounded to the European. Even if we recognize that no man knows his potential amount of energy, however limited, or its quantitative measure in relation to all expended energies, we are entitled to base the structure of the future society on a rejection, if not reversal, of the static view of human energy,

let alone arbitrary classifications of men and women into human types. The amount of energy in man is at least partly a function of its use, as is confirmed by learning theory. The brain surgeon, Wilder Penfield, has shown that it is just as easy for a child to learn three or even four languages as one, provided they are spoken and taught in appropriate circumstances. The importance of this entire question is considerable in the social structure of the future, in which one of the traditional drives behind the egalitarian principle will be weakened (by GAI) and in which elitist theories and the dominance of experts could do enormous harm.

Fourthly, I recommend that a sacrosanct assumption in all social systems be questioned—that it is always possible to find a correlation between individual worth and any external criterion such as income, possessions, occupation, prestige, power, conformity to social norms or conventional morality. We might define a Golden Age as that in which there was a perfect fit between the external role and the expected qualities or virtues of men in society, when kings were really kings, scholars were really scholars, hierophants and priests and seers and warriors and traders and peasants and all others conformed to the ideal images of their roles. Such a society is unknown to history and belongs to mythology. We have lived, for better and worse, for millennia in the Age of Zeus, in which there is no necessary correlation between role performance and ideal images, in which there has been an enormous and increasing amount of role confusion. It is tempting to go to the opposite extreme and suggest that there is usually an inverse correlation between entitlement and possession of any position of power or responsibility, especially in the United States with its pervasive abuse of all names and its conformist nominalism. We might have to say that X is a scholar though he has a Ph.D., that Y is a statesman though he is President, and so on at all levels. This could make for so much cynicism that we would never come closer to social sympathy, let alone social solidarity.

It is more important to hold that a mature society, like a mature man, will rely upon individual and freely given appreciation of due approval to individuals in different roles rather than upon superficial external signs. Externalization is related to conformity rather than to solidarity and inhibits the growth of individuality, as Durkheim saw. This modification of a generally held attitude could have several implications for the institutional set-up in the social structure of the future. The fewer formal requirements and external honors there are in such a society, the greater the chance of evolving an ethic of responsibility, a concept of intrinsic values, and the emergence of social norms out of the willing if imperfect

recognition by men of their peers and exemplars in a variety of subcultures. This also has a theoretical and practical implication for the emergence of a new type of non-official leadership, the encouragement of voluntary social and political schemes for reform, the devaluation of governmental authority, the gradual discrediting of coercive methods of regulation.

Fifthly, we might consider the replacement of the simple, crudely competitive, and rather juvenile distinction between winners and losers by the idea that all men are givers and receivers in a variety of ways and contexts, that the quest for excellence is more important than rivalry in its achievement in some formal sense. Penalizing the winners and compensating the losers do not help to weaken the distinction between winners and losers. All rules are inevitably arbitrary, and at any rate they will be viewed differently by the winners and losers. A rule-bound society will accentuate inequalities, however much equality of opportunity is achieved.

As involuntary work gives way to a new concept of work, the classical and conventional religious view of work as a burden could be replaced by the attitude of enjoyment and positive fulfillment in work that emerged in the Renaissance. This is connected with the diminution of the importance attached to competitive and comparative assessments, except in relation to a flexible and ever-enriched view of excellence. The distinction between the immature and the mature will not disappear in the society of the future, but it may be hoped that the latter will set the pace and increasingly hold the initiative, provided that the former do not crave positions of political power to compensate for their sense of inferiority. It will be difficult to safeguard against this danger without increasing the role of the psychiatrist to a point that could result in new dangers.

Sixthly, I recommend the abandonment of the principle in all societies, especially in the era of modern nationalism, that an overarching national ideology is needed to maintain the social norms that provide stability and continuity to a social structure. The social structure of the future must incorporate within itself the principle of transcendence if a truly free society is to emerge. This change is perhaps the most difficult to envisage at present, when the United States is becoming increasingly nationalistic and aggressive in world affairs, provoking the rest of the world to agree at least on their increasing anti-Americanism. The change will have to come gradually, but it must come if the idea of a society of abundance is not to become intolerable in a world of misery. The loosening of national ties, consequent upon the dwindling of a national

ideology, will be countered by the strengthened foundations of a new society, a community of communities, a confederation of subcultures. The terms "American" and "American dream" could be redefined and recover the inspiration attached to their original meanings. The "American" would be a man of universal culture, as Whitman expressed it, a "compassionator" and "encloser of all continents" —the continent of Humanity. The "American dream" would refer to a vast social experiment and an example in practical brotherhood to all men and nations.

Seventhly, I wish to add one more ruling principle, which I borrow from Ruth Benedict and Abraham Maslow, the principle of "synergy." (I commend the principle, not the name.) Ruth Benedict distinguished between "high" synergy and "low" synergy:

"Is there any sociological condition which correlates with strong aggression and any that correlates with low aggression? . . . societies where non-aggression is conspicuous have social orders in which the individual by the same act and at the same time serves his own advantage and that of the group. .

Non-aggression occurs [in these societies] not because people are unselfish and put social obligations above personal desires, but when social arrangements make these two identical. . . . I shall speak of cultures with low synergy where the social structure provides for acts which are mutually opposed and counteractive, and of cultures with high synergy where it provides for acts which are mutually reinforcing."

Bellamy would have approved of this principle, but I am not wholly happy with the idea that the person who is selfish necessarily benefits other people (this smacks of an invisible hand, harmony of interests, and all that Keynes devastatingly attacked in The End of Laissez-Faire) and that virtue pays. The problem arises out of the notorious ambiguity of the notions of "interest," "self," and "self-interest." But the principle of synergy, needed by the weak in every society, has a profound corollary, stressed by Maslow: “. . . the secure, high synergy societies had . a siphon system of wealth distribution whereas the insecure, low synergy cultures had . . . funnel mechanisms of wealth distribution. . . . Funnel mechanisms . . . are any social arrangement that guarantees that wealth attracts wealth, that to him that hath is given and from him that hath not is taken away, that poverty makes more poverty and wealth makes more wealth. In the secure, high synergy societies, on the contrary, wealth tends to get spread around, it gets siphoned off from the high places down to the low places. It tends, one way or another, to go from rich to poor, rather than from poor to rich."

This could be the basis of imaginative programs of interchange of materials and personnel between the United States and the rest of the world, provided "rich" and "poor" are understood in non-material as well as material senses, and a new concept of voluntary limitation of wants among the maturer members of society emerges as a check against wasteful and conspicuous consumption.

The social structure of the future could function on the basis of two sets of social norms, connected with two contrary conceptions of social and individual ethics. On the one hand, the authoritarian andsubjectivist and guilt-engendering theories of a non-naturalistic ethic could give way to a new naturalistic ethic which translates the "good" into the vocabulary of mental and psychophysical "health," a Paracelsian view of wholeness and a post-Freudian view of "maturity," as developed by the humanistic psychologists. This would enable us to view deviants and delinquents as candidates for compassionate therapy, while recognizing that even the most "mature" may need temporarily to go into retreats to sublimate, or to permissive places to work off, their own deviant tendencies. On the other hand, a supra-social or universally appealing ethic (in Bergson's sense) could evolve on the basis of the superogatory acts of courage and compassion of "heroic" and "saintly" individuals. In this ethic the "good" would be connected with a new concept of "honor" and "chivalry" and noblesse oblige, which could "shame" thoughtless individuals into an inward recognition of their neglected moral potentials.

Given these ruling principles, how can we visualize the rules and institutions of the society of the future? How would all of them be fused into a single vision of the social system?

I propose, for convenience, a distinction between private time, communal time, and civic[18] time in the life of every citizen, corresponding to a similar division in regard to space (that would be the basis for ecological and urban-cum-rural planning), and a similar division in regard to education, work, and leisure. Civic time is what the citizen owes to the government in return for the GAI. Communal time will be divided between voluntary and creative work performed in voluntary professional associations, and leisure-time activities and discussions under thé auspices of voluntary clubs and societies of various sorts. Private time will be devoted entirely to contemplative and creative tasks performed in solitude or in small families.

[18] The term is here used differently from conventional or classical usage.

There must be the maximum possible flexibility in the proportions of civic, communal, and private time at any point in the life of any citizen. Every person must contribute a minimal share of civic time duringthe early and middle periods of his life. Everyone must be encouraged to have some private time throughout his life and be offered a variety of incentives to give some communal time in the neighborhood as well as abroad. Educational facilities could be used during communal time, civic time wherever and whenever possible, and private time if desired. Those who wished to concentrate their energies, for a period, on civic or communal or private time must be allowed to do so, as far as possible. As a result, people will be free to augment their purchasing power (within broad limits determined partly by the supply and demand for goods and services, partly by the investment needs of the economy, and partly by the needs of foreign economies, as also by a ceiling to ensure social justice), their educational equipment, their chosen creative skills, their share of civic responsibilities, their leisure-time activities, their desire for privacy, their services to their families.

All of this points to a degree of freedom and flexibility incompatible with the amount of control that we have come to regard as indispensable to social survival. But, in practice, our approximation to this model will depend upon the extent to which a substantial number of citizens balance their concern with individual claims to freedom against a willingness to consider the claim of the community upon them.

Can even the organization of industry be dominated by the desire to serve, not the desire to be served? Psychologically, the desire to serve a community may be a late development, but the "instinct" to serve persons is as much rooted in the desire for self-expression as the instinct of self-preservation. The impulse to serve persons, first displayed in the family, could develop into the desire to serve a community. But even if the desire to serve is strong enough to dominate self-seeking, several questions arise. Will the free service of those engaged in industry allow sufficient freedom of choice to those who need their services? Will a bureaucracy of industrial organizations rule us for our good but without regard to our own conceptions of what is good? Clearly, we must envisage some control of industry by the persons served, by composite authorities representing both consumers and producers. On the other hand, a special virtue of the model is its allowance of individual claims to development in activities not needed by other individuals or communities.

The entire model rests upon the psychological assumption that as citizens mature into individuals, the very process of individuation involves

their recognition of the claims of other individuals and of communities as well as their concern with transcending themselves and also the claims of society. This assumption is indeed crucial to my vision of the social structure of the future. In practice, it requires an emphasis upon the continuance of the family in the future, possibly in an altered form anticipated by present trends. Why this connection between a psychological assumption and an institution traditionally regarded as natural but increasingly viewed as wholly social and dispensable? The answer is simple. The strength of the model of the future society lies in the extent to which the principle of voluntariness is enthroned. But, as a great deal depends upon whether this principle will generate the desire to serve the community (to a greater degree than in an acquisitive society of scarcity), the family acquires a new and important role. To call it a natural institution is to stress not only that it fulfills biological needs but also that a man does not choose his parents and relatives and that he has a psychological bond with his wife and children that is not wholly severed by a formal forfeiture of that bond. As a social institution, which need not be an iron cage, the family is an instrument of "socialization" that enables an individual to gain an awareness of other men, that helps him to choose his many voluntary relationships. This role acquires a new meaning when the economic function and the inescapable character of the family are undermined. But the continuance of the family will require that the distinction between the sexes (on the basis of child-bearing and child-rearing, apart from other criteria) must be taken into account in the allocation of private, civic, and communal time, just as the difference between children and adults and other distinctions in terms of physical and social handicaps must also be considered.

A crucial feature of the model is that communal time will be employed not only in creative work but also in informal associations. This is the immense opportunity afforded by the enormous increase in leisure consequent upon the enactment of GAI. The arts of friendship, participation in new forms of folk activities and play-activities, and of conversation and dialogue are the casualties of the present industrial society. They are the lost arts and they could be vital in the new society, giving it a richer way of life than is now known to Americans, helping to transform a seeming utopia into a high culture and a true civilization. The great ages of achievement in world history reflected a fortuitous clustering of creative individuals, a high degree of social and especially intellectual mobility, the confrontation and eventual fusion of diverse world-views and personal philosophies, the concentration of common energy on pervasive

and transcending themes, the magical release of imagination from the ruts of conformity and effete tradition, the free flow of persons and ideas. The art of conversation requires that each member of a voluntary group is judged by his individual value and not as a member of a class or race or status group. As centers of extended conversation arise, the issues of deepest concern to men – the ultimate questions of life – can be explored with a degree of freedom that organizations with formal and partisan allegiances cannot allow — "academic" or "political" or "vocational" or "religious."

In envisioning the social structure of the future, I have tentatively offered several fundamental ruling or saving principles and I have also suggested the merest hint of a possible "model." The principles raise numerous questions of theoretical and practical importance that need to be considered before concrete institutional possibilities could be elaborated. The broad, vague, and embryonic outlines of the future social system have been deliberately couched in abstract terms so that the "logic" of one possible model, embodying several unorthodox principles, could be intimated. Many gaps remain; many questions are unanswered and some are unanswerable. To the extent that the vision is utopian, it never has been and it never will be a concrete reality. To fail to see this is to be unaware of what is involved in the exercise of creative imagination. In the course of pursuing utopias, the dreams of men did not materialize, but something materialized that was the consequence of the dreams taking the form they did. It is only small-minded men who have imagined that the dreams and visions of men necessarily turn into nightmares. The consequences of utopias cannot be conclusively established for there is no way of knowing the gap in awareness between those who envisioned utopias and those who tried to translate them. Idle dreams are like those of Gonzalo in The Tempest— they merely reflect the goodness of heart, the childhood longings of the Gonzalos of this world, and may their tribe increase! Prophetic visions represent the triumph of hope over experience. They recognize the truth in the forgotten line of Miranda ("O brave new world/ That has such people in it") , and are nothing less than an act of faith in man, not in societies, still less in institutions.

If the model hinted at in this paper is elaborated, the crucial question for predictive guesses will be the relation between the private, communal, and civic sectors. In terms of the premises (some unstated) underlying the model, the communal sector has the highest visible priority, the private sector is causally (and invisibly) the most important, and the civic sector must "wither away" in glamour, if not in fact. In a deeper sense, it is

incompatible with the ruling principles of the model to talk in terms of sectors except for convenience. But, in practice, the major problem of the new society, which must grow out of an unregenerate past, is likely to be in relation to the civic sector. If the future rulers of this society are even more unwise than the rulers of our time, this paper is a warning against the danger of subordinating the private and communal sectors to the civic sector while pretending to do the opposite. Present trends in this country suggest that the "deception" of the people, especially of the young and the downtrodden, will be more and more difficult in the future. Many of the institutions of this society have begun to suffer from the first symptoms of a process of creeping paralysis. There is a loss of stimulus and failure of response; a kind of arteriosclerosis has set in, and, more and more, energetic minds must turn elsewhere for sustenance and inspiration. It is increasingly difficult to fool more and more people most of the time. If the future rulers of this society are no more unwise than at present, they will see the need for a new balance between the private, communal, and civic sectors. But if this society is fortunate to find future rulers wiser than any before, they will allow the civic sector less and less priority than the communal and private sectors while appearing to do the opposite or, better still, to do nothing.

This is a presumptuous offering and the inquisitive might wish to know more about its unstated premises. The answer to such was given by Goethe's Faust:

> Who may dare
> To name things by their real names? The few
> Who did know something, and were weak enough
> To expose their hearts unguarded—to expose
> Their views and feelings to the eyes of men,
> They have been nailed to crosses—thrown to flames.

This need apply only to the unstatable premises. Several of them were articulated a long time ago, and are shrouded in the myths and mists of antiquity, notably in Plato's account in Protagoras. In their concern for the preservation of the species of human beings, the gods charged Prometheus and Epimetheus with the task of equipping them and allotting suitable powers to each. Epimetheus begged Prometheus to allow him to do the distribution himself, and he acted on a principle of compensation, being careful by various devices that no species should be destroyed. Epimetheus was not a particularly clever person, and the task fell to Prometheus. He

stole from Hephaestus and Athena the gift of skill in the arts, together with fire, for without fire it was impossible for anyone to possess or use this skill in the arts. With these stolen gifts men could survive, but had no political wisdom. Prometheus, therefore, gave to man Hephaestus' art of working with fire, and the art of Athena as well. But as men still lacked the political wisdom to live in communities without injuring one another, Zeus sent Hermes. He imparted to men the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice, so as to bring order into our cities and create a bond of friendship and union. The gifts of Hermes were distributed to all men and not only to a few, as in the arts. What Protagoras omitted to mention was the greatest of all gifts – only it was not given and it could not be stolen, it had to be won by secret striving – the gift of Orpheus. If, with Epimethean hindsight and Promethean foresight, we could prepare for the society of the future, a society in which the gifts of Hephaestus, Athena, and Hermes are wisely used, Orpheus may well appear again on earth.

DISCUSSION

McDonald: My major critical question of Mr. lyer goes to his optimism. He is persuaded not that man will in fact triumph over the machine, over manipulation and depersonalized organization, but that he is not helpless, that he has the power to triumph. Abstracted from the concrete human condition, man does possess the power to control his life, but taken in his present human condition he finds it difficult if not impossible to summon the requisite reformist vision and will. I believe Mr. lyer must do more than assert the hope. He says, "As long as the control of the apparatus in modern industrial society requires free agents, rational discourse cannot be wholly eliminated." This is narrow ground indeed on which a stand can be made for optimism, or at least against pessimism.

I'm also inclined to question his statement that "In envisaging a new social structure, we may think of progress only as the continuous extension of the area of opportunity for decision and experiment and fulfillment." An added criterion of progress is actual human achievement of fulfillment. But that would be a test of the person, not of society. Social progress does, in fact, consist in the enlargement of human opportunity; if it goes beyond that, it constitutes a threat to human freedom.

Mr. lyer expresses the hope that in the future society a "new concept of voluntary limitation of wants among the maturer members of society" will emerge as a "check against wasteful and conspicuous consumption." There is no question that voluntary human action is preferable on all counts to coercedaction. But mustn't we always be prepared to compel that

which individuals refuse to do voluntarily for the common good? Is the reliance on voluntary virtuous actions based on anything more substantial than desire? Mr. lyer seems to suggest that the emergence of "heroic" and "saintly" individuals performing "superogatory acts of courage and compassion" may give us a "universally appealing ethic" in which the "good" would be connected with a new concept of "honor" and "chivalry" and noblesse oblige, and that this could shame "thoughtless individuals into an inward recognition of their neglected moral potentials." Certainly the example of men like Schweitzer, Gandhi, Pope John XXIII, justifies confidence in the ability of good men to radiate goodness. But the fact that as astute and perceptive a man as Mr. lyer must pin his hopes, apparently, on the random appearance of saintly men is an indication, I believe, of the magnitude of the difficulty in creating a social structure that will fulfill rather than crush the human spirit in the years ahead.

Weisskopf: Mr. lyer's paper is structured around a triad of antinomies: the antinomy between a hierarchical society, on the one hand, and the flexible society, on the other hand; the antinomy between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa; and, third, the antinomy between the social role (or the social function) and self-fulfillment. Although I may be accused of seeing Helen in every woman, like Faust, I seem to find in these antinomies the idea of balance that I have proposed. Practically everything points to balance between them. For instance, the hierarchical society and the flexible, democratic, mobile, egalitarian society are both extremes; the society of the future – the utopian society – may have to combine the two systems. As for the antinomy between the social function, or role, and the idea of fulfillment, I think that, on the whole, modern sociological and sociopsychological theory has made too much of the split between the individual and society. The split stems from the old libertarian ideology, the laissez-faire ideology, where the individual rebelled against medieval restrictions. Today we know that it is very difficult to distinguish what are we and what is society. The conflict is more internal, more within us, than between us and society. The rules and commands of society become part of us so that we come to feel that we want what society wants us to want. There is no society, future or past, that can really avoid this conflict, because every society will provide an outlet for certain human inclinations, aspirations, orientations, and traits, and will repress, suppress, and alienate the individual from others. The problem is only this: In what direction should we work to change our institutional system so that it permits a manifestation of certain now repressed and alienated traits? Here we work in the direction of the vita contemplativa, which has been

repressed at the expense of the vita activa, especially in science, technology, and industry.

Let me deal briefly with Mr. lyer's discussion of what I have called ontological scarcity. In this connection Mr. lyer refers primarily to the restrictive interpretation of ontological scarcity that he finds in Durkheim and in Bichat—that human energy is limited and thus justifies and requires specialization. We have moved away from this idea. We know today that fulfillment consists in more than specialization; it consists in getting out of the groove into which society has put us. To me this does not completely nullify the idea of ontological scarcity. The basic Aristotelian distinction remains valid: Man is a being who is aware of potentialities. This is perhaps the most important characteristic, but there are also imagination, thought, memory; man can transcend his existing, given situation, as the plant and the animal cannot, although at the same time he is bound by his physical, psychological, and social traditions to a restricted, limited actuality. The clearest evidence of this is the limitation of our lives and the limitation of our energy, not in the sense that we could not learn much more than we do, not that we couldn't have a wider horizon than we have, but that there is an end to it somewhere. This ontological situation will always present us with the economic problem of allocating our limited time and our great, but still limited, energy.

It is of great importance to recognize that there is a continuous changing relationship between what people think they are, and what they think their roles are. There have been societies and social structures in which the two have coincided closely, though never completely. In the high cultures – the high middle ages, the great Mandarin period of China, the great era of India – they probably overlapped verymuch. Today what a person thinks he is and what his social role is move further and further apart, and the tension between the two becomes greater. This cannot be avoided, and I don't think it should be avoided, because this gap is really the chief motivation in the dynamics of history, and itself leads to change and, if one may use the word, to progress.

Allen: I have several questions. Mr. lyer, you reject the static view of energy and contemplate that there may be the prospect of man's infinite growth and development. Are you suggesting something similar to what Bellamy suggests, that is, an increase in the spiritual powers of man? I'm, of course, aware that you're not suggesting that a child can learn not three, but thirty, languages—there does come a limit. But are you indicating the possibility of very great development of the psychic powers of mankind?

You speak about the danger of the domination of the civic element in the new society over the communal and the private. How is this going to be prevented? You say it will depend on the wisdom of the rulers of the future. But must it not be prevented by some shaping of the institutional means, by focusing on the democratic process and enhancing it, by enlarging the number of those who will participate in the decisions of government? What are the means to assure us there won't be the domination of the civic?

You suggest that there will not be the same hierarchical arrangements in the utopian society. But won't there still be different segments in the new society—those who are equipped to understand the science, the technology, and those who are not so equipped but who will simply participate in the private and communal segments of the society? If this will be the fact, won't there inevitably be social status as a consequence of this and a continuing hierarchy? lyer: I would say simply that my paper reflects my possibly excessive belief in the therapeutic effect of awareness. I think that when one sees a problem clearly, sees certain things for what they are, their hold over us is less. People are beginning to see through a lot of things; their trouble is that they don't know whom to blame. And if they don't know whom to blame, then, of course, they're confused and have no clear vision of what they can do. This is why vision is so very important. There may even be differences in social status, but they need not be incorporated into a rigid hierarchy, if the differences are seen merely as the by-product of human diversity. And, in relation to your question about the civic sector, I strongly reaffirm that the whole paper would be nonsense if this was left only to the rulers. It is really up to people who, thinking along these lines, will take the initiative away from the State, and not merely influence State decisions. The whole concept of nonofficial leadership is crucial. Even today it's amazing how much freedom one has in our society if one really tries to do something.

American society could benefit from a characteristic of the English people: a good-humored contempt of politicians and bureaucrats. How do we get these people to take themselves less seriously? I think, by behaving toward them as if they are not what they think they are. This is implicit in a dialogue with people in power. It also means a growth of unofficial activity. There will always be the danger of a ruler who will use his power to do the things we fear, but to watch out for this is a function of social opinion; in short, people get the government they deserve.

Dyckman: Let's suppose that the disenfranchised— the Negro civil rights movement, the beats, the New Left, and so on—by some accident

inherited the central city and defeated the rationalization of civic politics. And suppose they sought to create a democratic utopia along the lines of their present perspectives. I think they might produce a medieval city; in other words, a democratic — along limited lines — kind of utopia, but not a technocratic utopia. I say this because the thrust of these critics has been anti-technocratic. They are antagonistic to the whole system of rationalization that technology goes through. They object to the human cost and the casualties in the efficiency processes. They also object to the indirectness of these processes; they object to the ethic of postponed gratification, if you like. They object to the assignment of roles that lead to depersonalization. They object to the appetite that technological systems have for normalizing. They object to the premium placed on other-directedness,but they also object to the excessive rewards for inner-directedness.

In view of all this, how would we advise critics of the system to organize the citizens for the tasks in the city of the future? What would replace the efficiency systems, and on what would they be based? What new norms would be developed? How much hierarchical ordering would be necessary?

lyer: I'll just say two things. One is the question of people in this kind of model who want to opt out totally. To me, the idea is very attractive that every society should permit individuals to be outlaws, vagrants, tramps, peripatetic persons, and yet it is a fact that this happens less and less in human history. It was accepted in old cultures. In England, for example, the tramps were ignored by the police until a few years ago, even though there were rules against them. There will always be such people, and more tolerance must be shown to them. If they become a nuisance, they should be given some kind of territory. But the more important case concerns not tramps and vagrants but the ones we think of as genuine radicals. They are very few. Generally they care more about changing society than about themselves. What can they do to make civic work attractive? This is one of the crucial questions in the model. My feeling, on the whole, is, let civic work be disagreeable. Let the people who really can't do anything else, those conventional people who always need to rely on the big machine, let them become the bureaucrats, let them run the machine. The people who enjoy doing this sort of thing are the people who really can't do very much else. This is tolerable provided that outside the civic sector the really important things go on, the things that ought to concern radicals. One of the important matters outside the civic sector – and this is, I think, your main question —is the industrial part of the communal sector – new kinds

of craft activities, various kinds of even complicated industrial activities. The problem, of course, is how to organize this kind of industry in a socially satisfactory manner. Can we envisage a non-hierarchical organization of large-scale industries? Delisle Burns thought we can. Scott Bader has experimented in this direction. It is a matter for careful study. I haven't gone into this, but it must be done. Davis: The retreat from politics that we are experiencing today mirrors our own impotence. It mirrors a situation in society where people are increasingly free to act but where, increasingly, their acts are separated from any consequence or effect. It also mirrors their isolation from the apparatus of decision-making. One of the most interesting questions of our day is how the technological revolution might expand the possibility of human freedom, the possibility of greater participation in politics that might transform the nature of politics itself.

The Athenian polis is frequently used as a prism, as a mirror. It was the first learning society, the first one in which contemplation became a virtual mode of life. On the other hand, it was also the first politically participating society. The Greeks felt that freedom consisted in being freed of having to work for your subsistence. Freedom was participation in society; it was man becoming historical; it was involving himself. It was making decisions and molding them as a man. Even when Mr. lyer was posing the antagonism between the civic and the communal spirit, he was proposing a solution, and that is the extent to which the civic can become communal. He suggested one basis for this – the notion of decentralization. Politics based upon voluntary association, which I assume to be something similar to the grass-roots organizations that are the prime political motif of the civil rights movement, could create a whole new form of politics. People retreat from politics because it is no longer effective. Perhaps through some new merger of the communal and civic we might again see politics as the whole spirit of man's control over his environment, over his society, although there would always be a provision for opting out.

The final implications have to do with education. Donald Michael's report to the Center on cybernation[19] poses some thoroughly horrific views of the future: the gradual exclusion of people from information because the information has grown too complex and too technical for them to handle; the creation of new elites. Under these circumstances the right sort of education should not deal with the technical content or with specialization

[19] "Cybernation: The Silent Conquest," 1962.

but with the restoration of the media, the restoration of public access to information. Education would concern itself with the use of the premises of science and a knowledge of the alternatives. One of the implications of the technological revolution is that for the first time society has alternatives open to it. For instance, by abolishing labor, it might be possible to return to crafts. If alternatives and options like this are going to be open to us, they make politics more necessary than ever.

ALTRUISM AS A WORLDVIEW BASIS FOR THE BASIC INCOME CONCEPT

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The world has become much richer and more productive, but it has not become more stable and happy. At the same time, technologies designed to improve our lives are actively evolving, and sufferings, diseases, wars and crisis are growing exponentially.

The lack of effectiveness of attempts to solve this problem, based on purely economic, political and social perspectives, demonstrates the need to find solutions in the field of worldview issues.

Why are we coming into this world? The answer to this question raises another question. Who are we and what is our mission in the living space of the planet and the Universe? As we are biological creatures that occupy the appropriate link in the natural world, our goal is to sustain our existence and continue in the next generation. That is, to restore oneself. So do plants or animals. Their species have been unchanged for centuries and millennia. But they consume just enough to sustain their existence. They do not eat excessively, and do not destroy other species of animals, almost if they are predators. The instinct of self-preservation and procreation (the two basic instincts that are inherent in man) urge animals to direct their lives to seek and consume food. So matter exists, by virtue of its imperfection, as a form due to empirical conditions, it constantly